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Abstract  
Contemporary debates over intellectual property (“IP”) generally 
evidence positions that appear to line up at opposite ends of the same axis, with 
one side arguing for more rights for IP owners under each major regime – patent, 
trademark, and copyright – and the other side arguing for fewer.  Approaching 
from what some may see as a “more” IP view, this paper offers the 
counterintuitive suggestion to consider abolishing one of these IP regimes – 
copyright, at least with respect to the entertainment industry, which represents 
one of that regime’s most commercially significant users.  This realization is in 
fact consistent with the underlying view because the view is not accurately seen as 
even being directed to the “more” or “less” debate; and instead is focused on 
means as much as ends.  In keeping with this means-directed approach, the paper 
provides the first comprehensive analysis of IP regimes using the set of tools from 
the field of new institutional economics.  In so doing the paper offers the first 
normative case for IP that connects the path breaking literature on the theory of 
property rights generally with the seminal theories of the firm, transaction costs, 
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and agency costs.  Underlying this paper’s stark departure from both the “more” 
and “less” bodies of the IP literature is the realization that the institutional 
structure of the present copyright regime may make the social costs of the present 
copyright regime too high, for at least the entertainment industry, while at the 
same time preventing it from providing the coordination benefits an IP regime 
normatively should provide.  Building on this, the paper begins to explore for the 
first time whether the recent patent and trademark regimes have institutional 
structures that may allow them to provide these coordination benefits better, and 
with lower social costs.  The paper thereby suggests how the patent and 
trademark regimes of yesterday may obsolete the copyright system of today.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of IP theory and 
comparative outline of IP regimes using the set of analytical tools from the field 
called new institutional economics (“NIE”), which is often associated with the 
path-breaking work on institutions by Robert Fogel and Douglass North, for 
which they were awarded the 1993 Nobel Prize in economics, as well as the path-
breaking work on transaction costs, agency costs, and the theory of the firm by 
Ronald Coase, for which he was awarded the 1991 Nobel Prize in economics.1  In 
so doing, the paper offers the first theory of IP that connects the literatures on 
these seminal theories of the firm, agency costs, and information costs with the 
literature on the emergence of property rights generally.2   
                                                 
1  For more on the Nobel Prize to Fogel and North, see “The Bank of Sweden Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1993,” available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/.  For more on the Nobel Prize to Coase, see “The 
Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991,” available on-line 
at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/.  The term NIE, itself, was coined by Oliver 
Williamson, in OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975) at 1, and the field of NIE owes a great deal to the path-breaking work of 
many important scholars in addition to Williamson, who elucidated the pervasive impact of 
transaction costs across a range of settings from markets and firms to other organizational 
structures and politics. 
2  Although it is of course recognized that this paper will not be the only comprehensive 
treatment of IP theory from the perspective of NIE, and that the paper is not the first to explore IP 
implications of particular aspects of the NIE literature, the approach offered here is significantly 
more comprehensive than prior efforts.  Indeed, the more comprehensive approach taken in this 
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Many of the tools NIE uses to conduct comparative institutional analyses3 
have played a central role in the scholarly debate within property theory about the 
shifts that occur over time among property regimes, generally.4  And there 
certainly have been many shifts in recent time that have occurred within the field 
of IP.5  Yet, the case for or against formal property rights for IP, in particular, has 
largely escaped the attention of the NIE literature, until the present endeavor.6   
                                                                                                                                     
paper is particularly timely given the recent surge in interest in highlighting particular aspects of 
the interface between IP and NIE.  See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) (exploring the importance of IP rights for firms), Mark Lemley, Ex Ante 
versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (framing debate 
about IP rights in terms of timing); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004) (exploring the problems associated with pricing above 
marginal cost for IP); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the 
Boundaries of the Firm (Working paper, June 24, 2004) (available on-line at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195) (connecting IP and the theory of the firm); Clarisa Long, 
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright,  90 Va. L. Rev. 465 2004 (exploring information 
costs).  Indeed, this paper can also be seen as building upon the important foundational essay by 
Robert Merges on the interface between NIE and IP.  Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND L. REV 1857 (2000) (seventeen-page essay 
elucidating some important lessons from NIE for IP but unlike the present effort not exploring in 
depth each of the problems studied by NIE and not connecting integrating them into an 
overarching theory of IP).   
3  For a detailed discussion of these tools see infra Part II.   
4  See, e.g., Symposium, The Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002) 
(including Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property 
Rights, at S331, Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the 
Optimal Value of an Asset, at S339, Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, at 
S359, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus 
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, at S373, Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the 
Evolution of Property Rights, at S421, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two 
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, at S453, Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys 
and Contracts, at S489, Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public 
Roads, at S515, David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, at 
S545, Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights 
in the United States, at S589, Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American 
Bison, at S609, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition 
between Private and Collective Ownership, at S653).   
5  See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG A. NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE 
NEWMAN, AND F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6-42 (2nd ed. 2001) (reviewing 
history of changes to patent law); WILLAIM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1-120 
(1994) (reviewing history of changes to copyright law); ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. 
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 1-12 (6th ed. 2002) (same); CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 15-27 
(6th ed. 2003) (same); BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL, ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
1-5 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing history of changes to trademark law); FRANK I SCHECTER, THE 
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRADEMARK LAW (1925) (same).   
6  To be sure, several important works explore the case for property rights in IP using 
approaches other than NIE.  See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINVENTING PROPERTY (1993) 
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Prior work by the present author has explored the comparative institutional 
economics of using property rights protected by property rules7 for patents and 
trademarks to facilitate the commercialization of inventions and embodiments of 
goodwill, respectively.8  This commercialization approach is (mistakenly) 
sometimes characterized as simply representing one of two sides within a larger 
debate over intellectual property in which views generally line up at opposite ends 
of the same axis, with one side arguing for more rights for IP owners under each 
major regime – patent, trademark, and copyright – and the other arguing for 
fewer.9   
What is striking in view of this perception in the literature that the 
commercialization theory is a “more property” perspective is that when properly 
understood its NIE approach leads to the counterintuitive suggestion to consider 
abolishing one of these intellectual property regimes – copyright, at least with 
respect to the entertainment industry, which represents one of the most 
                                                                                                                                     
(applying Hagel’s personhood theory as an approach); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (reviewing philosophical approaches); Jeremy 
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 
68 CHI. KENT L. REV. 841, 866 (1993) (same); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, What 
Property Is, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-
05 (2004) (offering a “unified value” approach to property generally).  In addition, as discussed 
more fully in part III, some more recent scholars have made important contributions by starting to 
focus on particular components of the NIE literature, such as information costs, interactions with a 
firm, and marginal cost pricing, and some aspects of the distinction between ex ante and ex post.  
But as also discussed more fully in Part III, none of these projects embraces the set of tools from 
the field of NIE.    
7  The label “property rule” is used here as it is used in the classic Calabresi-Melamed 
framework under which an entitlement is said to enjoy the protection of a property rule if the law 
condones its surrender only through voluntary exchange.  The holder of such an entitlement is 
allowed to enjoin infringement.  An entitlement is said to have the lesser protection of a liability 
rule if it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay some court-determined compensation.  The 
holder of such an entitlement is only entitled to damages caused by infringement.  See Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  But see, Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, 
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE. L.J. 1335 (1986) (offering a “reinterpretation of 
the Calabresi-Melamed framework” under which property rules and liability rules merely 
represent two pieces of a broader “transaction structure” in that they are two different approaches 
for setting forth “conditions of legitimate transfer”).   
8  See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (comparative institutional analysis of patent-enforcing rules) 
[hereinafter “Kieff, Commercializing Inventions”]; F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering 
Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L.REV. 55 (2003) 
(comparative institutional analysis of patent-obtaining rules) [hereinafter, “Kieff, Registering 
Patents”].   
9  See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the 
Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 163, n.10 (2002) (collecting sources on “the larger 
debate about patent scope”).   
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commercially significant bodies of copyrighted works.10  This suggestion is in 
fact consistent with the underlying view because the view is not accurately seen 
as being even directed to the “more” or “less” debate; and instead is focused on 
means as much as ends.  That is, the question explored here is not merely whether 
any particular IP regime should give more or less protection; but rather how well 
the regime operates to achieve its desired goals and what those goals are in the 
first place.  As explained more below, underlying this paper’s stark departure 
from both the “more” and “less” bodies of the IP literature is the realization that 
aspects of the institutional structure of the present copyright regime makes the 
social costs of the present copyright regime too high, for at least the entertainment 
industry, while at the same time preventing it from providing the coordination 
benefits an IP regime normatively should provide.  In contrast, the institutional 
frameworks recently used for the patent and trademark regimes may allow them 
to better provide these coordination benefits, and with lower social costs.  The 
paper thereby opens the door to the exploration of a new industrial organization 
model for the entertainment industry under which the patent and trademark 
regimes of yesterday may obsolete the copyright system of today.   
This paper also stands in sharp contrast to prior efforts to re-evaluate the 
case for IP from first principles.  For example, the leading work by Stephen 
Breyer, which despite having spawned much of the recent literature on the weak 
property side of the debate, reaches a decidedly ambivalent position: “[H]e is 
unable to conclude that copyright should be abolished, but he argues that its 
extension is unnecessary and would be harmful.”11  Similarly, the most recent 
work on copyright by Richard Epstein, which was presented at the same 
conference as this paper, generally supports the present institutional framework of 
copyright law and concludes that when balancing the costs of exclusion versus 
governance “we could conclude that a sensible system of copyright is not such a 
bad trade-off after all.”12  In contrast with those efforts, the comparative 
                                                 
10  To some extent, the use here of the term “property” is somewhat imprecise, which is 
good in providing a short hand introduction to help frame the central theme of the paper, and bad 
in failing, like all short hand expressions, to capture the full complexity of the situation.  The 
approach in this paper may be fairly characterized as an effort to show how using the taxonomy of 
property provided by Henry Smith, patent and trademark function more like exclusion forms of 
property while copyright functions more like a governance form, but all three might be seen as 
property.   See, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).  See also Adam Mossoff, What is Property? 
Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZONA L. REV. 371 (2003) (reviewing theories of 
property).   
11  Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).   
12  Richard Epstein, Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright, University of Chicago Law 
School John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 204 (2d Series), at 40 (citing Richard 
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institutional analysis of this paper reveals how while the patent and trademark 
regimes basically work well in general, the copyright system on balance does not.  
Particularly in light of new technologies, the marginal benefits of the copyright 
regime may be too small to justify its use given the availability of patent and 
trademark regimes, while at the same time the costs of the copyright regime may 
be too great.   
Perhaps more importantly, this paper elucidates why this seemingly 
radical suggestion makes sense by elucidating the important lessons from the field 
of NIE that can be used to best shape the institutional framework for any IP 
regime.  That is, the paper offers a comprehensive theory of IP using the set of 
tools from NIE.  Put simply here for introductory purposes,13 the paper elucidates 
a goal IP can achieve effectively and efficiently.  Through a survey of the NIE 
literature, the paper shows that while IP regimes should not be expected to be 
effective in achieving a reward function or in providing direct incentives for 
specific inventive or creative efforts, they should be expected to be effective in 
facilitating coordination among complementary users of the subject matter 
protected by the regime.  But to achieve this goal efficiently they must be 
designed to mitigate various social costs including transaction costs, coordination 
costs, and public choice costs.  Taking these lessons, the paper then outlines the 
general nature of the economic costs and benefits of the particular features that 
distinguish the relative performance of the different institutional approaches 
offered by the IP regimes of patent, trademark, and copyright.     
In brief, concerning benefits, the commercialization costs associated with 
major copyright-based industries today, such as publishing, film, and television, 
are largely those associated with reputation and business networks (because of 
technological change other commercialization costs for these industries are less).  
Trademark law works well to allow some coordination and some pricing above 
marginal cost of the type necessary to facilitate commercialization of goods and 
services facing such reputation and network costs.  Indeed, if the result in the 
recent Dastar decision had not occurred or were statutorily reversed, even 
copying by competitors could be prevented through actions for false advertising.14  
And major advances in these industries, although likely rare, are eligible for 
patent protection (a new projector, a new chord, etc).15  Thus, patents and 
                                                                                                                                     
A. Epstein, Let “The Fundamental Things Apply:” Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal 
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (2002)). 
13  For more on the lessons of NIE for IP see infra Part III.   
14  See F. Scott Kieff, Contrived Conflicts: The Supreme Court vs. The Basics of Intellectual 
Property Law, 30 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 1717, 1722-26 (2004) (discussing Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23, 123 S.Ct. 2041 (2003) (holding Lanham Act does not 
prevent unaccredited copying of uncopyrighted work)).   
15  See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 728-828 (discussing statutory subject matter).   
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trademarks may provide effectively the coordination benefits needed by these 
industries.16   
Concerning costs, the present copyright system is so complex and so 
rapidly changing that it simply fails to facilitate the private ordering that IP 
regimes can and should deliver.  The copyright statute is essentially a set of large 
collective bargaining agreements struck through a discourse focused on metering 
out an amount of reward as a direct incentive for particular creative efforts that is 
“just right,” and that as a result probably work for the groups who negotiated 
them based on the needs of those groups at that time but they do not easily fit new 
technologies and markets, let alone the needs of all those players who were not at 
that table at the time of the negotiations.  At bottom, the costs associated with the 
system – such as for example transaction costs, coordination costs, and public 
choice costs – are simply too large, and are an affront to private ordering.17   
Put simply, the complexity of modern copyright may prevent the system 
from achieving the coordination benefits IP rights can deliver, which patents and 
trademarks generally do deliver.  In addition, the same complexity of modern 
copyright causes the costs of the system to be remarkably high.  One conclusion is 
that the case today for copyright itself may simply fail.  Put differently, the insight 
explored in this paper shows that the best way for copyright to become even more 
obsolete in view of patent and trademark is for copyright to become even more 
complex than it already is.   
In either case, the paper opens the door to the study of a new industrial 
organization model for the entertainment industry based on patent and trademark, 
rather than copyright.  Far from offering the final word on this model, the paper 
elucidates why it might be rational for individuals in the entertainment industry to 
consider using it individually (which some implicitly may have begun to do 
already), and for policy makers to consider encouraging its use more broadly.    
This paper proceeds in Part II to review the core analytical tools and 
lessons of NIE.  Part III applies these tools to study the normative law and 
economic case for the positive law IP regimes, in general.  Part IV outlines a 
comparative analysis among the institutions of the patent, trademark, and 
copyright regimes and begins to ask whether a sketch of a new industrial 
organization model for the entertainment system could operate using patents and 
trademarks instead of copyrights, while exploring some likely objections to the 
model and suggesting areas of future research.  Part V concludes.   
                                                 
16  This is so even though the subject matter that is protected by each regime is different.   
17  For more on the social costs of copyright see infra Part IV.A.  For more on what is meant 
by the term “private ordering” as used here see infra note 163.   
KIEFF NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT  9 
 
II. A REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS EXPLORED THROUGH NIE  
The field of NIE pays particular attention to the economic significance of 
institutions, as distinct from other factors, such as technology, capital, or labor.18  
As described in North’s Nobel Essay:  
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. 
They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.19 
 
NIE emphasizes the use of comparative institutional analyses to look at the 
different characteristics of institutions and what impact they have on individuals 
and organizations over time.20  The comparative institutional analysis approach of 
NIE teaches us to ask not only what we want, but also which mix of formal and 
informal institutions will work better in achieving our set of goals.   
The approach makes both conceptual and practical sense.  Engaging in a 
comparative institutional analysis makes conceptual sense because the perfect 
institution, like the perfect anything, simply is not achievable.  Every real 
institution will have some problems.  For this reason, institutional choices should 
not be about a singular search for perfection but rather about which sets of 
problems and benefits are best suited to tolerances and needs.  Put differently, it is 
better to compare the particular costs and benefits of actually available options 
than merely to identify problems with any one option and seek to perfect it.  This 
                                                 
18  For a good introduction to NIE, see JOHN DROBAK & JOHN NYE, FRONTIERS OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1997) (volume of papers honoring Douglass North and his 
contribution to the field of NIE). See also THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1990) (survey of NIE, or as Eggertsson refers to it: “neo-institutional economics”); 
Philip Keefer & Mary M. Shirley, Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development, 
in CLAUDE MENARD, INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2000) (collecting sources).   
19  Douglass C. North, Prize Lecture, available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/ /north-lecture.html.  As Coase points out, the field 
of NIE differs from the older field known as “institutional economics” because NIE does more 
than merely highlight the economic impact of institutions as compared with capital, labor, and 
technology.  NIE also develops a research agenda devoted to characterizing this impact.  That is, 
NIE does not just note that institutions matter, or that law matters, NIE endeavors to elucidate how 
institutions matter.  See Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 
(1998).   
20  For detailed explorations of NIE, see EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, 
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS (2003) (reviewing field and collecting sources) and MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARDS A 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001) (applying game theory to comparative 
institutional analysis and NIE).   
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is a theory of the “second-best.”21  The search for perfection is what Demsetz 
calls the “nirvana” fallacy;22 and as Voltaire noted, it is through such searches that 
“the perfect is the enemy of the good.”23   
To be sure, this is not to say that any particular institution, existing or 
otherwise, should not be studied critically or that everything should be left alone.  
Such complacency ignores the countervailing sage warning by John Dewey that 
“the better is too often the enemy of the still better.”24   
At bottom, a core lesson of NIE is that even when there is consensus about 
what the goals of a particular institution should be, the particular choices that are 
made about the details of the institutional framework will have different important 
implications for a number of problems operating on a number of levels.25  On the 
individual level, these problems include, inter alia, those of incentives, rent 
dissipation, information costs, and behavioralism.26  On the interpersonal level, 
these problems include, inter alia, those of transaction costs, agency costs, and 
coordination and private ordering.27  On the institutional level, these problems 
include, inter alia, enforceability of laws and norms, market failures, the 
differences between dynamic and static efficiency or between ex ante and ex post 
considerations, monopoly effects, government failures and public choice, as well 
as public goods problems and the tragedies of the commons and anticommons.28   
                                                 
21  See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total 
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2000) 
(applying second-best analysis in antitrust context); Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic 
Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567 
(1979) (same); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An 
Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (1998) (overview of second best theory); Andrew P. 
Morriss, Implications of Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case 
Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 170-76 (1998) (application to 
administrative law); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (example of early path-breaking work using second-best 
approach); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 
699 (1977) (same). 
22  Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 
(1969) (critiquing the so-called nirvana approach in favor of a comparative institution approach).  
23  VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (“le mieux est l’ennemi de bien:” literally, 
“the best is the enemy of the good,” or colloquially, “the perfect is the enemy of the good”).   
24  Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 315 (1992) (citing John J. 
McDermott, ed, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY 652 (Chicago, 1973)) (“To the economists’ 
plea that ‘the perfect is the enemy of the good,’ we might oppose Dewey’s suggestion that ‘the 
better is too often the enemy of the still better.’”).   
25  For a somewhat more detailed discussion of each of these problems see infra Part II.   
26  See infra Part II.A.   
27  See infra Part II.B.   
28  See infra Part II.C.   
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Because different institutional choices will have different implications – 
positive and negative – for these different problems, NIE teaches why it makes 
sense as a conceptual matter to pay attention to means as well as ends.29  What is 
more, because institutions are essentially endogenous – we can change them if we 
want30 – a comparative institutional analysis makes great sense as a practical 
matter as well.31   
To be sure, each of the problems considered in association with NIE is the 
subject of its own debates and sub-fields within the law, economics, and political 
science literatures; and therefore a full discussion of each is beyond the scope of 
this article.32  Nevertheless, because each refers to phenomena that may be 
understood by a general audience, it is discussed more fully below to provide at 
least some introduction to its relevance to the debates over IP in particular.  In 
addition, while the below discussions of these problems are grouped for 
presentation purposes by the level at which they are most evident, and with the 
recognition that in some respect these groupings are inevitably imperfect, most of 
these problems can be seen to operate on more than one level.   
                                                 
29  For a short and accessible overview of these various problems in the context of NIE see 
Oliver E. Williamson, The Institutions of Governance, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 75 (1998) (collecting 
sources)).  See also Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics:  Taking Stock, 
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 595 (2000) (same).   
30  The term “we” is used here in its broadest sense to refer to people, in general.  Often, 
even groups of people are unable effectively to have particular government agencies or other 
institutions fully incorporate their views.  Indeed, this is one of the problems explored in NIE 
under the topic of “public choice.”  For more on public choice, see infra Part II.C.3. 
31  To be sure, some institutions are harder to change than others.  For example, re-writing 
statutes may not change the behavior of courts, and may also not have the desired effect on norms.  
In the end, the mix of institutions that may be best may depend in part on the institutions that are 
presently at play.  Put differently, path dependency may also be relevant to the comparative 
institutional analysis.  In addition, the field of NIE extends far into the realm of political science, 
where the process of institutional change is well studied.   
32  Indeed, debate continues over even the field of NIE itself, and in particular its relation to 
other fields such as “Law and Economics,” and “neoclassical economics.” For a collection of 
views on the debate over the proper characterization of the field of NIE in relation to the 
disciplines of economics and law, including debates over the particular problems explored by NIE, 
see, generally, Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 
149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 73 (1993)[hereinafter Posner, NIE Meets L&E]; 
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Costs Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., (1993); Ronald H. Coase, Coase on Posner on Coase, 149 
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 96 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Reply, 149 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 119 (1993).  This paper is agnostic about these debates 
and indeed takes as positive the contributions of the many important scholars whose work serves 
as the basis on which the field, by any name, has been built, while endeavoring to highlight each 
of the important themes that have emerged from these debates in the subsections that follow.   
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A. Problems at the Individual Level 
Several of the problems explored by NIE are most evident when 
considering actions or decisions at the level of the individual.33  These include, 
inter alia, the problems of incentives, rent seeking, information costs, and 
behavioralism. Importantly, one of the essential insights that can be taken from 
the field of NIE is that these problems are not unique to individuals acting in 
markets, and indeed also extend to individuals acting in hierarchies, such as firms 
or governments.34  That is, these are problems shared by all individuals, private 
and public.   
1. Incentives 
A basic and consensus lesson of economics is that because individuals35 
have complex agendas, or preferences, and only limited resources available to be 
deployed to achieve the diverse items on these agendas, they must, and do, make 
choices about which agenda items to pursue before others.  The point here is not 
that people are perfectly rational in making such choices; but only that they must, 
and do, indeed make such choices, at least implicitly.36  To be sure, as explored 
by Gary Becker in the path-breaking work extending economic analysis to new 
areas of human behavior and relations for which he was awarded the 1992 Nobel 
Prize in Economics,37 “no approach of comparable generality has yet been 
                                                 
33  The term “individual” is used here in its broad sense to refer to an entity that is acting as 
an individual, thereby including not only a single person, but also a group of people when acting 
as a group, such as a firm or government agency.   
34  Leading scholars who have studied these effects in what many might view as the private 
sector – studying interactions within and among firms and in other financial or business settings – 
include Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson.  Leading scholars who have studied these effects in 
what many might view as the public sector – studying interactions between voters and elected 
officials, within and among government agencies, and in other political settings – include James 
Buchanan, Randy Calvert, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast.  Many leading scholars made 
path-breaking contributions to both sides, including Kenneth Arrow (information, regulation) 
Milton Friedman (regulation, price), and George Stigler (economics of information and economics 
of regulation).  For an excellent bibliography on NIE see, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 
497-538.   
35  For the broad definition of individual used herein see supra note 33.   
36  See generally, Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000) 
(reviewing limits of rational choice theory).   
37  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1992, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1992/press.html.   
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developed that offers serious competition to rational choice theory.”38  Yet, the 
point here is not to take sides in the debate about whether rational choice theory 
fully captures the behavioralism models or whether they are appropriately 
considered somehow distinct.39  Instead, the point is simply to note that 
consideration of incentives, agendas, and resources does make sense because 
people themselves really do consider them, as Becker noted when borrowing an 
aphorism from fellow Nobel Laureate George Bernard Shaw about the general 
tendency individuals have to try to make the most out of their lives: “[e]conomy is 
the art of making the most of life.”40   
An important implication of incentive analysis is that a given individual’s 
agenda is likely to be complex, and for example might include the goals of 
accruing money, fame, relaxation, or other things.  Such an individual will 
regularly make decisions that effectively set priorities among these different 
goals.  As some items on the agenda appear to that individual to be less likely to 
be achieved, the individual will tend to shift focus, or re-prioritize, towards other 
items on the agenda.  For example, if it appears harder to obtain some 
hypothetical goal A than some other hypothetical goal B, then investment in 
achieving A relative to B will decrease.  The complex interaction among agendas, 
resources, information, and decision-making helps explain why actual incentive 
effects may be different than hypothesized.  The true set of relevant parameters 
may not have been accurately perceived, may have changed, or both.   
Even when a particular incentive effect is accurately predicted, the exact 
outcome it induces may be different than expected because of the many of the 
other problems discussed below.  In addition, one problem associated with 
incentives getting too strong, which therefore may be thought of essentially as a 
side effect, is the problem of rent seeking, or rent dissipation, as discussed below. 
The essential lesson when considering incentives for purposes of this 
discussion is that the mere identification of a potential incentive effect does not 
indicate a great deal about its net impact in a real-world situation.  Important 
implications of this lesson will be discussed below in the context of agency 
costs,41 coordination and private ordering,42 public and private institutions,43 and 
IP theory.44    
                                                 
38  Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, in THE 
ESSENCE OF BECKER, 633, 650 (Ramon Febero & Pedro Schwartz, eds. 1995).   
39  For more on behavioralism limitations to rationality see infra Part II.A.4.   
40  See Press Release supra note 37 (citing Becker quoting Shaw).  See also, Gary S. Becker, 
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 38, at 3 
(Becker quoting Shaw). 
41  See infra Part II.B.3.   
42  See infra Part II.B.4. 
43  See infra Part II.C.   
44  See infra Part III.   
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2. Rent Seeking and Rent Dissipation 
Rent is the benefit that is gained by engaging in a certain activity.  Private 
rents are those accruing to the individual.  Public rents are those accruing to 
society as a whole.   
One problem associated with rents is that private and public rents may be 
different.  For example, what an inventor gets for herself often is less than what 
her invention generates for society.45  The potential differences in both magnitude 
and sign between public and private rents can lead to private incentives to engage 
in a given rent-generating activity to be either too little or too big than would be 
socially optimal.  As another example, an inventor may develop something only 
slightly better than available options in a way that turns out to cause waste 
overall.46  Because this particular problem of rents also can be thought of as the 
problem of externalities, it is discussed in more detail in the section on 
externalities below.47 
A related problem associated with rents is that they may provide 
incentives for an individual to engage in efforts designed to gain private rents but 
that may turn out ultimately to dissipate social rents.  This is the problem of rent 
dissipation.  Rent dissipation itself can take at least two forms.  One type of rent 
dissipation involves over investment in the race to obtain the rent.  Another type 
of rent dissipation involves investment in alternative but socially undesirable 
techniques to win that race.   
The most common way to conceptualize the over investment type of rent 
dissipation is in the context of a race towards a common prize.  If the community 
is characterized by a prize having a known value and an uncoordinated group of 
individuals who are each seeking the prize, then each individual might rationally 
elect to spend up to just less than the value of the prize to get it, which would 
mean that as a group they are spending more in aggregate than the value of the 
prize.48  In the context of innovation, the effect has been demonstrated by 
                                                 
45  See STEVEN SHAVELL AND TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6956, 1999) 
(suggesting a system of government-sponsored cash rewards instead of or in addition to a system 
of patents as a tool for improving the match between the private and public rents associated with 
an invention).     
46  A.K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product 
Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977) (showing how it may be profitable for the one firm to 
come to market to get the customers but yet total industry profits can decline by more than 
consumer welfare increases).   
47  For a discussion of externalities, see infra Part II.B.1.   
48  If the value of the prize is X and the group of individuals is Y in number then each 
individual might rationally elect to spend up to just less than X to obtain the prize, say some 
amount equal to X minus a small discount, say İ or (X-İ).  Yet, if all individuals spend that 
amount, then the community has spent the amount equal to [(X-İ) x Y] to obtain something worth 
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economic models of multiple firms seeking the same invention in a race to patent, 
which show that investment overall may be too great.49  Nevertheless, this type of 
rent dissipation may be less of a problem in reality than in theory for a number of 
reasons, especially when it comes to the subject matter covered by IP, as 
discussed in more detail in the discussion of the prospect and rent dissipation 
theories of IP.50 
The most common way to conceptualize the improper alternative 
investment type of rent dissipation is also in the context of a race towards a 
common prize, but this time where some types of racing are viewed by society as 
good (or fair) and others are viewed as bad (or unfair).  In the context of sports, 
for example, the use of practice sessions is often viewed as good while the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs is often viewed as bad.  In the context of regulated 
markets, the use of innovation is generally considered to be a good form of 
competition (making better products or services) while the use of agency capture 
is generally considered to be a bad form of competition (getting the government 
to differentially regulate a competitor).  Because this type of rent dissipation can 
also be thought of as the problem of public choice, it is discussed in more detail in 
the section on public choice below.51  
A central lesson to be taken from the NIE literature on rent dissipation for 
purposes of this discussion is that rent dissipation is a problem that must be 
considered when shaping institutions like IP.  Different institutional frameworks 
can have different implications for rent dissipation.  As discussed in more depth 
below within the context of IP theory, concerns about rent dissipation can be 
addressed by a properly shaped IP regime; but concerns about rent dissipation can 
not totally drive the shaping of such a regime.52   
                                                                                                                                     
only X.  The rub is that the expression [(X-İ) x Y] will be greater than X itself as long as X and Y 
are positive numbers greater than one and İ is a positive number less than one.  Put simply, the 
amount spent in that community as a whole to obtain the prize is greater than the amount the 
community as a whole got by obtaining the prize, which would be a waste of resources.   
49  See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395 (1979) 
(model showing overinvestment under appropriate conditions).  P. Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980) (same). 
50  For a discussion of these theories, see infra Part III.B.   
51  For a discussion of public choice, see infra Part II.C.3.   
52  See infra Part III (discussing limits of the so-called rent dissipation theories of IP but 
pointing out how properly shaped IP regimes can nevertheless mitigate rent dissipation effects).   
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3. Information Costs 
There are a number of significant problems associated with information 
and these are generally referred to collectively as information costs.53  In order for 
individuals to even make the many decisions associated with acting through either 
the market or political processes, they must be able to obtain and use information 
appropriately.  The importance of considering the difficulties in obtaining and 
using information when studying decision-making was elucidated in the path-
breaking work by Herbert Simon, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
economics in 1978.54  
The problems of finding information in the first place – often called search 
costs – were elucidated in the path-breaking work by George Stigler,55 which 
formed part of the foundation for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
economics in 1982.56  In the same work, Stigler elucidated various tools for 
decreasing search costs, including, reputation and advertising.57  Stigler also 
elucidated the problem of using information in his work on statistical inference.58 
As nicely summarized by Oliver Williamson, four other distinct problems 
associated with information were elucidated in the path breaking works by 
Kenneth Arrow, some of which formed part of the foundation for which he shared 
the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972:59  
 
The ways in which information influences economic organization include (1) the 
“fundamental paradox” of information: “its value for the purchaser is not known 
                                                 
53  For an excellent survey of information and uncertainty see Jack Hirshleifer & John G. 
Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 1375, 
1404 (1979) (collecting sources).   
54  See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, Q. J. ECON., at 241 
(1955) (“the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational 
behavior that is compatible with the access to information and computational capacities that are 
actually possessed by … man.”).  See also, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of 
Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1978 (available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1978/press.html).   
55  See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) 
(elucidating the importance of information search costs and various methods for decreasing them 
including, for example, reputation and advertising). 
56  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1982 (available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1982/press.html.   
57  See Stigler supra note 56.   
58  See, e.g., George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 22, J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964) (using 
statistical inference techniques to examine oligopoly).   
59  See Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1972 (available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1972/press.html) (noting Arrow’s work on “decision 
theory”).    
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until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost;” 
(Arrow [1971, 152]); (2) information asymmetry: “the critical impact of 
information on the optimal allocation of risk bearing is not merely its presence 
or absence but its inequality among economic agents” (Arrow [1969, 55]); (3) 
appropriability: “It really calls for some explanation, why the firm that has 
developed the knowledge cannot demand a greater share of the resulting profits” 
(Arrow [1962, 355]; and (4) the distinction between hidden action and hidden 
information problems (moral hazard and adverse selection, respectively) (Arrow 
[1985, 38-48]).60 
 
The problem of the information paradox reveals important reasons why it 
can be difficult for parties to negotiate over information itself and so is discussed 
more fully below in the section on public goods.61  The problem of information 
asymmetry reveals important reasons why it can be difficult for parties to 
negotiate over many types of goods and services.  As elucidated in the path 
breaking work on information asymmetry for which George Akerlof, Michael 
Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics,62 the 
information asymmetry problem includes the problem of adverse selection,63 yet 
there are tools available for mitigating this problem including signaling64 and 
screening.65  Each of these problems is also closely related to the problems 
                                                 
60  Williamson supra note 32, at 112 (citing KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RISK-BEARING, at 152 (1971); Kenneth Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues 
Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in Joint Econ. Comm., 91st 
Cong., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System 47-64, at 55 
(Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter “Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity”]; Kenneth 
Arrow, Comments on Case Studies, and Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources of 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY II: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS (Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Res. eds., 1962) 355, 609; Kenneth Arrow, The 
Economics of Agency, in JOHN PRATT & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS (1985) 
at 38-48).   
61  See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989, 1050-51 (1997) (discussing difficulties in negotiating in connection with Arrow’s 
information paradox); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: 
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 81-82 (1994) (same).  For more on the Arrow 
Information Paradox and the problem of public goods see infra Part II.C.4(a).   
62  See, Press Release: The 2001 Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/press.html.   
63  See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (elucidating the classic example of the adverse selection 
problem known as the “lemons problem”).   
64  See, e.g., A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973) (showing 
how education can serve as a form of signaling for productivity in the job market).   
65  See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976) 
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associated with transactions generally and so are also discussed more fully below 
in the section on transaction costs.66   
The problem of appropriability is closely related to the problem of 
externalities because one way to view appropriability is as a form of positive 
eternality.  As a result, appropriability is discussed more fully below in the section 
on externalities.67   
The problem of information asymmetry also relates to the problems of 
hidden action and hidden information and the distinction between them, which 
arise whenever one is endeavoring to regulate the behaviors of another.  As a 
result, these are discussed more fully below in the section on the theory of the 
principal/agent interaction and in the section on the theory of government.68   
A central lesson to be taken from the NIE literature on information costs 
for purposes of this discussion is that IP rights can operate directly to mitigate 
some information problems – like the Arrow Information Paradox.69  Another 
lesson is that IP rights can operate indirectly to mitigate many of the other 
information problems.  IP rights can achieve this effect through the transactions 
required to negotiate over an IP right to exclude better than the alternatives of 
government regulation through use of liability rules or direct government 
provision through subsidy.   
4. Behavioralism 
The term “behavioralism” refers to all of the ways in which human beings 
are not perfectly rational in decision making and instead are said to be only 
boundedly rational in that they suffer cognitive biases, framing effects, employ 
heuristics, etc.70   While some scholars, such as Posner, have suggested that 
                                                                                                                                     
(elucidating how an uninformed party can give informed parties incentives to reveal pertinent 
information about themselves, a method referred to as “screening”).   
66  For a discussion of transaction costs see infra Part II.B.2.   
67  For a discussion of externalities see infra Part II.B.1.   
68  For a discussion of agency costs see infra Part II.B.3.  For a discussion of government see 
infra Part II.C.3.   
69  See infra Part III (discussing IP theory).   
70  For an excellent recent review of behavioralism literature see, e.g., Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 
(2003) (collecting sources).  As noted by Troy Paredes, “Explaining and understanding these 
deviations from perfect rationality make up the core of [the field known as] behavioral law and 
economics.”  Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 434-444 (2003) (collecting sources)  (citing 
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sustein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1995); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutional 
Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 36; Jennifer Arlen, 
Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765 (1998)).  
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decision-making under conditions of behavioralism can be thought of as same 
thing as perfectly rational decision making in a world of positive information 
costs,71 other scholars, such as Williamson, suggest behavioralism really refers to 
something more complex.72 As explained by Williamson, the problems of 
behavioralism include the problems of situations that simply are impossible to 
think through,73 the problems of misconception, like short-sightedness and 
incorrectly assessing probabilities, the problems of being rushed to make 
decisions,74 and the limitations of language.75  At bottom, according to 
Williamson, an especially productive way to conceptualize the problems of 
behavioralism is taught by Simon as the “idea of the mind as a scarce resource.”76   
Regardless of precise etiology, the problems of behavioralism have a 
number of manifestations.  Decision-making processes reveal strategies that, 
using the terminology of Simon, seek to “satisfice” rather than “optimize;” or in 
the more modern parlance, employ “heuristics,” as explored more recently in the 
work by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Paul Slovic,77 which formed part 
of the basis for which Kahneman shared the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics.78  
Other manifestations include risk and loss aversions,79 and various cognitive 
biases such as primacy and recency,80 framing,81 anchoring,82 and overoptimism, 
                                                                                                                                     
Cf, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551 (1998) (commenting on the behavioralism literature in general and in particular Jolls et al. 
supra); Becker supra note 38.     
71  Posner, NIE Meets L&E, supra note 32, at 80.  This view of behavioralism is consistent 
with the types of information costs described earlier as the costs of obtaining and processing 
information.  See supra notes 54-58, and accompanying text.   
72  Williamson supra note 32, at 109-110. 
73  Id. (citing Herbert Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND 
ORGANIZATION, 161 (C.B. McGuire & R. Radner, eds., 1972)).   
74  Id. (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 
J. LAW & ECON. 453 (1993) (problems of being rushed to make decisions)). 
75  Id. (citing MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY (1962)).   
76  Id. (citing Herbert Simon, Rationality as Process and Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. 
REV., 1, 12 (1978)).   
77  Paredes supra note 70, at 435-36 (citing Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99, 262-64 (1955); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE 
DECISION MAKER 1-2 (1993); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982)).   
78  See, Press Release: The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel 2002, available on line at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/press.html.   
79  For the basic exploration of methods for measuring risk aversion see KENNETH J. ARROW 
ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1965); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and 
in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA, 122 (1964).  
80  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1165, 1169-70 (2003) (“psychologists have found that when individuals are asked to 
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overconfidence, and egocentricism.83  One central lesson on behavioralism from 
NIE is that because it impacts individuals regardless of whether they are in the 
private sector or the public sector, and whether they are acting as individuals or in 
groups, the mere identification of behavioralism as a problem does not alone 
indicate whether decision-making should be left to individuals or not.   
A final dimension of the behavioralism problem that certainly strikes at 
the individual level but essentially is driven by interactions among individuals is 
the problem known as “groupthink.”84  There are several components to the 
groupthink problem.  One involves the heuristic individuals use to avoid having to 
re-think problems that they think already have been thought through sufficiently 
by trusted others, thereby creating what Cass Sunstein describes as an 
“information cascade.”85  Presumably, the opposite effect is also seen, whereby 
the heurist is one of mistrust, not trust, and so the information content takes on the 
                                                                                                                                     
memorize a long sequence of words, they are more likely to remember the first few words (the 
“primacy” effect) and the last few words (the “recency” effect) much better than the words in the 
middle of the list”) (citing EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER & STANLEY E. NYBERG, HUMAN MEMORY: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND THEORY 60-71 (1982) (reviewing research on primacy and 
recency effects in memory)).   
81  For empirical evidence of framing effects see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1983) (framing effects observed in decisions 
involving lotteries and other risky monetary payoffs); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The 
Framing Effect of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (same).   
82  Rachlinski supra note 80 at 1171 (“When making numeric estimates, individuals will 
tend to rely heavily on reference points and then adjust from these reference points”) (citing 
Tversky & Kahneman supra note 81 1128-30 (explaining anchoring and the related process of 
adjustment)).   
83  Rachlinski supra note 80 at 1172 (defining “overoptimism, which consists of 
overestimating one’s capabilities; overconfidence, which consists of overestimating one’s ability 
to predict outcomes; and egocentricism, which consists of overstating the role that one has played 
in events in which one has participated”).  See also Paredes supra note 70, at 481 (“Some of the 
most well-known sources of these deviations from rationality include loss aversion, framing, the 
representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, overoptimism, and overconfidence.”) 
84  See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:  Is CEO Overconfidence the 
Product of Corporate Governance?, at 60, n. 227 (2004) (discussing groupthink in the context of 
corporate governance and as a contributing factor to CEO  overconfidence) (working paper, copy 
on file with author) (citing IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982) and Marleen O’Connor, 
The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003)).   
85  See id., at 12 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 683-691, 720-23 (1999) (describing the problem as one of 
“informational cascades” through which a view cascades through a pool of individuals as each 
individual adopts the view of those believed to be better informed); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
CONFORMITY AND DISSENT, U. CHICAGO LAW & ECONOMICS, OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 164 
(available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=314880)).   
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opposite sign.86  Put differently, a related component, also explored by Sunstein, 
is that individuals may appear to change or even actually change their views and 
behaviors in response to perceived peer pressure.87  As Troy Paredes points out, 
going along may be a particularly attractive strategy, if little else.88  What is more, 
once group think has set in, there may be a lock-in effect, as pointed out by 
Arrow:  
 
[Social and political] agreements are typically harder to change than individual 
decisions.  When you have committed not only yourself but many others to an 
enterprise, the difficulty of changing becomes considerable…89   
 
At bottom, groupthink can have important implications for the way norms 
operate, as discussed below.90   
Finally, an additional component of the groupthink effect is tied to the 
phenomena of fashion.  Sometimes a particular behavior, view, slogan, manner, or 
appearance is desired in its own right, as an affirmative expression of a discrete 
fashion preference – a fashion statement.91  And, as evidenced by the cyclical 
nature of changes over time in width of neck ties or length of skirts, fashion is 
fickle and so the fashion effect may be either to conform to the groupthink or to 
deviate from it.  That is, an individual might either adopt or eschew groupthink as 
an affirmative fashion statement.  Put differently, sometimes the culture is in 
fashion and sometimes the counter-culture is in fashion.  Implications of fashion 
can be particularly important for the IP regime of trademark law,92 as well as for 
the way consumption patterns evolve in the entertainment industry.93   
                                                 
86  To be sure, this opposite component of the effect can be seen to be encompassed by the 
elucidation from Timur and Sunstien, but its express statement here is made simply to make its 
existence clear.   
87  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 85 at 723-725.   
88  See Paredes supra note 84, at 13.   
89  KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION, (1974) at 128.   
90  See infra Part II.C.1.   
91  The desirability of a slogan as a fashion statement in and of itself is tied to a controversial 
issue in trademark law relating to marks that are desired in and of themselves, unconnected to a 
good or service.  For more on this see infra Part IV.A.   
92  See infra Part IV.A (discussing trademark law).   
93  See infra Part IV.B (discussing role of norms in payment systems in the entertainment 
industry).   
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B. Problems at the Inter-Individual Level 
When individuals interact with each other, another set of problems 
explored by NIE become most evident.94  These include, inter alia, the problems 
of externalities, transaction costs, agency costs, and coordination.  As with the 
problems on the individual level discussed above, these problems at the inter-
individual level also are common across all settings:  public and private, and when 
individuals are both atomistic, such as strangers interacting across an open 
market, and within hierarchies, such as firms or governments.95   
1. Externalities 
The term “externality” generally is used to refer to some cost or benefit 
that is external to a given economic decision-making system in that it is not 
factored into the decisions made by that system.  Some definitions in the literature 
seem to define the term in relation to individuals, in that an externality is seen as 
something external to the decision-making of an individual.96  Other definitions in 
the literature see the term as referring to something external to the decision-
making process of the entire market.97 Both uses can be somewhat misleading, 
especially in law and policy discussions, because if the decision-making process 
is working perfectly, then nothing will be completely external to the individual or 
the market.98  This, of course, is one of the insights of the path-breaking work by 
Ronald Coase that contributed to his being awarded the Nobel Prize in economics 
in 1992, and that was labeled by Stigler as the “Coase theorem.”99   
                                                 
94  See supra note 33 (pointing out that the term “individual” is used here to refer to both a 
single person, and a group of people when acting as a group, such as a firm or government 
agency).    
95  See supra note 34 (pointing out that these effects are present in diverse settings).   
96  See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 423 (3rd ed. 1992) (“When the 
actions of one agent directly effect the environment of another agent, we say that there is an 
externality”) (emphasis in original).   
97  ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 297, 617 (1989) 
(“Such costs or benefits are called externalities because they are ‘external’ to the market.” “In this 
chapter we study externalities – the effects of production and consumption activities not directly 
reflected in the market”) (emphasis in original).   
98  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 71 (6th ed. 2003) (“Even if 
‘externality’ is defined as external to the market process or decision rather than to the [individual], 
it is still a potentially misleading usage since if transaction costs are low the market may operate 
efficiently despite the apparent presence of externalities.”) 
99  See supra note 1 (discussing Nobel Prize to Coase).  See also, RONALD COASE, THE 
FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157 (1988). (“I did not originate the phrase, the ‘Coase 
Theorem,’ nor its precise formulation, both of which we owe to Stigler.”); GEORGE J. STIGLER, 
THE THEORY OF PRICE, 113 (3d ed. 1966) (coining the term “[t]he Coase theorem” writing that it 
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But the real power of the Coase Theorem is not that the problem of 
externalities is illusory because decision-making in the real world is perfect.100 
Real decision-making, like everything else in the real world, is not perfect.  
Instead, the Coase Theorem teaches that the problem of externalities is entirely 
reciprocal and that the tough questions facing any real decision-making process 
are essentially how to best determine what the “correct” decision is, and how best 
to implement it.   
A brief review of the historical context of the Coase Theorem elucidates 
the point.  In the early 1900’s the economist Arthur Pigou wrote about factory 
chimney soot as a problem of externalities imposed on others in the environment 
around the factory and argued that the proper use of taxes or subsidies could be 
used by the government to encourage such individuals to properly account for the 
benefits and harms they project on those around them.101  According to Pigou, 
“resources devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys” provide an 
“uncompensated service,” or what some would call a positive externality, while 
smoke “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community,” or provides what 
some would call a negative externality.102   
Coase was responding to Pigou by showing that government taxes or 
subsidies were not needed to ensure the perfect amount of externalities because 
under appropriate conditions, such as zero transaction costs, etc., a well defined 
allocation of entitlements among those impacted – in the case of the soot, either a 
right to emit it or a right to be free from it – would ensure that they traded with 
each other to achieve the same perfect result sought by Pigou.103     
Coase continued by pointing out that of course the world is not perfect and 
therefore not all potential exchanges will occur, due to the presence of transaction 
costs and other imperfections.104  As a result, he urged that there be consideration 
of overall net costs and benefits to the alternative initial allocations, including the 
costs of any subsequent transactions that might be needed, with an eye towards 
ensuring that that the entitlement to the resource be allocated in such a way that 
                                                                                                                                     
“asserts that under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal” and citing Ronald 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).   
100  See generally COASE supra note 99, at 157-186 (1988) (responding to a number of 
common misperceptions regarding the Coase Theorem).   
101  See generally, ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 166-68 (1920).  See 
also, ARTHUR C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912).   
102  PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, supra note 101, at 160-61.   
103  See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 105-6.   
104  Id. at 115 (and noting that because of transaction costs “the initial delimitation of legal 
rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates”).   
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the resource itself would most likely end up at its highest and best use.105  The 
essential policy implication on this point is therefore to compare carefully real 
costs and benefits of available institutional arrangements – such as different 
entitlement allocations, enforcement rules, or taxes and subsidies.106   
For example, Coase’s work laid an important part of the foundation for the 
later work by Harold Demsetz on the emergence of property rights as a tool for 
internalizing positive externalities.107  Demsetz argued that property rights emerge 
when the benefits of internalization outweigh its costs – when the good of 
concentrating benefits and costs on owners so they deploy resources more 
efficiently outweighs the bad of the transaction costs associated with recognizing 
those rights.108  As Demsetz pointed out 
 
Because of the lack of control over hunting by others, it is in no person’s interest 
to invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of the game.  Overly intensive 
hunting takes place.  Thus a successful hunt is viewed as imposing external costs 
on subsequent hunters – costs that are not taken into account fully in the 
determination of the extent of hunting and of animal husbandry.109    
* * * 
The resulting private ownership of land will internalize many of the external 
costs associated with communal ownership, for now, an owner, by virtue of his 
power to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards associated 
with husbanding the game and increasing fertility of his land. 110  
 
Put differently, with the lack of property rights, “the underuse of animal 
husbanding and land management resources (skills and labor) led to near 
                                                 
105  Id. at 132 (arguing that we should ask “whether the gain from preventing the harm is 
greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which 
produced the harm”).   
106  Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-Colored Glasses: A Property Rights View of Natural 
Resource Economics, Distinguished Fellow Address presented to Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society, 13 February 2004, at 8 (copy of manuscript on file with author) 
(“Following Coase’s lead, we need to carefully examine the institutions”).   As a qualitative 
example, consider that the costs of using a government tax or subsidy approach include public 
choice costs, and administration costs, while the costs of using an entitlement delimitation 
approach include transaction costs and enforcement costs.   
107  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356 
(1967) (explaining the emergence of property rights in land among Labradorian Indians as a 
response to over hunting: “an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, can generally count 
on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding the game and increasing fertility of his land”).  
For more on the emergence of property right see infra notes 173-178, and accompanying text.   
108  Id. at 353 (noting that property rights did not emerge among those living on the southwest 
plains because the benefits would have been less since there were no animals of commercial 
importance comparable to the furry animals of the north whose pelts were tradable and because 
the costs would have been more since the animals that were there tended to wander more).   
109  Id. at 351.   
110  Id. at 356.   
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exhaustion of animal resources (food and clothing) . . . [while the presence of 
property rights] provided incentives for individuals to make more use of the one 
set of resources so as to not waste, and indeed to replenish, the other.”111  Thus, 
one lesson on externalities is that the use of appropriate property rights can be an 
effective tool for avoiding what otherwise might be externality problems.  
Importantly, as discussed in more depth below, property rights can also do much 
more than internalize externalities.112 
A second lesson on externalities is that the words “positive” and negative” 
are both reciprocal.113  That is, in the case of the negative externality of soot, for 
example, the factory’s neighbor would see a potential interference with the right 
to use the air as a reservoir free from emissions while the factory side would see a 
potential interference with the right to use the air as a reservoir in which to place 
the emissions.    In this sense, there is no such thing as “an externality,” in the 
singular, because externalities only come in pairs.   What this means for the 
externality analysis is that it must be studied from both angles, with the 
understanding that otherwise the attractiveness of different institutional responses 
may likely turn on the angle from which the problem is viewed.   
A third lesson on externalities is that in the real world many externalities 
turn out to be irrelevant to efficient allocation of resources.114  For example, in the 
case of positive externalities, such as the pleasure a visually aesthetic garden 
brings to many of those passersby who happen to see it regardless of whether they 
contributed to its upkeep, the keeper of the garden has clearly managed to fund its 
creation and maintenance without reaping specific contributions from those 
passers by.115  Put differently, the positive externalities the passersby enjoy have 
                                                 
111  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 718, n.95.   
112  See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing property rights generally, including their role in 
facilitating coordination).   
113  See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 122 (“If we are to discuss the 
problem in terms of causation, both parties cause the damage.”).  See also, Anderson, Donning 
Coase-Colored Glasses, supra note 106, at 3 (“Coase emphasized that because one use precludes 
the other, the costs are reciprocal.”); A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 53, 60 (1996) (describing one of the core ideas presented by Coase to be that “the 
problem of social cost [or externalities] is, at least to an economist, a reciprocal problem.”).   
114  See, DAVID D. HADDOCK, IRRELEVANT INTERNALITIES, IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES, 
AND IRRELEVANT ANXIETIES, Northwestern University School of Law, Law & Economics 
Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 03-16 (2003) (available on-line at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=437221) (providing examples and models and citing James M. 
Buchanan, & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).     
115  For other examples of such irrelevant positive externalities see Bernstein & Nadiri, 
Interindustry R&D Spillovers, Rates of Return, and Production in High-Tech Industries, 78 AM. 
ECON. REV. 429 (1988) (finding that, in recent years, social rates of return significantly exceeded 
private rates of return in five high-tech industries).  
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not prevented the good from being produced.116  To be sure, the possibility of 
capturing some benefit from these users of the garden may be a factor a garden 
planner might consider when making decisions about how to fund the garden 
creation and maintenance processes; but those gains would have to be weighed 
against the costs of such metering techniques.  As a result, many such 
externalities are found in the real world effectively to be irrelevant to decision-
making because a sufficiently small number of individuals having sufficiently 
great interest in the externalities are able to engage in sufficient private ordering 
for the appropriate amount of the desired activity to take place.117 Put simply, the 
point is that in many cases things that generate positive externalities would be 
made anyway, whether that positive externality is fully internalized to the 
producer or not.   
2. Transaction Costs  
Transaction costs are particularly important to the field of NIE because 
“transaction-costs economics is the original centerpiece of what Williamson … 
called the New Institutional Economics.”118  There has since been substantial 
empirical support for the validity of the transaction costs implications of NIE, as 
elucidated by Paul Joskow and others.119 
The term “transaction cost” generally refers to all the costs associated with 
contracting among individuals, including the hassle those parties experience in 
finding and dealing with each other, the costs of lawyers and other professionals 
to arrange the deals, and the bargaining process itself.  Transaction costs also can 
be thought of as including information costs.120  The term encompasses the costs 
                                                 
116  In economic terminology, these uses are said to be “inframarginal,” as opposed to 
“marginal,”  Haddock, supra note 114, at 24 (“Transaction cost for collective goods—even those 
demonstrably enjoyed by millions—are chronically overestimated in policy discussions. Only one 
or a few strong demands often determine both actual and ideal provision, and even two million 
demands are irrelevant if inframarginal.”).   
117  Id., at 1-2 (citing Buchanan & Stubblebine supra note 114).   
118  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 176 citing Williamson supra note 1, at 1.   
119  See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of 
Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 33 (1983); Paul L. Joskow, Asset 
Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 
95 (1988).  See also Howard A. Shelanski and Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction 
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 335 (1995) (survey of 
empirical evidence on transaction-costs economics assessing roughly 100 references on empirical 
research in transaction-cost economics published before 1993).   
120  See, Armen A. Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment, 7 W. 
ECON. J. 109 (1969).  See also, Stigler, supra note 55 (noting that acquiring and processing 
information about potential exchange opportunities are costly).   
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of successful transactions – such as time and money – as well as the costs of 
failed transactions – such as lost opportunities.   
Transaction costs became a focus of study in the NIE literature when they 
essentially were discovered by Coase in his path-breaking work on the theory of 
the firm, in which he pointed out that when making the decision about whether to 
make or buy it must be considered that moving activities into a firm can save on 
the transaction costs associated with conducting those activities in the open 
market.121  As summarized by Coase in later work:   
 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that 
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal with and to 
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the 
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on.122  
 
Put differently, these can be viewed as a set of six types of transaction costs: 
search, inspection, contracting, execution, control, and enforcement.123  In 
addition, because each of these activities hinges on interactions among 
individuals, the term transaction costs is taken to encompass the problems on the 
individual level discussed earlier, including information costs and 
behavioralism.124  
The path-breaking work by Williamson adds to this set the transaction 
costs of asset specificity and opportunism, both of which become most relevant 
after individuals have begun to interact with each other.  Williamson explains that 
asset specificity refers to the problem that arises when an asset cannot be re- 
deployed from its present use to some alternative use without a decline in 
value.125 He defines ex post opportunism to be “[s]elf-interest seeking with guile, 
[including] calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise 
confuse.”126   
                                                 
121  Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  For a review of 
modern transaction costs literature see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE (1996).   
122  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 15.   
123  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 291.   
124  See supra Parts II.A.3-II.A.4.   
125  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 52-56 (1985) 
(reviewing history of scholarship on asset specificity, collecting sources, and pointing out that 
“[a]t least four types of asset specificity are usually distinguished: site specificity, physical asset 
specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets… [and that t]he importance of asset 
specificity to transaction costs economics is difficult to exaggerate.”).   
126  WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 121, at 378.  See also 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 47-52, 64-67 
(exploring in detail various types of opportunism within the context transaction cost economics 
and collecting sources).   
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Importantly, there is both a good and bad side to transaction costs.  While 
on the bad side, they are costs, on the good side, they are the costs that are 
associated with the very specialization and division of labor that generally are 
thought to be good things.127  That is, the availability of transactions to obtain 
from others the goods and services beyond those an individual is most interested 
in or most adept at providing itself facilitates each individual’s ability both to 
have and to hone those specialized skills and tastes, as well as to bear 
individualized distributions.  The link between specialization and transactions 
allows even large numbers of individuals to achieve complex tasks by 
coordinating with each other directly or indirectly.128   
In addition, given such individualism in the form of diverse skills and 
preferences, transactions, and their concomitant costs, have other important 
beneficial side effects that often are overlooked.   First, transaction costs are 
associated with the privately beneficial exchanges among individuals that are 
essential for achieving private gains from trade.129  Second, transaction costs are 
associated with the publicly beneficial socialization that occurs as individuals 
come to interact with each other.130    The socialization effect occurs because for 
                                                 
127  John J. Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American 
Economy, 1870 –1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 95 (Stanley L 
Engerman & Robert E. Gallmann, eds.) (Studies in Income and Wealth, No. 51, 1986).  The 
connection between division of labor and transaction costs, including the inevitable limit that 
transaction costs places on the extent of the division of labor, was articulated earlier by Adam 
Smith.  See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q. J. ECON. 33, 35 (1968) (empirical 
evidence of transaction costs in the market of the New York Stock Exchange and quoting Adam 
Smith: “As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor, so the extent 
of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the 
extent of the market.”).   
128  For more on coordination see infra Part II.B.4.   
129  See, ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 184 
(1991) (pointing out that societies tend to develop institutions – such as norms in the case he is 
studying – that “minimize the members’ objective sum of (1) transaction costs and (2) deadweight 
losses arising from failures to exploit potential gains from trade.”).  See also, Coase The Problem 
of Social Cost, supra note 99, at 10.  (noting that the principal condition that must be satisfied for 
individuals to maximize wealth by engaging in an exchange is that the transaction costs of the 
exchange must not exceed the gains from trade.); Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free 
Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 113 
(1998) (“[H]umans interact to capture potential gains from trade – the knowledge for this 
interaction is bounded by transaction costs.  The gains from trade (a positive-sum game) result 
because people place different values on goods and services and because people have different 
abilities to produce those goods and services.  Because of these differences, trade has the potential 
to make the parties exchanging goods and services – of lower value to each respectively – better 
off.”) 
130  See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Value Judgments in Economics, in THE ESSENCE OF 
FRIEDMAN 3, 3-8 (Kurt R. Leube, ed., 1987) (discussing the “role of the market as a device for the 
voluntary cooperation of many individuals in the establishing of common values” and concluding 
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transactions to achieve gains from trade it must be the case that individuals having 
diverse resources and preferences learn enough about each other’s resources and 
preferences to exploit them, and this process of learning about each others’ values 
is part of socialization.   Third, the bargaining process – for both consummated 
transactions and for failed ones – inherently elicits important information about 
not only the particular transaction being negotiated, including intensity of 
preferences and budget constraints, but also relative values compared to other 
available transactions.  That is, transaction costs can mitigate information costs.  
Because these beneficial effects of transactions are often totally absent from 
discussions of the transactions that must occur around an IP right’s right to 
exclude, an important lesson of NIE is that these effects must be considered when 
evaluating IP.   
The net impact of those employed to facilitate transactions, such as 
lawyers and other professionals, is similarly ambiguous.  Often they are portrayed 
as a large component of the negative side of transaction costs.131  Yet, because 
they help the transactions occur,132 they also can be seen as part of the positive 
side of transactions costs to the extent that the transactions themselves are a good 
thing.   
Another important lesson of transaction costs economics is that, all-in, the 
likelihood and extent of the pernicious impact of many types of transaction costs 
                                                                                                                                     
that “[i]n many ways, this is the basic role of the free market in both goods and ideas – to enable 
mankind to cooperate in this process of searching for and developing values.”).   
131  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender 
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 62-63 (1982) (“Let me start with two important elements of 
transaction costs in the acquisition setting: information costs necessary to identify the opportunity; 
and mechanical costs – for example, lawyers’, accountants’, and investment bankers’ fees –
necessary to effect the transaction and cope with regulatory or other barriers (including defensive 
tactics by the target).”). 
132  See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why 
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1110-12 
(exploring Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer and citing 
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE 
L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (describing lawyers as “transaction cost engineers”); Bernard Black & 
Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1923 
(1996) (pointing out that in addition to lawyers “savvy investors and issuers” also help facilitate 
transactions); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An 
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 58 (2000) (also 
using term “transaction cost engineers” for lawyers)).  See also, Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley 
Lawyer as Transaction Costs Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 241 (1995) (further exploring 
Gilson’s analytical framework of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer and, in addition to 
Gilson, also citing Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon 
Valley: A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 562 (1989) (“[t]he Silicon Valley lawyer not only 
works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer -- a legal engineer ... his job is to 
solve problems, to take a principle, a task and engineer it legally”)).  
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is generally worse in what are known as thinner markets as compared with thicker 
markets, where thinner and thicker refer to the amount and diversity of resources 
and participants, including their diverse evaluative techniques and preferences.133  
The intuition behind this lesson is essentially that thickness increases the chance 
some individual in the market will find it profitable to arbitrage what otherwise 
would be a gap in information flow by finding and acting on that information, to 
offer an attractive option for what otherwise might be a hold-up problem, etc.  
To be sure, there is reason to think that some types of transaction costs 
may be worse in markets that are thicker, in at least some sense.  For example, the 
behavioralism logic behind the problem of groupthink suggests that as the group 
gets bigger the problem gets worse.134  Of course, to the extent that thicker is 
taken to mean not only bigger but more diverse, then the problem of group think 
may also decrease with market thickness.   
A somewhat related lesson of transaction costs economics is that, all-in, 
the likelihood and extent of the pernicious impact of most transaction costs is 
generally worse in political markets than in economic markets.135  As pointed out 
by North when contrasting the two: 
 
economic markets throughout history, and in the present world, are frequently 
very imperfect, beset by high transaction costs, and defined by institutions that 
produce incentives to work against economic efficiency.   
 
Political markets are far more prone to inefficiency. 136   
 
Although in part due to transaction costs, the many problems raised by political 
markets are explored in greater depth below in the discussion of public choice.137   
3. Agency Costs 
The term “agency cost” generally refers to all the costs associated with the 
inevitable divergences in the interests among two individuals in situations in 
                                                 
133  The so-called efficient market hypothesis (also known as “EMH”) is based on the view 
that in a perfectly thick market, assets will be perfectly priced.  The basic theoretical foundation 
for the EMH was laid by Paul Samuelson and Benoit Mandelbrot.  See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof 
That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41, 48 (1965); 
Benoit Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and Martingale Models, 39 J. 
BUS. 242, 248 (1966).  Empirical support was added by Eugene Fama.  See Eugene Fama, 
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 392 (1970).   
134  For more on groupthink see supra note 84, and accompanying text.   
135  For an in-depth treatment of the topic see Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory 
of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355 (1991).   
136  Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON., 11, 18 (1993).   
137  For more on the problems of government and public choice see infra Part II.C.3.   
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which one individual (known as an agent) acts on behalf of the other (known as a 
principal).  As summarized by Michael Jensen and William Meckling: 
 
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent.  In addition in some situations it will pay the 
agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take 
certain actions which would hard the principal or insure that the principal will be 
compensated if he does take such actions . . . . In most agency relationships the 
principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-
pecuniary as well as pecuniary).  And in all there will be some divergence 
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the 
welfare of the principal. 138 
 
Thus, agency costs can be seen to include the costs of the agent’s looting, 
shirking, other inadvertent deviations from instructions, and bonding, and the 
costs of the principal’s unmet reasonable expectations, monitoring, and enforcing.   
In part, agency costs can be seen as particularized versions of the many 
problems discussed earlier.  For example, the divergence in interests between 
agent and principal implicate the problems of incentives – a core component of 
agency costs is triggered by the drive to get the agent’s incentives aligned with 
those of the principal.139  Similarly, many of the information costs explored 
earlier, including moral hazard and adverse selection, have formed a big part of 
the agency costs literature.140  For example, as elucidated in the path breaking 
work by James Mirrlees, which formed part of the basis for which he shared the 
1996 Nobel Prize in Economics,141 the moral hazard problem can be mitigated by 
a properly designed incentive scheme.142 And of course the interactions needed 
for an agency relationship are merely one category of the transactions explored in 
the earlier discussion of transaction costs.143 
Two particular aspects of the agency problem have special prominence in 
IP.  The first concerns hierarchy in general.  The second concerns innovation in 
particular.   
                                                 
138  Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON., 305, 308 (1976) (emphasis in original).   
139  See supra Part II.A.1(discussing incentives).   
140  See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing agency costs).  See also FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra 
note 20, at 186-232 (exploring models of moral hazard and adverse selection in the context of 
agency costs).   
141  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1996/press.html.   
142  See, e.g., John A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an 
Organization, 7 BELL J. ECON. 105 (1976). 
143  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing transaction costs). 
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 Hierarchy is itself one of the core areas of study within the field of NIE.  
More particularly, the contrast between interactions among individuals through a 
market on the one hand and interactions among individuals within a hierarchy 
such as a firm or government on the other hand lies at the core of the early NIE 
literature by Coase on the theory of the firm.144  On the one hand, moving 
interactions within a hierarchy can avoid or mitigate many of those transaction 
costs associated with exchanges in the context of an open market.145 On the other 
hand, integration within a hierarchy has limits because of the decreasing returns to 
management due to several factors, including agency costs, such as those 
involving the agency relationship between owners and managers and those 
involving the agency relationship between managers and labor.146   
As demonstrated through models of both the private and academic sectors, 
agency problems can be particularly acute when the agent is tasked to innovate 
because the process of innovation is itself particularly fraught with uncertainty 
and because information about an innovator’s efforts is likely to be especially 
asymmetrical as between a technologically trained innovator and a non-
technologically trained manager.147  To be sure, relational contracting like that 
among individuals within a hierarchy is just one typical form of incomplete 
contracting for which there are well studied strategies to mitigate agency costs.148  
Yet, the general uncertainty of allocating credit for innovation within a hierarchy 
combined with the problem of potential expropriation by control groups of the 
                                                 
144  See generally, Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 121 (elucidating tension in 
theory of the firm between transaction costs avoidance and decreasing returns to management).  
See also Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998)(“It is 
commonly said, and it may be true, that the new institutional economics started with my article 
‘The Nature of the firm’ (1937).”).   
145  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing transaction costs).   
146  See, generally, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at  336-342 (discussing the limits 
of integration elucidated by WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra 
note 125, at 138-142).   
147  See, Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305 
(1989) (modeling agency costs in innovation and identifying attributes that make it comparatively 
more difficult as a production activity in which to solve ordinary principal/agent problems 
compared to ordinary production processes because of greater ex ante uncertainty, and asymmetric 
information about the innovator’s efforts).  See also, Wallace Huffman & Richard E. Just, Setting 
Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory, 82 AM. J. AG. ECON. 
828 (2000) (applying principal agent theory to model different funding approaches for basic 
scientific research in the field of agriculture).   
148  Williamson notes the general importance of repeat play, reputation effects, and other 
private enforcement techniques he collectively calls “private ordering” as tools for mitigating 
problems such as agency costs and asset specificity.  See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 163-68).   
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reward associated with innovation operate synergistically to particularly impair 
incentives for innovation within a hierarchy.149   
4. Coordination and Private Ordering  
Another implication of specialization and division of labor150 is that often 
many diverse actors must interact with each other for a particular activity to be 
achieved effectively.151  In the context of IP, for example, the process of bringing 
a new invention to market after that invention has been made – a process called 
commercialization – often requires the coordination of inventors, financiers, 
labor, management, advertisers, and marketers.152  For such coordination to take 
place, each of these individuals must both identify and interact with each other, at 
least indirectly.153   
On the other side of the coin, the ability to achieve coordination among 
large numbers of individuals further supports the ability for each individual to 
have particular skills and tastes beyond what is achieved with the mere 
availability of pair-wise transactions.154  That is, without the ability to coordinate, 
in the case of an invention for example, the inventor hoping to achieve 
commercialization would need to simultaneously serve as financier, production 
labor, management, advertiser, and marketer.155   
                                                 
149  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 336-37 (highlighting Williamson’s discussion 
of the problems of “causal ambiguity” and “general office instruction” (expropriation) leading to 
impaired incentives to innovate and citing WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 141-42)).   
150  See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing transaction cost implications of 
specialization and division of labor).   
151  For more on the general link among specialization, division of labor, and coordination, 
see generally, Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, 
and Knowledge, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 38, at 609.   
152  See generally, Kieff supra note 8 at 707-712 (discussing role of patents in 
commercialization of inventions).   
153  Id.  To be sure, the interactions may be transitive, in that each individual might not 
directly interact with each other in a pair-wise fashion, but each does interact on the same broadly 
defined endeavor.  That is, assuming individuals A through E are needed for commercialization to 
take place, individual A may not directly interact with each of the other individuals B through E, 
and individual B may not directly interact with individuals A and C through E, and so forth, but 
each of the individuals will be interacting with the same invention commercialization process and 
with a least a subset of the group comprising A through E, which means that in effect each 
individual is interacting with each other at least by transitivity.   
154  See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text (discussing role of transactions between 
individuals in supporting individualized skills and tastes).   
155  The recognition of this problem was indeed one of the motivating factors behind the 
present U.S patent system, which focuses on the importance of coordination to achieve invention 
commercialization.  See, Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-
Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 177 (Mar., 1942) (discussing incentive aspects of 
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For IP, coordination can be particularly important because the subject 
matter protected by IP ideally is not yet the subject of successful 
commercialization, or perhaps not even known yet.156  As Frank Knight 
recognized, such uncertain and risky endeavors have a particularly strong need for 
coordination:   
 
When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it 
takes ascendancy over that of execution, the internal organization of the 
productive groups is no longer a matter of indifference or mechanical detail.  
Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is imperative.157  
 
To be sure, this is not a call for the strong form of centralized control, such as 
government.  After all, coordination, or “centralization” as Knight calls it, can 
occur through different institutional arrangements and the availability of each 
ultimately provides an important set of options for use in different cases.  As Eirik 
Furubotn and Rudolf Richter note: “collective action, but not necessarily state 
action is needed.”158  Quoting Arrow, they continue: 
 
[M]any other departures from the anonymous atomism of the price system are 
observed regularly.  Indeed, firms of any complexity are illustrations of 
collective action, the internal allocation of their resources being directed by 
hierarchical controls.159 
 
Coordination may occur among individuals who are linked to each other 
through some social group such as family, friendship, or ethnic or religious 
identity.   While coordination among those within a social circle such as a family 
does have some advantages of mitigating information costs and transaction costs, 
it also has some disadvantages – what Stephen Haber calls the problems of “crony 
capitalism”160 – including asset specificity and the non-fungible nature of the 
attributes that underlie the social connection, such as familial relationship.161  As 
                                                                                                                                     
patent system and noting that one of its most important components “applies to the inventor but 
not solely to him, unless he is his own capitalist”).  See also infra Part IV.A (discussing the 
commercialization theory of the patent system).   
156  For more on the positive law rules for obtaining IP rights see infra Part IV.  The basic 
reason these rules must operate in this way is to protect the reasonable investment backed 
expectations of third parties.  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 (exploring normative 
case for positive law rules for validity).   
157  FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, 268 (1965).   
158  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 64.   
159  Id. (citing Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity, supra note 60, at 62).   
160  STEPHEN HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2002) [hereinafter “HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM”].   
161  For discussions of the information cost and transaction cost benefits see, e.g., Barak D. 
Richman, Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New 
York, (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business, Discussion Paper No. 384, 2002); 
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Troy Paredes explains within the context of corporate and securities laws:  “when 
laws are in place, parties can rely less on personal and family relationships when 
transacting, allowing them to engage in transactions with strangers.”162 
The NIE literature also is replete with work exploring the tension between 
achieving coordination within a hierarchy such as a firm on the one hand or 
among individuals in an open market who only interact via private ordering on the 
other hand.163  As Williamson notes when describing what is referred to as the 
“marvel of the market,” “[o]f special importance to Hayek was the proposition 
that the price system, as compared with central planning, is an extraordinarily 
efficient mechanism for communicating information and inducing change.”164 But 
he also noted that this requires spontaneous cooperation and coordination, in 
contrast with the “kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, 
purposeful,” which is referred to as the “marvel of internal organization.”165 Put 
differently,  
 
Markets are characterized by high-powered incentives, which help to keep 
bureaucratice costs in check and support strong autonomous adaptation.  
Hierarchy, by contrast, has much weaker incentives and greater bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                                     
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law In The Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms, And Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).  For discussion of the problems 
relating to fungibility and asset specificity see HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM, supra note 160.   
162  Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing 
U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2004) (also noting 
that “Strong legal protections for shareholders expand the available pool of capital for businesses 
and entrepreneurs and facilitate contracting by shoring up shareholder rights.”).   
163  The term “private ordering” is used more broadly in this paper than it is in some of the 
NIE literature.  Williamson, for example, often uses the term “private ordering” to refer to the 
various informal mechanisms to privately enforce contractual relationships as compared with 
formal legal process.  See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 
supra note 125, at 163-68.  (suggesting that repeat play and reputation can serve as “private 
ordering” tools for enforcement).  Here, the term is used to refer to all private interactions entered 
into voluntarily by individuals as compared to those coerced by a hierarch, such as cooperation 
directed by management among different divisions within a firm or tax transfers directed by law 
among members of a state.   For uses of the term private ordering as it is used here see, e.g., Henry 
E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 983 (2004) 
(using the term “private ordering” to refer to private voluntary exchanges, not to private 
enforcement); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,  8 (2000) (using the term “private 
ordering” in the context of individual choice and freedom of contract); Richard A. Epstein, All 
Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 569 (1991) (“Within the context of Eastern 
Europe, property and economic protections are critical to the ability to turn nations and economies 
around from central planning to private ordering”).   
164  Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON., 36, 47 (1993) (citing Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV., 519, 524-27 (1945)).   
165  Id. (citing CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, 4 (1938)).   
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costs but has superior ability in cooperative adaptation respects.  If different 
transactions have differing needs for autonomous and cooperative adaptations, 
which they do, then the cost effective response is to align markets and 
hierarchies in a discriminating way.166 
 
As Coase elaborated, “[t]he main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”167 But as 
Williamson points out, such transaction cost market failures are only failures to 
the extent “that they involve transaction costs that can be attenuated by 
substituting internal organization for market exchange.”168  Indeed, in recognition 
that not everything can be done as well inside a firm, Williamson asked:  “Why 
can’t a large firm do everything a collection of small firms can do, and more?”169  
According to Williamson,  
 
selective integration, whereby integration realizes adaptive gains but 
experiences no losses, is not feasible. Instead, the transfer of a transaction out of 
the market into the firm is regularly attended by an impairment of incentives, 
and this type of difficulty will tend to be particularly severe where innovations 
are important.170 
 
At bottom, as elucidated earlier by Coase, the choice of whether to coordinate 
within a firm or among individuals in a market essentially involves a balance 
among the competitive benefits and transaction costs of the open market on the 
one hand against the transaction-cost-saving benefits and agency and management 
costs of hierarchy on the other hand.171  
Finally, coordination can be facilitated through the use of focal points.  As 
Randy Calvert has pointed out, “[r]ecognizing or creating focal points is one 
                                                 
166  Williamson, supra note at 164, at 49.   
167  Coase, supra note 121, at 390.   
168  Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure 
Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114 (1971) (exploring relative advantages of “once and 
for all contract,” series of short term contracts, and outright vertical integration, as alternative 
options for firms).     
169  Williamson supra note 195 at 131.  This problem is sometimes cited as the “Williamson 
Puzzle.”  See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).   The problem is 
also explored in Coase, supra note 121, at 394 (“Why is not all production carried on by one big 
firm?”) (citing Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Preface to the Re-Issue, London 
School of Economics Series of Reprints, No. 16 (1933)).   
170  Williamson supra note 195, at 161. (included in the problems he identifies is the decrease 
incentive to innovate because of sharing with other divisions within the new merged firm).     
171  See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text (exploring tradeoff between market and 
firm).   
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important way in which the players can successfully coordinate.”172  This type of 
focal point coordination can be achieved using property rights.  The classic work 
by Harold Demsetz on the emergence of the institution of property rights focuses 
on their role in internalizing benefits and costs.173  Yet, within the field of IP, 
earlier work by the present author has explored the role of property rights as focal 
points in facilitating coordination among complementary users of an asset.174  
Later, Demsetz also highlighted this coordination function of property rights 
when discussing the increased specialization of labor that has occurred over time:  
 
Difficulties in stipulating and enforcing agreements so as to encourage and 
facilitate productivity-increasing cooperation between different owners come 
into play here.175   
*** 
The legal institutions that define private ownership and guide exchange 
arrangements must become operative if the complexity that is inherent in 
specialization is to be productive.176 
 
Indeed, recent empirical work by Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky 
confirms such a coordination effect for IP rights.177  Thus, the use of property in 
this coordination sense can be seen as navigating between the Coasian poles of 
open market on the one hand and internal to a firm on the other hand.178   
At bottom, a central lesson from NIE here is that property rights in IP can 
provide an important option for facilitating coordination.  In this sense, property 
rights are options to achieving such coordination within families, firms, and 
government.179   
C. Problems at the Institutional Level 
Each of the problems explored above manifests itself in different ways 
depending on the particular set of institutional arrangements under which 
individuals are operating.  The NIE literature has explored extensively several 
paradigmatic institutions including, inter alia, laws, norms, markets, 
                                                 
172  Randy Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, 
Coordination, and Communication, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: OLD TOPICS, NEW 
DIRECTIONS 216, 244 (J.S. Banks and E.A Hanushek eds., 1995).   
173  See supra notes 107-111, and accompanying text (discussing work by Demsetz).   
174  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 67-68 (citing Demsetz, supra note 173).   
175  Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II, supra note 4, at S657.   
176  Id. at S664-5.   
177  See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 2.   
178  See supra notes 144-146, and 163-171, and accompanying text (exploring tradeoff 
between market and firm).  For more on property rights see infra Part II.C.4.   
179  See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing property rights generally).  See also infra Part III 
(discussing property rights in IP).   
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governments, and property rights.  Each institutional arrangement has been shown 
to offer strengths and weaknesses, the major lessons of which are highlighted 
below. 
1. Laws, Norms, and Problems of Enforceability 
As mentioned at the outset of the article, the field of NIE views 
institutions to be “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction… [including] formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal 
constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), 
and their enforcement characteristics.”180  As evident from the definition, an 
important characteristic of institutions is their ability actually to constrain 
behavior; and of course different institutions exert this effect differently.   
Much of the work in NIE looks at different approaches to formal legal 
regimes and compares their overall impact with respect to the many problems 
explored in the discussions above.  Some view this work as the component of NIE 
that includes the traditional law and economics literature, which some in the NIE 
literature call “legal studies.”181  Comparative institutional analyses of IP law 
regimes that take into account the problems explored thus far are presented in 
greater depth in Parts III-IV below.  For purposes of the discussion here, it is 
sufficient to note that while the enforcement characteristics of law traditionally 
have been the focus of study, important recent work including that by Cass 
Sunstein has focused on the expressive function of law.182 Under this view, law 
matters not only because of its ability to shape behavior through coercion, but also 
through its ability to communicate in a way that ultimately shapes norms.183   
This leads to another central component of NIE, which looks at the 
different approaches to informal rules, often called norms, and compares their 
overall impact with respect to the many problems explored in the discussions 
                                                 
180  North, supra note 19.   
181  See, Eirik G. Furubotn & Rudolf Richter, Editorial Preface to Symposium Edition:  The 
New Institutional Economics, Recent Progress; Expanding Frontiers, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON., 1, 2-4 (1993) (reviewing “legal studies” as literature within the field of NIE 
and citing early major works such as RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) 
and GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1971)).  
An important recent component of this literature directed to the field of IP itself, but offering a 
different perspective than the present piece in that it does not directly most of the major lines of 
thought in NIE that are outside of the domain of classical law and economics, includes WILLIAM 
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW (2003).   
182  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 
2035 (1996). 
183  Id. at 2051-52 (concluding that law has an expressive function which operates through 
norms).   
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above.  Indeed, Williamson argues that the focus on positive law regimes reflects 
a type of “legal centrism” that fails to account adequately for dispute resolution 
and enforcement activities that occur without the formal legal system, what he 
terms “private ordering.”184    Norms can be thought of in at least two ways:  as 
“prescriptive norms,” also called “normative norms,” which refer to beliefs about 
what people should do, and as “descriptive norms,” or “regularities,” which refer 
to how people tend to behave.185  Indeed, thus far the only significant connection 
between the literatures of IP and NIE has centered on the role of norms.186 
Much of the NIE literature on informal, or non-legal ordering has focused 
on enforcement and dispute resolution.  One example is the important work by 
Lisa Bernstein on relational contracting within homogeneous communities, which 
has focused on what it calls “private ordering” as a mechanism by which 
individuals in the market can interact with lower administrative costs than with 
formal legal institutions through the use of more informal institutions for 
enforcement and dispute resolution such as norms, reputation, etc.187  Similarly, 
                                                 
184  See, WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125, at 20-
21 (discussing “legal centrism”); See also supra note 163 (explaining Williamson’s use of the 
term “private ordering” is more narrow than the use in this paper).   
185  For a recent discussion of these two types of norms within the context of IP see, e.g. F. 
Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science - A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 693, 696 (2001).  To be sure, 
norms of each type may influence the other.  What is more, when it comes to prescriptive norms 
about how individuals should behave, they may be driven by either external, or internal pressures.  
See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 162, at 1087-88 (“By ‘norms’ I do not mean those steps that 
managers take to please the market or to avoid shame or a lawsuit, although sometimes ‘norms’ is 
used broadly this way. Rather, I am referring to a sense of right and wrong – a  sense of duty and 
responsibility – that directors and officers internalize and enforce on themselves simply because it 
is the right thing to do”) (citing, inter alia, Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant Take? 10 (UCLA School of Law, Working 
Paper No. 02-11, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679 (“In lay terms, corporate 
insiders act like fiduciaries not only because they fear external sanctions, but also because they 
have internalized a sense of obligation or responsibility toward others ....’); Edward B. Rock, 
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1104, 
1013 (1997) (“All of us internalize rules and standards of conduct with which we generally try to 
comply. We do this not only because we may fear some sanction, formal or informal, but also 
because doing so is important to our sense of self-worth, because we believe that doing a good job 
is the right thing to do.”)).   
186  See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights 
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (exploring the role of norms in 
establishing private institutions to coordinate IP transactions); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1999); 
Kieff, supra note 185.   
187  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (showing how some 
communities opt for informal private enforcement mechanisms for contractual relationships 
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important recent work by Barak Richman comes closer to the theory of the firm 
literature and focuses on the importance of the private enforcement and dispute 
resolution techniques as means for ensuring not just lower administrative costs, 
but also better contractual enforcement, and enhanced transaction certainty.188   
The view of property rights offered in this paper differs from both of these 
perspectives by seeing private ordering in the more general sense than simply 
private enforcement.189  Instead, private ordering is seen as the set of interactions 
among individuals that are more reliable because they are enforced in some way, 
whether by private informal institutions, such as norms, or by formal legal 
institutions, such as the coercive power of the state.   
This view is consistent with traditional liberal views of the rule of law and 
role of government as the monopoly over the coercive powers – such as force – to 
back property rights and contractual arrangements because such backing enhances 
the overall market economy by enhancing individual liberty to elect to deploy 
one’s resources in whatever way best suits that individual.190 While important 
recent work by Richman has shown that private enforcement mechanisms may, 
under appropriate conditions such as small and homogenous communities, 
provide even more transactional security at a lower administrative cost than 
public enforcement,191 the point here is that having the option of public 
                                                                                                                                     
instead of formal legal approaches because the administrative costs can be lower).  Bernstein’s use 
of the term “private ordering” to refer to private enforcement is consistent with the use by 
Williamson, which is narrower than the use in this paper, which encompasses all private 
interactions voluntarily entered.  See supra note 163 (contrasting Williamson’s use of the term 
“private ordering”).  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 
(2002) (similar use of the term “private ordering” to refer to private enforcement or regulation).   
188  Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, at 4 (working paper, forthcoming as 104 COLUM. L. REV. __ (2004) 
(available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=565464) (“This paper argues that concerns over 
transactional assurance and contractual enforcement, not administrative costs, drive merchant 
communities to private ordering (and to vertical integration as well).”) 
189  See supra note 163 (discussing this more general use of the term “private ordering”).   
190  See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990) (elucidating the importance to economic growth of the reliable enforcement 
of property rights and contracts by formal public legal institutions); DOUGLASS C. NORTH & 
ROBERT P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1973) (putting property rights at the 
center of the explanation of economic performance); Avner Greif & Eugene Kandel, Contract 
Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in ECONOMIC 
TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM (Edward P. Lazear, ed., 
1995) (same).  See also, Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Principles of a Liberal Social Order, in THE 
ESSENCE OF HAYEK, (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube, eds., 1984) (providing general 
discussion of the theory of liberal government including its use of coercive powers to enforce 
law).   
191  Compare, Richman, supra note 188, at 24 (contrasting benefits and costs of, inter alia, 
private and public enforcement mechanisms under different conditions).   
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enforcement is a benefit to those under other more generalized or diverse 
conditions.  What is more, the option of public enforcement also helps allow such 
arrangements to be struck reliably without creating as much risk of asset 
specificity and opportunism that are associated with bringing such transactions 
entirely within a firm.192   
2. Markets and Market Failures 
One consensus lesson of economics, NIE and otherwise, is that markets 
are not perfect and they do fail.  Indeed, each of the problems explored in the 
sections above and below can be, and often is, viewed as a type of “market 
failure.”193  Nevertheless, as suggested in the introductory discussion of a theory 
of second-best, the mere identification of market failure does not in and of itself 
justify a call for resolution because it is the all-in comparative analysis among 
truly available options that should drive policy.194  Put differently:   
 
Traditional economics ascribes departures of actual market organizations from 
the idea type of perfect markets to monopolistic practices.  The approach of 
[NIE], on the other hand, holds that because of transaction costs, and thus 
informational problems, such departures may serve economizing purposes.195   
 
For example, rules limiting competition, such as those limiting access to the stock 
exchange can have many positive, or efficiency-promoting, effects: “The 
exchange organizes not only the conclusion of contracts but also all associated 
transaction activities (from search to enforcement)….”196  To be sure, this does 
                                                 
192  See supra notes 125-126, and accompany text (discussing asset specificity and 
opportunism).   
193  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive 
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 553-58 (1979) (exploring various market failures 
including externalities, monopoly, and information costs); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomnic 
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 
(1995) (listing information costs, transaction costs, and externalities – what they refer to as “free 
riding” – as examples of market failure).   
194  See supra notes 20-31, and accompanying text.   
195  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 291 (citing WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 125) and citing Coase, Industrial Organization: A 
Proposal for Research,” VICTOR R. FUCHS, POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59 (NBER, 1972) (“One important result of this preoccupation with 
monopoly is that if an economist finds something – a business practice of one sort or other – that 
he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.”).   
196  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 302 (citing other examples such as “the 
evolution of ‘privately ordered’ medieval trade organizations as explored in [the following 
works:]” Avner Grief, Reputation and Coalitions on Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi 
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST., 857 (1989) (among long-distance Jewish traders in the Mediterranean 
during 11th century called the Maghribi); Roger Milgrom, et al., The Role of Institutions in the 
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not mean that all market failures should be embraced.  Rather, the general point is 
that when thinking about market failures it is essential to keep track of the real 
costs and benefits of all available options.  In addition, there are two more specific 
points that need to be kept in mind when thinking about the ways markets work or 
don’t work within the context of IP, as discussed more fully below.   
(a) Ex Ante vs. Ex Post  and Dynamic vs. Static Efficiency  
While there is debate about exactly how rational or irrational individuals 
are when they make decisions about whether and how to act there is consensus 
that individuals do make such decisions and do plan.197  The term “ex ante” refers 
to the time period before a decision is made about a given action.  The term “ex 
post” refers to any of the times afterwards.  That is, the information and other 
resources an individual has ex ante will impact the decision-making process.   
This includes not only what is known, but what is expected.  As a result, 
there can be feedback between the ex ante and ex post worlds because individuals 
interpret events in the world around them as having some predictive value for the 
way events in the future will unfold.  As elucidated by the path breaking work on 
rational expectations by Robert Lucas, which formed part of the basis for which 
he was awarded the 1995 Nobel Prize in Economics,198 individuals constantly 
update and reinterpret information presently available to make best estimates 
about the future.199  In game theory terminology, the point is that life is a multi-
cycle game, not a single-cycle game, and individuals may use information from 
past cycles of the game when making decisions about how to play future 
cycles.200  Individuals may change their expectations about what may happen to a 
                                                                                                                                     
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Campagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 
(1990) (law merchant system of the Champaign Fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries)).  See 
also, Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine 
Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2004) (elucidating how antitrust enforcement 
may interfere with environmental conservation and other goals).   
197  See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing incentives and their relationship to decisions).   
198  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1995, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1995/press.html.   
199  See, e.g., Robert E. Lucas, Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, 4 J. ECON. THEORY 
103 (1972).  See also, Sanford J. Grossman, An Introduction to the Theory of Rational 
Expectations Under Asymmetric Information, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 541, 543 (1981) (describing 
rational expectations equilibrium).   
200  Games that are not static are sometimes said to have multiple cycles, rounds, or 
iterations, or are said to repeat.  For their pioneering work on game theory, John C. Harsanyi, John 
F. Nash, and Reinhard Selten were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994.  See 
Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
of Alfred Nobel for 1994 (available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1994/press.html).  For a general overview of game 
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given state of affairs in the future based on what they perceive happening to 
similar states of affairs in the present and past.  If individuals perceive that 
property rights and contracts are not being enforced, they may have less faith in 
property rights and contracts being enforced in the future, all other things being 
equal.  As investment in such property rights and contracts becomes less 
attractive, ordinary incentive analysis suggests that individuals will shift 
investments towards other activities.  Indeed, the literature on private ordering 
places great emphasis on the role of ex ante predictability and certainty in 
property and contract enforcement for facilitating efficient investment and other 
decision-making over time, or in the dynamic sense.201   
A problem with this dynamic approach is that can be in tension with other 
more static approaches to efficiency, which may see resource distributions at any 
point in time as sub-optimal.  For example, a promise to make my car available to 
you at a particular time if you elect to use it then may put me in a position when 
that time arrives in which the car is not in use by anyone.202  In the static sense, at 
that moment in time, it may indeed look as though the car is being allowed to go 
to waste, which would be inefficient.  Yet, if I am allowed to deploy the car to 
other uses out of fear for the risk that it might go unused then your expectation 
that it will be available for your use if you so chose will be dashed.  What is more, 
if you know this ex ante, then you may not even be willing to enter into the 
contract to reserve the car in exchange for some other compensation, such as 
money, or you will be willing to pay only a lesser amount.  Thus, in the dynamic 
sense, the future abrogation of the contract to provide the car, which presumably 
would make both you and me better off, which is why we would elect to enter 
into it in the first instance, is not a contract that we can consummate ex ante.  As a 
result, over time we cannot engage in as many productive exchanges as otherwise.  
Put differently, there would be dynamic inefficiency.203   
To be sure, it is recognized that recent important work by Ian Ayers and 
Eric Talley, and by Jason Scott Johnston elucidates how, due in large part to many 
                                                                                                                                     
theory see, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944) (first formal treatment of game theory as a part of economics); 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (more modern treatment of 
game theory with focus on legal implications). 
201  See generally, Paredes, supra note 132, at 1133-34 (“Legal certainty, which is part and 
parcel of well-defined property rights, is a valuable asset that facilitates business and investing, 
aside from how the law actually allocates rights and responsibilities”) 
202  To be sure, this is a highly stylized example and in the real world every contract can have 
detailed insurance, futures, and options components.  Indeed, the availability of these provisions 
provides justification for treating contracts among sophisticated parties as though they do indeed 
speak to these issues, even when silent on their face.   
203  See generally, David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for 
Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1990) (showing how uncertainty in 
enforcement discourages investment ex ante). 
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of the behavioralism problems explored earlier,204 uncertainty in enforcement may 
in some cases improve the ability to negotiate over property rights and contracts 
by decreasing hold-out problems through a feed-back mechanism in which 
uncertainty makes more credible the threat of infringement or breach ex post, 
which may cycle back to decrease incentive ex ante for the rights-holder to hold 
out in the first instance.205  Nevertheless, other recent empirical work by Rachel 
Croson and Johnston shows that in other cases uncertainty degrades the ability to 
reach dynamic efficiency.206  Indeed, other work by Ayres and Robert Gertner 
elucidates the importance of at least some certainty – in that case what they term 
“penalty default rules – because it will have the impact of bringing to light 
information about potential negotiations and help avoid opportunism by one party 
attempting “to get a larger piece of the smaller contractual pie.”207  At bottom, at 
least in many cases private bargaining over property rights can be more efficient if 
the right is clearly defined ex ante according to a predictable rule, rather than made 
ex post by a judge applying a standard.208   
The difference between ex ante and ex post, or dynamic and static 
efficiency, also matters beyond the narrow setting of individual transactions 
discussed above – although that is not irrelevant – because in many ways change 
is desirable in and of itself.  For example, as resources such as fossil fuels become 
depleted, we must change to make use of alternative energy sources.  Put simply, 
innovation that occurs over time can improve the size of the pie for everyone by 
making available more options.  Thus, as Einer Elhauge has cautioned with 
respect to certain forms of antitrust enforcement motivated by concerns for static 
efficiency but that may negatively impact innovation:  
 
                                                 
204  See supra Part II.A.4 (exploring behavioralism problems).   
205  Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027-1118 (1995); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining 
under Rules versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256-281 (1995).   
206  Rachel Croson & Jason Scott Johnston, Experimental Results on Bargaining under 
Alternative Property Rights Regimes, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50, 67-70 (2000).   
207  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 127 (1989).    
208  ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (1988).  For a discussion of 
the broader debate between legal systems based on rules and those based on standards, see 
generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987) (describing basic 
framework of the debate and collecting sources); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (exploring the costs implicated by the choice between 
rules and standards and showing: rules typically are more costly than standards to create; standards 
typically are more costly for individuals to interpret, both by individuals deciding how to act under 
them and by government decisionmakers deciding how to apply them; and individuals are more 
likely to act in accordance with the goals of rules as long as the individuals can determine how they 
will be applied); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards 
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (reviewing more recent literature and collecting sources). 
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Such innovations make consumers and society better off by giving them new 
market options that are better (because they are cheaper or of higher quality) 
than the market options they would have had without the innovation. This is the 
most desirable form of market activity we can have. To condemn it is to 
fetishize the ex post avoidance of static allocative inefficiency under given cost 
and demand curves, and ignore the disastrous ex ante effects such a standard 
would have on dynamic productive efficiency that either raises demand curves 
by making the product more desirable or lowers cost curves by making the 
product cheaper to make. Repeated economic studies indicate the latter is far 
more valuable.209 
 
Thus, the distinction between dynamic and static efficiency is particularly 
important for IP because it is focused on innovation.   
(b) Monopoly Effects 
The problem of monopolies is another specific point that must be kept in 
mind when thinking about the ways markets work or don’t work within the 
context of IP.  Because monopolies can create important inefficiencies, they have 
been the subject of substantial attention by both lawyers and economists.  Indeed, 
the core purpose of antitrust law is “to root out unreasonable restraints of trade 
and transactions that substantially lessen competition or tend to create 
monopoly.”210  The central inefficiency associated with monopolies is the creation 
of dead weight loss by the monopoly’s ability to set price above marginal cost, or 
to have power over price.211  But, there are several reasons why the extent of this 
inefficiency may not be the same in practice as it is in theory.   
                                                 
209  Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 275 
(2003) (collecting sources).  See also Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, 
Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003) (reviewing tension between static and dynamic 
efficiency within the context of public goods and monopolistic competition).   
210  F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual 
Property, Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 
275, at 7, forthcoming __ G.W. LAW REV. __ (2004) (generally exploring the interfaces IP law 
shares with other regimes such as antitrust, and collecting sources including PHILLIP AREEDA & 
LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES 174-250, 447-77, 785-806 
(1997)).  For a different take on the interface between IP and antirust see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST (2003).   
211  This dead weight loss represents a collective loss of societal wealth, in that it is not 
merely wealth that has been shifted from consumers to producers but rather wealth that is 
altogether lost from producers and consumers collectively.  The dead weight loss inefficiency 
associated with power over price is depicted graphically, and its etiology is explained in a manner 
targeted for a lay audience, in CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 60-66.  To be sure, there are other 
inefficiencies associated with monopolies, including, for example, the rent dissipating effects that 
competition for monopoly profits may generate.  See generally, Gordon Tullock, The Welfare 
Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (seminal work on rent-seeking 
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First, monopoly is a term that relates to a market, not to any particular 
good or service sold in that market.  As Kenneth Dam has pointed out within the 
context of IP, for example:   
 
Indeed, it had become conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly.  
Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another from 
“manufacture use and sale” may give no significant market power, even when 
the patent covers a product that is sold in the market.  Indeed, without the 
benefit of empirical research, it is entirely plausible to conclude that in the great 
bulk of instances no significant market power is granted.  We must bear in mind 
that leading companies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and 
yet many such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any 
market.212 
 
There often is a difference between a product or service market and an IP asset.  
Consumers often buy computers that essentially involve the licensing of hundreds 
of licensed IP rights – for hard drive, processors, DRAM, other chips, etc – 
without acting as direct customers of any of the IP owners.   
Put differently, while in a certain sense every property right can be 
thought of as a monopoly, only those that convey effective control over an entire 
market can have the troubling economic inefficiencies associated with 
monopolies.  For example, the owner of a hypothetical piece of real estate 
Blackacre can exclude use of that particular parcel, but must compete with other 
parcels of land in the market for land generally.  Indeed, while the amount of real 
estate in the world actually is limited by the surface area of the planet, unless it 
turns out that the scope of human intellectual content is presently so close to the 
limit of its full potential there is no reason to think that for IP the long run 
monopoly impact of a given property right is likely to be any worse than for real 
property; and instead it is likely to be much less.   
Second, the economic inefficiency that is associated with a monopolist’s 
power over price is not inevitable.  More specifically, the inefficiency is tied to 
the potential for a decrease in quantity (not an increase in price) as compared with 
the perfectly competitive model.  If the monopolist is able to engage in perfect 
price discrimination, then the quantity produced will be the same as if there were 
competition and while the price charged at least some consumers will be higher, 
there will be no dead weight loss inefficiency.213  While perfect price 
                                                                                                                                     
costs of monopoly).  Yet, the rent dissipating effects of monopolies, like other rent dissipation, 
depends on several factors.  For more on rent dissipation generally, see supra Part II.A.2.     
212  Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.L. STUD. 247, 249-
250 (1994).   
213  For those who are familiar with the graphical representation of the monopolist’s dead 
weight loss triangle, an example of which is depicted in CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 65, price 
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discrimination, like perfect anything, is not possible in the real world, the extent 
to which the monopolist can engage in price discrimination may mitigate the 
practical extent of the theoretical static inefficiency associated with monopoly 
dead weight loss.214    
3. Government, Government Failures, and Public Choice  
Like markets, government institutions have many strengths and 
weaknesses.  One core role of government is to step in to provide services the 
market would fail to provide efficiently because of economies of scale or scope, 
or because of collective action problems, or positive externalities, with the 
paradigmatic example of a service that meets each criteria being national 
defense.215  Government also has the benefits of hierarchy explored earlier in the 
                                                                                                                                     
discrimination allows the monopolist to convert what otherwise would be that dead weight loss 
triangle into being producer surplus instead.   
214  For a basic overview of the economics of price discrimination, see JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133-68 (1997).  It is also recognized that in certain cases 
efforts to engage in price discrimination may lead to decrease in efficiency.  For example, recent 
work by Wendy Gordon, Glynn Lunney, and Michael Meurer has shown that while price 
discrimination by IP owners might lead in theory to more use in certain instances, in practice some 
price discrimination strategies can result in less output than if such price discrimination were 
prohibited, depending, in part, on the licensing arrangements employed to discriminate among 
users).  Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for 
Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Copyright and the Supposed 
Efficiency of First-Degree Price Discrimination (2002) (working paper); Michael J. Meurer, 
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).  However, as 
summarized by Richard Posner:  
 Perfect price discrimination would bring about the same output as 
under competition, because no customer willing to pay the seller’s marginal cost 
would be turned away.  But perfect price discrimination is infeasible, and 
imperfect price discrimination can result in a lower or higher output than under 
competition, or the same output.  See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE 494-96 (3d ed. 1990); PAUL A. 
SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42-45 (1947); JOAN 
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95 (1933).  Many 
economists believe that even crude discrimination is more likely to expand than 
to reduce output, see, e.g., ROBINSON, supra, at 201; SCHERER & ROSS, supra, at 
494-96; Peter O. Steiner, Book Review, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 882 (1977), but 
there does not appear to be a firm basis for this belief.  See Hal R. Varian, Price 
Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 597, 629-33 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 925, 932 n.10 (2001).   
215  See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) (setting forth 
classical libertarian exposition of the role of the minimalist state as “limited to the functions of 
protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts”). 
For later refinement of the issue see ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-87 (1989) (“The 
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discussion of the theory of the firm and its ability to save transaction costs.216  
Others see government as also providing important distributive social justice 
goals.217  Along these lines, the path breaking work by Amartya Sen that formed 
part of the basis for which he was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics218 
elaborates methods for aggregating values across different individuals and offers 
important hope for improving welfare distributions through social choice.219  
While there is of course an extensive literature beyond the scope of this article on 
the theory of government, it is sufficient for the present purpose to highlight some 
lessons on government from the field of NIE.   
In addition to the many important strengths of government mentioned 
above, just like markets, governments may also have weaknesses (government 
failures).  And just like for markets, each of the problems explored in the sections 
above and below can be, and often is, viewed as a type of government failure.  
For example, just as the transaction costs of the market include the costs of 
bargaining over property rights and striking and enforcing contracts, as well as the 
costs of professional lawyers and accountants to help with these processes, the 
transaction costs of the political process include the costs of striking and 
enforcing political deals, as well as the costs of professional lobbyists, and 
                                                                                                                                     
libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate ....”).   See also, 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25-32 (1962) (emphasizing that the role of the 
government can be justified not as a tool for protecting rights in and of themselves but as a tool for 
protecting rights as a method for solving collective action problems).   
216  For more on transaction costs and the roles of hierarchy see supra Part II.B.2 (discussing 
transaction costs including the transaction cost saving benefits of hierarchy) and Part II.B.3 
(discussing the agency costs and other costs of hierarchy).   
217  See generally, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (elaborating a view that 
justifies a more expansive role of government to protect the disadvantaged).  To be sure, there are 
many important views on distributive and redistributive justice that are beyond the scope of this 
article.  Some of these relate rather closely to NIE.  For example, one take on the views of 
government by some including those in the critical legal studies movement is that it inevitably has 
redistributive qualities to it and because those have been controlled by subordinating groups to the 
detriment of subordinated groups they have inevitably redistributed from the subordinated to the 
subordinating.  For a recent take on anti-subordination see Christoper A. Bracey, Adjudication, 
Antisubordination, and the Jazz Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV. 853 (2003) (exploring the 
antisubordination principle and collecting sources).  See also Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs 
of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919 (1997) (pointing out that any theory of 
government must provide for its funding and elucidating tax policy implications of various 
theories of government).  The NIE literature’s take on these perspectives is to elucidate the 
problems of rent seeking and collective choice.    
218  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1998, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1998/press.html.   
219  See, e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).   
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political parties to help with these processes.220  In addition, it is often overlooked 
that the transaction costs of government also include administrative costs, or the 
costs of administering particular government processes.221  As another example, 
while behavioralism problems can plague those negotiating over property rights 
and contracts, they can also plague legislators, administrators, and judges.222  Put 
differently: 
 
Just as in the private sector, these governmental undertakings have to bear 
search and information costs, the costs of decision making, the costs of giving 
(official) orders, and the costs of measuring, monitoring, creating, and enforcing 
the observance of official instructions.223 
 
In addition, the information and transaction cost problems facing 
individuals in government may be even greater than those facing individuals in 
the market.224  As North points out, referring to one type of information costs – 
the information needed to engage in exchanges – the intuition behind this lesson 
is that in government it is “extraordinarily difficult to measure what is being 
exchanged – promises for votes.” 225  According to North, when discussing 
efficient markets: “[s]uch markets are scarce enough in the economic world and 
even scarcer in the political world.”226  
                                                 
220  See generally, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 47-49 (summarizing political 
transaction costs) (citing MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 46 (1965).   
221  These costs include the costs of obtaining the information needed to carry out these 
processes, the costs of behavioralism by those charged with carrying out these processes, as well 
as the transactions that occur when they are attempted to be carried out.  In addition, just as 
transaction costs of the market include the costs of transactions that are efficient but that fail, the 
transaction costs of government administration include the costs of failed processes that should 
have been successful.   
222  Kieff, supra note 14, at 1730 (pointing out in the context of IP that government actors 
also experience behavioralism problems most often discussed in the context of market actors and 
that in addition they experience the public choice problems discussed in this Part, and citing 
Paredes, supra note 70, at 461-2 (same, but in the context of securities law, and collecting 
sources)).   
223  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 47.  See also, MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND 
REVENUE, 12 (1988) (noting as political transaction costs “the costs of measuring, monitoring, 
creating, and enforcing compliance”).   
224  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 22 (“transaction costs associated with political 
markets are high, and for this reason institutional inefficiency tends to persist”) (citing DOUGLASS 
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 190 at 
52). 
225  North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 136, at 18.   
226  NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra 
note 190 at 51.   
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But there is another important information cost associated with 
government.  This is the problem of obtaining information about whatever 
particular activity the government is acting upon in any given setting – legislative, 
regulatory, or judicial, such as health, safety, the environment, efficiency, welfare, 
or even what exactly the facts are in any given case.  As Haddock points out, 
“[o]ne crippling bureaucratic disadvantage is that many external costs and 
benefits are subjective and thus knowable only to the demander or supplier, while 
the links from production to consumption skirt formal markets where objective 
proxies might be observed.”227  While instead the government certainly can 
simply ask individuals what they want and feel in the hope they will reveal such 
subjective information accurately, as Haddock notes “survey respondents do not 
put their money where their mouths are, and often return either zero or 
unrealistically high valuations with little variation across a wide range of 
amenities, in addition to cross-amenity comparisons that are inconsistent, 
intransitive, or sensitive to query order and wording.”228   
These problems facing government including information costs and 
transaction costs are several, and are generally known under the field of “public 
choice,” or “collective choice.”229  As noted by Richard Epstein, “modern public 
choice literature postulates self-interest to all political players, and asks how they 
respond to the incentives created by the rules of the political game.”230  
At bottom, in addition to those problems explored elsewhere in the paper, 
public choice problems also include the particular difficulties government actors – 
executives, legislators, regulators, and judges – have in determining exactly what 
the public really wants the government to do.  That is, public choice problems 
include the general difficulties in assessing the information content of votes such 
as their limited ability to fully reflect intensity of preferences, to be fungible, as 
well as what are generally known as interest group politics, agency capture, etc, as 
discussed below.   
                                                 
227  Haddock, supra note 114, at 9-10 (citing Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge 
in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 529 (1945)). 
228  Id. at 10, (citing Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis 
When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000)) 
229  For an excellent review of the field see, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C. 
Mueller ed., 1997); Dennis C. Mueller, PUBLIC CHOICE II 232 (1989); Maxwell L. Stearns, PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1997); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the 
Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); 
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An 
Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988); Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).   
230  Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of Posnerian Pragmatism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 652 
(2004).   
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Concerning intensity of preferences, while in a market the mechanism of 
price provides a finely grained mechanism for expressing intensity of preferences, 
votes in a political system do not convey similarly fine-tuned expressions of 
intensity of preferences.  In the U.S., for example, when an individual casts a vote 
in a national election the individual is only able to elect whether to cast that vote, 
or not.  The individual cannot cast a smaller or larger vote.  Indeed, this is why the 
technique of cumulative voting is offered as alternative voting system mitigating 
this effect.  As Lani Guinier describes:   
 
Under cumulative voting, voters get the same number of votes as there are seats 
or options to vote for, and they can distribute their votes in any combination to 
reflect their preferences. Like-minded voters can vote as a solid bloc or, instead, 
form strategic, cross-racial coalitions to gain mutual benefits. The system is 
emphatically not racially based; it allows voters to organize themselves on 
whatever basis they wish.231 
 
Concerning fungibility, while in the market the fungibility of money and 
many other resources allows them potentially to be spent on various competing 
uses, votes within the political system can only be spent on the few items on the 
ballot at any given time and indeed efforts to make them more fungible by, for 
example, offering them for sale, are strongly discouraged.  As Kathleen Sullivan 
has pointed out:  
 
Literal vote-buying is regarded as a paradigm instance of undemocratic conduct. 
We no longer countenance gifts of turkeys or bottles of liquor to voters on 
election day, nor the counting of dead souls. These qualities of voting 
distinguish the electoral sphere from the marketplace, where goods and services, 
unlike votes, are fungible, commensurable, and tradable.232   
 
Put simply, the increased fungibility of price over voting helps price develop 
greater information about relative preferences than voting. 
Finally, the institution of government is well known even to lay people to 
be afflicted with the problems of interest group politics233 and agency capture. 234 
                                                 
231   LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 14-15 (1994).   
232  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
663, 671 (1997).   
233  For more on interest group politics see Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, 
and Deadweight Costs, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 38, at 544 (presenting model of 
competition among interest groups and showing that “an increase in the deadweight cost of 
taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers, while an increase in the deadweight costs of subsidies 
discourages pressure by recipients”).   
234  For more on agency capture see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 
1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997).   
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As described by George Stigler in the path-breaking work that formed in part the 
basis for which he was awarded the 1982 Nobel Prize in Economics:235   
 
Particular industries and occupations obtain from the state a variety of economic 
privileges which are injurious to the vast majority of the population.  Farm 
subsidies, oil import quotas, tariffs, and occupational licensing are examples.  
These small minorities achieve their effectiveness primarily because it is 
uneconomic for the majority to oppose them.236 
 
In part, therefore, the agency capture problem, also sometimes called 
regulatory capture, is one of low incentives due to diffuse costs on the part of the 
public on the one hand and high incentives due to concentrated benefits on the 
part of the beneficiaries of the agency capture.  In part this may be seen as a form 
of rent dissipation by those seeking the government benefit.  Indeed, this link 
between what is essentially lobbying and rent seeking was first elaborated in the 
path-breaking work by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock,237 which formed in 
part the basis for which Buchanan was awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in 
Economics.238  The basic concept is that the “competition for government favors 
… involves a wastage of resources in (unproductive) lobbying activities, bribes, 
legal fees, and so on.”239 
In addition, as elucidated in the path breaking work by Fred McChesney 
and Hernando de Soto, to the extent the beneficiaries include the government 
actors themselves, who might for example, enjoy enhanced political contributions 
or political power (depending in part on whether they are elected or appointed), 
then the problem can also be seen as one form of the principal agent problem in 
which the official is the agent of the public and is pursing its own goals instead of 
                                                 
235  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1982, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1982/press.html.   
236  George J. Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 117, 125 in THE 
ESSENCE OF STIGLER (Kurt R. Leube and Thomas Gale Moore, eds. 1986) (citing George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGM’T. SCI. 3 (1971)). See also, 
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 
97, 105 n.37 (2000) (collecting sources and describing two variants of capture: one they attribute 
to the formation of “subgovernments” along the lines outlined by Stigler and another that is 
slightly different in which the general public is seen to lose “interest in agency policymaking, 
leaving only regulated interest groups to participate in the process”).  
237  See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & 
Gordon Tullock eds., 1980). For more on rent seeking and rent dissipation see supra Part II.A.2.   
238  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1986, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/press.html.   
239  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 479.   
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those of the public.240  Under this view, “the problem then, is how principals in 
the form of … taxpayers can protect themselves against opportunistic behavior on 
the part of their agents (the policy authorities).241  This problem is referred to as 
the tollbooth view by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer.242  What is perhaps more troubling, is that even 
when those within an agency experience periods of underuse, there will be a 
tendency for the agency to take on additional missions regardless of whether they 
are socially desirable.  As Milton Friedman, who was awarded the 1976 Nobel 
Prize in Economics,243 explains: 
 
The general rule is that government undertakes an activity that seems desirable 
at the time.  Once the activity begins, whether it proves desirable or not, people 
in both the government and the private sector acquire a vested interest in it.  If 
the initial reason for undertaking the activity disappears, they have a strong 
incentive to find another justification for its continued existence. 
* * * 
Again, let me emphasize, the problem is not that bureaucrats are bad people.  
The problem, as Marxists would say, is with the system, not with the people.244 
 
What is perhaps striking is that recent empirical study of entry regulation in 85 
countries including the United States by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer confirms both the extent and 
nature of the capture problem.  As they point out: 
                                                 
240  See, Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation,” 16 J. LEGAL. STUD. 101 (1987) (elucidating that politicians and bureaucrats use 
legislation, regulation, and their threat both to create rents and to extract them through campaign 
contributions, votes, political favors, or even bribes).  See also, FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR 
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (same, and 
collecting sources); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1990) (same).  For more on the 
principal agent problem see supra Part II.B.3.   
241  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 23.   
242  Simeon Djankov, et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 3 (2002 (empirical 
data showing existence and extent of the problem).   
243  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1976, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1976/press.html.    
244  Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem, Hoover Institution Essays on Public 
Policy (1993), 1, 7-13:  
This text leaves me two tasks: one easy, one difficult.  The first task is to 
demonstrate that government is the problem; that’s the easy task.  The hard task 
is to understand why government is the problem.  Why is it that able, public-
spirited people produce such different results according to whether they operate 
in the political or economic market?  Why is it that if a random sample of the 
people who read this essay and are not present in Washington were to replace 
those who are in Washington, our policies would likely not be improved?  This 
is the real puzzle for me.   
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[Public interest theory of regulation would predict regulation to be associated 
with] higher quality of goods, fewer damaging externalities, and greater 
competition. Public choice theory, in contrast, predicts that stricter regulation is 
most clearly associated with less competition and higher corruption.245 
 
In concluding their report of the data showing decreased public benefits 
and competition and increased corruption, they note that “[t]his evidence is 
difficult to reconcile with public interest theories of regulation but supports the 
public choice approach, especially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent 
extraction by politicians.”246   Such rent extraction implicates both the cost of 
rent-seeking caused by the option of a particular legal result,247 as well as any 
improper restrictions on freedom of contract and exchange imposed by such a 
law.248 In the final analysis, the central question to be explored when deciding 
whether to put a particular activity under government control is the relative 
“adaptive capabilities of institutions such as markets or hierarchies.”249   
4. Property Rights and Common Tragedies 
The final institution on which this paper places special focus is the 
institution of property rights.  As discussed earlier, property rights may provide 
some of the coordination benefits of a firm without requiring the entire 
institutional structure of a firm.250  By avoiding the degree of hierarchy associated 
with a firm, property rights can have fewer of the costs associated with the firm.  
For example, the degree of asset specificity and opportunism can be less because 
the amount of lock-in or investment in the relationship can be less when 
contracting over a property right than with the full process of joining a firm.251  
Similarly, while contracting over the property right will require transaction costs, 
the ability to strike those contracts on the open market gives more information 
about opportunity costs and increases the number of potential evaluators, both of 
                                                 
245  Djankov, et al., supra note 242, at 4.   
246  Id. at 35.   
247  James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., 
TOWARD A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY, 359-67 (1980) (exploring rent seeking effects). 
248  JAMES D. GWARTNEY, ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995 (1995) 
(comparative study of the effects of reduced economic freedom).   
249  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 20, at 24 (internal citations omitted) (citing (Friedrich 
von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (markets)) and (CHESTER I. 
BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, 30th Anniversary Edition (1968) (hierarchies)).   
250  See supra notes 144-146, 163-171, and 173-178, and accompanying text (exploring 
property rights in the context of the tradeoff between market and firm).   
251  See supra notes 125-126 and accompany text (discussing problems of asset specificity 
and opportunism), and text accompanying note 192, supra (discussing the role of public 
enforcement of property and contract rights in avoiding the need for a integration within a firm).   
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which can mitigate some of the information costs discussed earlier.252  Indeed, as 
Henry Smith has pointed out, property rights, including IP, can even be structured 
so that they impose sufficiently modest information processing costs on third 
parties who must evaluate and understand them enough to respect them by 
avoiding infringement.253   
At bottom, property rights achieve a type of private ordering via what may 
be seen as a type of middle ground between the open market on one hand and the 
hierarchy of the firm on the other hand.  This view of the role of property rights 
elucidates territory that although suggested by different lines of the literature has 
thus far escaped direct attention.  As a foil to the firm, much of the literature on 
the open market has focused on contractual arrangements among individuals 
without focusing on the specific rights over which those contracts will be struck; 
indeed often simply assuming the existence of such rights.  The view offered here 
differs from that line in the literature in suggesting that the creation of specific 
property rights – in this case IP rights – may help achieve some of the 
coordination function that is usually ascribed to the firm, without the full 
integration associated with the firm.   
Finally, several special cases of property rights have attracted particular 
attention in the literature.  These include what are called public goods, the tragedy 
of the commons and the tragedy of the anticommons, which are each discussed 
below.   
(a) Public Goods and Commons 
The subject matter protected by IP can be thought of as information, and 
indeed when writing about patents Arrow described what is often known as the 
inventor’s paradox or the Arrow Information Paradox, as mentioned earlier in the 
discussion of information costs generally.254  The inventor’s paradox is due 
largely to certain features that are shared by all forms of information in general.  
Information is a special type of economic good, often called a public good, as 
distinct from so called private goods, in that it is both nonrival (i.e., 
                                                 
252  See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing information costs).   
253  Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105, 1108, 1114-15 (2003) (“If everyone in the world is expected to respect an owner’s 
right to Blackacre, the content of that right cannot be too complicated or idiosyncratic without 
placing a large burden on many third parties.”) (“the correlation between extensiveness of the 
audience and mandated unintensiveness of legally significant communication holds in a variety of 
areas beyond land law, including patent law, copyright law, and innovative forms of intellectual 
property such as that suggested by the approach of the Supreme Court in International News 
Service v. Associated Press”) 
254  See supra notes 60-61, and accompanying text (discussing the Arrow Information 
Paradox, which is that “its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but 
then he has in effect acquired it without cost”).   
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inexhaustable) and nonexclusive. A good is considered to be nonrival if 
consumption by one individual does not leave any less of the good to be 
consumed by others.255  A good is nonexclusive if people cannot be excluded 
from consuming it.  National defense, television signals, and police protection are 
generally considered to be further examples of public goods.256  The two 
distinctive features of public goods – nonrival and nonexclusive – suggest that 
public goods will tend to be under produced, or not produced at all because of 
what some call a “free rider problem.”257   
Free rider problems are not unique to public goods and indeed also can 
occur anytime an asset is left open to common access.  The generalized statement 
of the problem of open access was elucidated in the seminal work by Garrett 
Hardin on what he termed the “tragedy of the commons.”258   
But the free rider problem for both public goods and for commons also 
can be seen as merely an example of positive externalities, as discussed earlier.259  
And as discussed earlier, there are a number of reasons to think that many 
externalities turn out to be irrelevant.260  For example, in the case of an inventor 
facing the inventor’s paradox and wanting to fund further development of the 
invention, strategic trading in financial markets may prove sufficient.261  That is, 
the price for goods that would be needed as production inputs for the invention 
                                                 
255  Put differently, a good is considered to be nonrival if for any given level of production, 
the marginal cost of providing it to an additional consumer is zero. 
256  For a more detailed discussion of public goods and the market failures associated with 
them, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 46-49, 108-119, and 134-
141 (1988); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 617-641 (1989); 
BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS  99-102, 556-585 
(1988). 
257  U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185 
(1992) (“Indeed, individuals have an incentive not to pay for the good, or to undervalue it, in 
hopes of getting access as ‘free riders.’ The inability to exclude free riders distorts market signals 
and is thought to result in inefficient allocation of resources to nonexclusive goods and 
underproduction of them, relative to socially optimal quantities”).  See also, MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43-52 (1971) 
(elucidating how small, defined groups are the most likely to overcome the transaction costs and 
free-rider problems raised by public goods); 
258  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (elucidating 
how unrestricted sharing of limited resources can lead to their over use and depletion).  See also, 
THE COMMONS, ITS TRAGEDIES AND OTHER FOLLIES, (Tibor R. Machan, ed., 2001) (providing 
critical review of literature on the “tragedy of the commons”).   
259  See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing externalities).   
260  See supra notes 114-117 (discussing the irrelevance of inframarginal externalities).  
261  See, Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to 
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 572 (1971) (suggesting just such a strategy, but in 
addition to reliance on patents).   
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(like raw materials) would likely increase if the invention became a commercial 
success while, conversely, the price for goods that would compete with the 
invention but are more expensive would likely plummet. Indeed, after Stanley 
Pons and Martin Fleischmann announced (erroneously) that had discovered cold 
fusion, Forbes magazine reported:  
 
It sounds too good to be true: an almost limitless source of clean, 
inexpensive power from a scientific breakthrough which, if fully confirmed, will 
be as important as the discovery of fire. 
 Two chemists working at the University of Utah have announced a 
simple benchtop device which, they claim, produces a thermal output of 4.5 
watts on an input of just 1 watt. The scientists, Stanley Pons and Martin 
Fleischmann, believe the heat arises from nuclear fusion. Laboratories all over 
the world have been rushing to confirm the experiment, with mixed results. 
 The Utah discovery is still a very long way from a commercially usable 
device. But speculators can’t wait for scientific proof. They’re laying bets now, 
in, for example, the commodity markets. Because the Utah device uses a 
palladium electrode, palladium futures have vaulted. One company is making 
some quick profits selling deuterium to experimenters. 
 Palladium is the most obvious way to play the cold fusion 
phenomenon, but there are at least two other metals now known to have 
potential importance to the process – titanium and lithium. The pure play on 
titanium, Oregon Metallurgical (OREM), has skyrocketed. An analyst who 
covers the stock lifted his buy recommendation as it roared through $15 – and as 
I write this, it has crested at $24. This is speculation on a speculation: Ignore it. 
Palladium and titanium are risky because cold fusion may not depend on either 
one. 
* * * 
 Maybe palladium is the secret – but maybe it isn’t. For investors who 
are intrigued by the possibility of cold fusion but don’t want to bet too heavily 
on it, I believe lithium is the best choice. We have ourselves followed this 
course, because I am strongly convinced that lithium is the essential (and 
commercially most promising) ingredient in the cold fusion process. 
 Why lithium? I believe lithium-6 is a source in the cell for tritium (just 
as it is in the nuclear industry) and that the dominant fusion reaction occurs 
between this tritium and deuterium. Lithium and its other isotopes, notably 
lithium–7, are implicated in several alternative interpretations as well. 
 You can play lithium by investing in the stock of FMC Corp. (My firm 
bought the stock for customer accounts at $33 on Apr. 11.) FMC is a diversified 
chemical and machinery company that happens to own and produce lithium. It is 
probably slightly undervalued, so it is thus a fair investment on its other merits. 
If the cold fusion phenomenon sputters to a dead end – as it certainly could – 
you would be left with FMC holdings with substantial value. One could not say 
this of palladium futures.262   
 
                                                 
262   Michael Gianturco, A Fusion Flier, FORBES, May 15, 1989.   
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Indeed, properly timed trades in palladium futures would have yielded substantial 
profits even though it was ultimately determined that Pons’ and Fleischmann’s 
cold fusion turned out actually not to work, which did not seem to be lost on at 
least Pons:   
 
B. Stanley Pons.... He has a wry sense of humor. Asked in Dallas if a cheaper 
substitute metal for the rare palladium could be used to generate the same effect 
in his experiment, he replied: “I refuse to say until I sell my futures.”263    
 
To be sure, the trading of commodities futures is not the only tool for 
making irrelevant the positive externalities of inventions and other information 
goods.264  Direct government subsidy is another option, and indeed this is done in 
the case of many areas of basic science.265  But this is not the only form of 
government action that is available.   In addition, subsidies only give individual 
                                                 
263  Chris Black, Pons A “Little Nerdy” Maybe, But He Gives Great Parties, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, April 17, 1989.  For more about market pricing behavior see BURTON MALKIEL, A 
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1996).   
264  Indeed, it may not be a legally prudent strategy for inventors to rely on this option.  Nor 
may it be socially desirable.  After the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. O’Hagan applying the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading, liability might attach to the trading of securities based 
on information obtained in breach of a fiduciary duty, whether in the strict insider sense or not.  
See U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (extending liability under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act to be predicated under “misappropriation theory”).  For more on the 
misappropriation theory see Richard W. Painter, et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading after 
United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, 
and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 443 (2001).  In the case of a scientist inventor trading on the basis of information about his 
own invention the easy insider case before O’Hagan would be if the invention were made within 
the scope of his employment and so the information might be viewed as being owed by his 
employer and its use for the personal profit of the inventor would be trading on insider 
information.  But after O’Hagan, which expands the liability to include broader types of 
misappropriation, the scientist inventor might be viewed to be breaching some kind of fiduciary 
duty to the one funding the science – perhaps the government – or even to science at large in the 
way other professionals are viewed as owing duties associated with professional ethics.  To be 
sure, this last view of a duty to science at large would require that the norms of science be 
considered by a court to be so dictated by prescriptive norms.  But there is at least some debate as 
to whether the norms of science are so strongly prescriptive, or merely aspirational.  Compare, Rai 
supra note 186 (arguing the norms are both descriptive and prescriptive) with Kieff, supra note 
185 (arguing that the norms are more aspirational).   
265  See, e.g, Michael Polanyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 61, 65 (1944) 
(discussing the option of direct government subsidy).  Indeed this is the option Pigou offered to 
solve the problem of positive externalities and that Coase was criticizing responding in his famous 
article on the problem of social cost.  See supra notes 101-106, and accompanying text.     
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rewards, which for many reasons may not be effective, and yet they fail to 
facilitate coordination.266   
Property rights can provide a middle ground between the two extremes of 
atomized free market acting within the context of an open commons on the one 
hand and total government production on the other hand.267  Michael Heller, 
building upon earlier work by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, provides the 
example of a hypothetical community called “Poach Pond” in which under-
fishing of the pond may occur if the rule were that any community member could 
appropriate fish until the moment of consumption because people might prefer to 
wait on shore and poach others’ catches rather than invest in fishing itself.268   As 
Demsetz pointed out in his seminal work on the emergence of property rights, 
property rights may serve as a tool for internalizing externalities.269  And as Coase 
pointed out, this can be used as a tool in place of direct Pigouvian subsidy.270   
Indeed, the free rider, tragedy of the commons, and positive externalities 
problems each can be thought of essentially as an inverse of the problem of rent 
dissipation, discussed earlier.271  Whereas the problems of free riding, commons, 
and positive externalities, refer to cases in which individuals within a group 
decide not to invest in a given activity for fear that others will benefit but not 
compensate and as a result too little of the activity is produced, the problem of 
rent dissipation refers to a case in which individuals within a group decide to 
invest in a given activity for fear that others will do the same and win the race for 
the common prize and as a result too much of the activity is produced.  In both 
sets of cases, the failure to coordinate leads to inappropriate amounts of the given 
activity being produced.  The connection between these two classes of problems 
                                                 
266  For more on the failures of reward theories and the strengths of coordination theories for 
property rights in the context of IP see infra Part III.   
267  This is a different middle ground view of the role of property rights than the one explored 
earlier between the open market and the firm.  See supra notes 144-146, 163-171, 173-178, and 
250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context of the tradeoff between 
market and firm). 
268  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998).  See also, Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 23-24 (1973) (providing the 
example of a community in which food caught in a hunt for animals may be shared by all and the 
resulting diminished incentive for individuals in that community to elect to hunt, or in his words 
“shirk,” absent other inducements such as a state order to hunt or a cultural indoctrination to hunt).   
269  See supra notes 107, 173-178, and accompanying text.   
270  See supra note 103, and accompanying text.   
271  See Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S. 
ECON. J. 438, 441, 447 (1983).  For more on rent seeking and rent dissipation see supra Part 
II.A.2.   
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based on their common failure of coordination is important because, as discussed 
earlier, property rights can provide this coordination.272   
While property rights can have benefits, they of course also have costs.  
Chief among these are the transaction costs that are needed to create, exchange, 
manage, and avoid property rights.273  Related to these costs are the information 
costs of determining what the rights are and what value they have, and to 
whom.274  There also can be rent dissipation costs associated with the desire to 
obtain property rights.275  Finally, recent important and innovative work by 
Michael Heller has spawned a rich literature on a different problem associated 
with property rights (although often in a mistaken fashion) that he termed the 
“tragedy of the anticommons,”276 as discussed in the following.   
(b) Anticommons, Permit Thickets, and License Raj 
Heller’s landmark contribution to the property literature regarding 
anticommons was originally based on his study of real property in the post-
socialist economies of Eastern Europe, but he has also applied it to IP.  As 
described by Heller:   
 
Consider new areas for property law, such as the problem of spurring private 
investment in biomedical research or creating well-functioning markets in post-
socialist economies…. By drawing the wrong property boundaries around 
resources, by fragmenting ownership too much, it turns out that privatization can 
destroy resource productivity in enduring ways. To capture these unexpected 
results from excessive privatization, I have proposed the idea of anticommons 
property, an image that goes beyond the old trilogy [private, commons, and 
state] and crystallizes emerging real-world property relations that had previously 
remained invisible….[A] resource is prone to underuse in a tragedy of the 
anticommons when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a 
scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use. In theory, in a 
                                                 
272  See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing coordination problems generally and the ability for 
property rights to help solve them).   
273  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing transaction costs).   
274  Much of the important recent work on the information costs associated with property 
rights has been done by Henry Smith.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 163; Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 163; and Smith, supra note 253.  For more on information costs generally, see supra Part 
II.A.3.   
275  See Anderson & Hill, supra note 271 (elucidating how the rent seeking costs associated 
with obtaining property rights can dissipate the gains from creating those rights, and providing 
case studies).  See also, Levmore, supra note 4 (noting that rearrangements of property rights can 
have the same effect).  While in some cases the rent dissipation will be directly through the 
resources expended to race, in other cases the rent dissipation will also trigger problems of public 
choice.  For more on public choice see supra PartII.C.3.   
276  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).   
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world of costless transactions, people could always avoid common or 
anticommons tragedy by trading their rights. In practice, however, avoiding 
tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive 
biases of participants, with success more likely within close-knit communities 
than among hostile strangers. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights 
into usable private property is often brutal and slow…. I developed the idea 
initially from closely observing privatization in post- socialist economies. One 
promise of transition to markets was that new entrepreneurs would fill stores 
that socialist rule had left bare. Yet after several years of reform, many 
privatized storefronts remained empty, while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of 
goods, mushroomed up on the streets. Why did the new merchants not come in 
from the cold? One reason was that transition governments often failed to endow 
any individual with a bundle of rights that represents full ownership. Instead, 
fragmented rights were distributed to various socialist-era stakeholders, 
including private or quasi-private enterprises, workers’ collectives, privatization 
agencies, and local, regional, and federal governments. No one could set up shop 
without first collecting rights from each of the other owners.277 
 
Heller seems to suggest that what he terms “fragmentation,” or excessive numbers 
of rights holders, is key to the anticommons effect because the transaction costs of 
dealing with so many claimants will dominate.278   
But fragmentation itself is not the key to the anticommons effect that is 
observed in post socialist economies.  What really drives the problem is the lack 
of what Anderson and Hill call a “residual claimant.”279 To provide a brief 
summary definition at the outset, a residual clamant in the context of the 
anticommons problem caused by many holders of a right to respond “no” to 
requests for permission essentially means an individual who is able to extract 
private value from such a request by electing to respond with a “yes.”  But to 
more fully understand the nature of the issue, further elaboration is required.   
As Buchanan and Yoon elucidated, there actually exists “a formal 
symmetry between the overusage of a resource because of common (multiple) 
access and the underusage because of multiple exclusion rights”280  In 
                                                 
277  Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law , 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 79, 87-89 (2001) (drawing the definition of anticommons property from Heller, supra note 276, 
and building on the discussion of IP rights from Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) 
[hereinafter Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons]. 
278  See, Heller supra note 276, at 624 (arguing that when too many owners hold rights of 
exclusion in a resource, the resource is prone to under use).  See also, Heller & Eisenberg, 
Anticommons supra note 277, at 700; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 
YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999).   
279  See Anderson & Hill supra note 271 (using the term “residual claimant” while exploring 
the related problem of rent dissipation during races for a common prize).   
280  See, e.g., James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:  Commons and 
Anticommons, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 12 (2000).  For an interesting taxonomy applying this 
symmetry see, Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907 (2004).   
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highlighting this symmetry, they then point out that in both cases (commons and 
anticommons) the heart of the problem can be tied to the nature of the holders of 
the right (to use or exclude, depending on whether the tragedy is one of commons 
or anticommons).  More particularly, according to Buchanan and Yoon, the 
problem lies in whether the holders have “noneconomic motivations” in that they 
are those “who cannot or may not desire to, capture directly pecuniary gains,” 
meaning that their goals may not be “primarily distributional but instead may 
reflect different objectives.”281  Indeed, Buchanan and Yoon warn of the 
potentially pernicious impact in either case (commons or anticommons) of the 
“genuine zealot…[who] may be insensitive to proffered compensations.”282  At 
bottom, the concern Buchanan and Yoon highlight is that the crux of the problem 
for both commons and anticommons relates to the ability of those engaged in the 
group activity to coordinate with each other, but when the individuals have 
noneconomic motivations they are unlikely to so coordinate unless they happen to 
share some other coordinating attribute, such as being close-knit.283   
In contrast, as discussed previously, coordination is a central problem 
studied by NIE and one general response to coordination problems can be 
property rights.284  While at first blush given the way Heller presents the 
anticommons problem it would seem that property rights are more a part of the 
problem than a part of the solution, it turns out this just is not so.  Property rights 
provide individuals with the economic motivation to engage in trades with each 
other.  Indeed, the easier it is for the holder of a property right to engage in such a 
trade and the greater the value that the individual can extract from the trade (the 
greater the residual claim), the greater the motivation and ability the individual 
has to engage in it.285   
What really drives the anticommons problem in the post-socialist 
economies is both the lack of residual claim and the lack of clarity that are 
                                                 
281  Id. Buchanan & Yoon (citing the example of an environmental regulator whose 
permission is needed to put an asset to use but whose permission should not be bought). To be 
sure, without being motivated by direct pecuniary gains, a regulator may be economically 
motivated along the lines of the political favors discussed in the public choice literature.  See 
supra Part II.C.3 (discussing public choice).   
282  Id.   
283  Heller suggests the coordination benefits of being “close knit.”  See text accompanying 
note 277, supra.  See also supra notes 160-161, and accompany text (discussing the coordination 
benefits of family and other close personal ties within the context of “crony capitalism”).  
284  See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing coordination problems and the role of property rights in 
easing them).  See also supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text (focusing on property rights 
and coordination as a tool for mitigating both commons problems and rent dissipation problems).   
285  See R. Quentin Grafton & Dale Squires, Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A 
Study of Common Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON. 679 (2000) (providing empirical data showing 
how various institutional changes towards the treatment of private property rights as fully tradable 
assets are essential for facilitating efficient use of common pool resources).   
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associated with the pertinent rights of exclusion.286  As Richard Epstein and Bruce 
Kuhlik have recently pointed out in response to the perceived anticommons 
problem relating to IP, the distinguishing feature of the anticommons in the post-
socialist economy is that efforts by the bureaucrats to engage in open trading of 
their permission for personal gain are likely to trigger various forms of criminal 
liability for graft, bribery, public corruption, etc.287  What is more, in such a 
sequential bribe situation there is a greater degree of uncertainty that each bribe 
will either be needed or effective.  This is in part because those being bribed can’t 
openly coordinate.  It is also because some of those who’s permission would be 
needed might not even be open to being bribed.  They might justifiably be 
steadfastly acting to prevent an activity they see as bad.288  Alternatively, they 
may derive more benefit – perhaps sense of control or power or even just some 
other kind of perhaps perverse pleasure – from simply being able to say “no” than 
from what otherwise might be obtained in exchange for saying “yes.”289   
Put differently, the anticommons problem in the post-socialist 
environment, indeed just as the anticommons problem in general, is tied to the 
inability of those who hold rights of exclusion to openly negotiate to extract value 
for a decision to give reliable permission rather than withhold permission or give 
faulty permission.  At bottom, there is a huge difference between the openly 
tradable nature of property on the one hand and what Epstein refers to as a 
pernicious “permit thicket” as in the case of the post-socialist economy on the 
other hand.290  Interestingly, the anticommons problem is not unique to the post-
socialist economy and indeed is nicely captured by a well known expression used 
in India after throwing off British rule, also called “Raj,” where it was said that 
Raj had been replaced by “License Raj” in the form of excessive and 
unpredictable requirements for permits and licenses from the many branches of 
                                                 
286  The importance of certainty for facilitating private ordering is explored supra notes 198-
208, and accompanying text.   
287  See, e.g., Richard Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for 
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman, Chicago John M. Olin Law & 
Economics Working Paper (2d Series) No. 209, at 4 (“But the state bureaucrat is not the owner of 
any asset whose value will remain unlocked unless he brings it to market”).  Nevertheless, 
individual regulators have incentives to try to extract such value, which explains the results of the 
empirical study of the public choice “tollbooth” theory of regulation discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 240-246  supra.   
288  This would be consistent with the public interest view of regulation.  For more on the 
public interest theory of regulation see supra text accompanying note 245.   
289  Consider for example the well known childhood tease, or prank, sometimes known as 
“Want a lick?… Psych!” involving the offering a lick of an ice cream cone to a peer and then after 
inducing anticipation, but before delivery, withdrawing the cone to prevent the lick while 
exclaiming “Psych!” or some more colorful equivalent.   
290  See Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 287 (citing Richard. A. Epstein, The Permit Power 
Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407 (1995)).   
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the central government in order to conduct many important business activities.291  
At bottom, the essential lesson of anticommons is that it can be seen as a coin 
having two poisonous sides:  the pernicious “permit thicket” or “License Raj” 
implications for taxing and retarding development on the one hand; and the 
“tollbooth” implications of extortion by agencies on the other hand.292   
D. Wrapping-up Problems Explored through NIE  
The many problems explored above and their interrelationships are quite 
complex.    As a result, the above treatment is necessarily too brief, and therefore 
in many respects inaccurate.  But it is offered in the hope that it sufficiently helps 
elucidate the general nature of these problems and how they relate to each other to 
inform the below discussion of the extensive literatures on normative IP theory 
and positive IP law, which for the most part have relied upon many of these 
problems in a rather piece-wise fashion.   
Before proceeding to a more focused discussion on IP there are a few core 
lessons that should be drawn from the above treatment.  First, on a general level, 
the details of different institutional choices matter in that they have different 
implications for a large number of costs and problems.  Second, on a very 
granular level, the treatment above will be used below to show how many of the 
problems that have attracted attention in the IP literature turn out to be properly 
viewed as inapposite, overstated, or even having implications opposite of those 
offered by the literature.  Third, on a conceptual level, property rights in general 
and IP in particular are not offered as perfect solutions to every problem.  The 
case is not being made for property or IP, uber alles.   
Rather, the point is that property rights and IP can provide an important 
additional and middle-ground tool for optional use by individuals engaged in 
private ordering beyond those offered by the extreme poles of either the free, open 
market without them on the one hand or the hierarchy of family, firm, or 
                                                 
291  I thank participants in the faculty workshop held at Wolfson College, Cambridge 
University, June 28, 2004, for pointing out this term to me.  For more on the problem of License 
Raj in India see, e.g., JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 49-51 
(1993) (discussing the system of permits and licenses needed in India for both outside investment 
and for internal economic development).  See also, Emran, M. Shahe, et al., After the “License 
Raj:” Economic Liberalization and Aggregate Private Investment in India (2003) (available on-
line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=411080) (same); Sunita Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A 
Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1608 (1997) (“This system, 
known in India as License Raj, means that the center retains control over the distribution of 
permits and licenses for new areas of economic development through the relevant central 
ministry”).   
292  See supra notes 240-246, and accompanying text (discussing “tollbooth” theory of 
regulation in the context of agency capture and public choice).   
KIEFF NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT  65 
 
government on the other hand.293  But, to play this role, IP rights must be 
designed to facilitate private ordering.  To achieve this role effectively, they must 
operate as rights of exclusion around which coordination can take place.  To do so 
efficiently, they must be structured to mitigate the costs of rent dissipation, 
information, transactions, and public choice.   
As discussed in more detail below, it therefore makes sense as a matter of 
normative theory for IP rights to be designed to achieve this coordination role.  
Indeed, other popular normative theories of IP – reward and prospect or rent 
dissipation – fail to teach how the regimes could be structured to be either 
effective or efficient in achieving the various goals posited by those theories.294   
In addition, there are reasons to think that the regimes of patent law and 
trademark law can be both effective and efficient in achieving this coordination 
role, while least for the entertainment industry the copyright regime may be 
neither effective nor efficient in achieving this effect, and indeed may not be 
needed.295   
III. LESSONS FROM NIE FOR LAW & ECONOMIC THEORIES OF IP 
While the large body of literature involving law and economic theories of 
IP has taught a great deal about some of the specific issues it explores, this paper 
objects to the approach of much of that literature as focused too narrowly on only 
some of the issues explored in the above review of NIE, and too often only in 
some settings.  As discussed more fully below, one central lesson for IP from NIE 
is that in the real world each of these issues is at play, and often in several 
different settings.  Put differently, each issue must be considered in relation to the 
others, and all in the context of private ordering as it occurs in the real world over 
time. At bottom, the views explored here are more consistent with private 
ordering than those in the literature, which may instead be seen as justifications 
for various forms of more extensive government regulation.296    
The overall theme of this paper is that government, law, contracts, 
property rights, organization, and norms can complement each other to overcome 
barriers that otherwise prevent the subject matter of IP from coming to market.  
This stands in contrast to most of the literature on the law and economics of IP,297 
                                                 
293  For elaboration on the role of property rights as a middle ground see supra notes 144-
146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context 
of the tradeoff between market and firm). See also supra note 267(exploring property rights in the 
context of the tradeoff between market and government).   
294  See infra Part III (discussing theories of IP).   
295  See infra Part IV(discussing positive law IP regimes).   
296  Again, as discussed supra in note 163, the term private ordering is used here in a broader 
sense than in some of the NIE literature.   
297  See infra Part III.A (discussing reward literature).   
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which has focused largely on only one of the major obstacles at a time, such as 
elucidating the transaction costs or monopoly costs of property rights, as part of a 
larger effort to advocate a shift towards the elimination of property rights in IP to 
leave what some call greater “open commons” or “public domain.”   
The approach of this paper differs in considering the set of problems from 
the NIE literature that are explored above to answer questions about improving 
the delivery of IP subject matter in the real world.  For example, in addition to the 
transaction costs explored in other works on innovation, this paper also considers 
those costs without IP rights as well as each of the other problems relating to the 
individual level, inter-individual level, and institutional level, as explored 
above.298  That is, it performs a more comprehensive comparative institutional 
analysis of options for bringing ideas to market so as to avoid indulging a nirvana 
thesis, which would strive towards the theoretical utopia rather than those options 
available in the real world.299   
In making this comparative institutional analysis, the paper reveals how 
the Copyright system fails to offer sufficient coordination benefits, and in addition 
generates too many costs.300  In contrast, patent and trademark do offer 
appropriate coordination benefits and impose sufficiently few costs.301  In 
addition, the particular coordination benefits offered by patent and trademark may 
be able to meet any need that otherwise would exist for coordination by copyright, 
at least in the entertainment industry.302  Thus, the paper shows how patent and 
trademark may obviate the need for copyright in this setting.   
A. Problems of Reward Theories and the Incentive Access Paradigm 
The bulk of the law and economics literature on IP regimes in this country 
focuses on the government’s role in providing targeted incentives to specific 
creative individuals to solve the public goods problem associated with intellectual 
works while at the same time mitigating the monopoly distortion and transaction 
costs associated with the IP right to exclude.303  The concern driving this 
                                                 
298  See supra Part II (reviewing set of problems explored by NIE).   
299  See supra notes 20-31, and accompanying text (discussing comparative institutional 
analysis).   
300  See infra Part IV.A (discussing social costs and benefits of copyright).   
301  See infra Part IV (discussing social costs and benefits of patent and trademark).  
302  See infra Part IV.B (discussing possible use of patents and trademarks in place of 
copyrights to facilitate commercialization in the entertainment industry).   
303  See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 
466 (2004) (“The conventional theory of intellectual property rights posits that such rights exist to 
stimulate the creation and distribution of intellectual goods”) (citing Lemley, supra note 61, at 993 
(1997) (“Intellectual property [rights are] fundamentally about incentives to invent and create.”).  
Although there are a number of incentive-based theories for IP that are mentioned in the literature 
– including “incentive to invent”, “incentive to disclose” or “teach,” “incentive to innovate,” and 
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perspective is that the subject matter protected by IP will be under-produced 
because it is characterized by the Arrow Information Paradox, which is to say it 
has public good qualities or has positive externalities.304  Under this view, 
incentives to produce are provided through specific rewards for specific creative 
work.  For example, patents are offered as incentive to invent; and copyrights as 
incentive to generate creative expression.  Importantly, the literature does not see 
rewards merely as some kind of ancillary effect of IP; it sees reward as IP’s 
central goal.  What is more, under this view, the reward and its recipient must be 
carefully regulated to mitigate monopoly effects and transaction costs.305  As 
summarized by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley when discussing patents, for 
example, “[t]he central problem considered by modern analysts has been the 
conflict between the social goals of achieving efficient use of information once 
produced versus providing ideal motivation for production of information.”306  
Glynn Lunney has called this conflict, or balance, between incentive and access 
the “incentive access paradigm.”307   
                                                                                                                                     
“incentive to design around” – there are essentially three dominant theories today: (1) some 
version of the “incentive to invent” and “disclose” theories treated together under the rubric of 
“reward;” (2) the “prospect” theory; and (3) the commercialization theory.  For a recent review of 
the patent literature on incentive theories and a collection of sources see CHISUM, ET AL. supra 
note 5, at 58-90 (reviewing various incentive theories for the patent system).  See also, Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1017, at 1024-46 (1989) (same); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories Of 
Patents – The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (same).  For recent 
reviews of the copyright literature on incentive theories and a collection of sources, see Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996) 
(reviewing and collecting sources and suggesting that incentives may draw efforts away from 
other productive activities); Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, George Mason Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 03-03 (2003) (available on line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=374580 
(reviewing and collecting sources and highlighting the opportunity cost issues discussed by 
Lunney as well as showing how additional works on the margin may contribute little while at the 
same time causing rent dissipation).   
304  For more on public goods problems and the subject matter of IP see supra Part II.C.4(a).   
305  See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics 
of Intellectual Property, 5 J. Econ. Persp.  3, 8 (1991) (“The patent offers the incentive of the 
statutory right to exclude as a means for inducing creative activity.”).  Several types of regulatory 
responses to IP rights are generally justified by this concern.  Examples include liability rule 
treatment, misuse, fair use, etc.   
306  Hirshleifer & Riley, supra note 53, at 1404 (emphasis in original) (citing Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources of Invention, supra note 60, and Fritz 
Machlup, Patents, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 461 
(Macmillan, Free Press, 1968)). 
307  Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 483 (1996) (reviewing the incentive access-paradigm and highlighting an additional cost 
of IP is the opportunity cost of deploying resources towards IP that could instead have been 
deployed elsewhere).   
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Although the reward literature contributes much to our understanding of 
IP, it has a number of serious limitations.  One perspective is to see these theories 
as focusing on the role of government in providing both subsidy and regulation 
rather than in providing less invasive forms of intervention, such as setting rules 
and resolving disputes.308  That is, the government is seen as needed on the one 
hand to prop up potential holders of IP and then on the other hand to keep them in 
check.  Another perspective is to see the reward literature as paying too much 
attention to direct incentives for creators, to monopoly power, and to transaction 
costs, all on only some settings, while paying remarkably little attention to these 
same issues in other settings, as well as overlooking a host of other important 
issues including, for example, coordination problems and public choice 
problems.309   
Indeed, the reward theories may be seen as premised on a false perception 
of tension between incentives and access.  Under this view, the inventive side of 
the paradigm is inapt because IP rights are not and should not be offered to 
provide direct incentives to invent or create.  Similarly, the access side of the 
paradigm is also inapt because IP rights are more successful than rewards, by 
design, in facilitating access.  These objections to both components of the 
paradigm are explored in more detail below.   
1. Imprudent Incentives 
The incentive side of the paradigm is inapt because it is not clear that 
endeavoring to provide direct incentives is even prudent.  Put differently, one 
central objection to reward theories is tied to the problem of rewards themselves.  
That is, rewards may not be needed, may not be effective, or may have bad side-
effects.  Rewards may not be needed to the extent that enough of the desired 
activity may occur without added incentive of the reward.310  Rewards may not be 
effective to the extent that the desired activity might not be responsive to 
                                                 
308  For a general discussion of the role of government see supra notes 215-219 and 
accompanying text.   
309  For a review of each of these problems see supra Part II.   
310  See supra notes 114-117 (discussing the irrelevance of inframarginal externalities).  For 
example, individuals may be driven by self-satisfaction, search for knowledge, reputation, etc.  
Indeed, although the positive shift in 1980 to allow patents in basic biotechnology did lead to 
some increase in amount of inventive activity being done in the field, the amount before was still 
quite substantial.  This is not surprising given that in a field with large lumber of people having 
sufficient creative ability working to solve a problem it is likely the solution will be found.  See 
JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 215 (1966).  For more on the norms of 
science and the incentive they provide towards discovery see, e.g., Robert K. Merton, The Role of 
Genius in Scientific Advance, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 2, 1961, at 306.   
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additional incentive.311  Rewards may have bad side effects to the extent that the 
social costs of investments made to get them may be greater than the social value 
of the activity rewarded.312   
A related problem with reward theories is that the correlation between the 
amount of reward and the merit of the awarded activity is unclear.  On the one 
hand, for example, empirical works by Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele 
and by Michael Kremer have shown that at least for patents the patentee often 
does not receive the full social surplus created by the patented invention.313  On 
the other hand, for example, earlier work by the present author has pointed out the 
difficulties in developing a theory of just deserts as a basis for government to 
allocate any reward among potential claimants, whether the reward is a patent or 
cash.314   
Understanding the relationship between the reward and the activity being 
rewarded is important because it would inform determinations about how to set 
the reward.  If set too low, then there may be insufficient positive response.  If too 
                                                 
311  This may be because the activity is only responsive to alternative inducements such as 
self-satisfaction, search for knowledge, reputation, etc.  See, e.g., Besen & Raskind supra note 
305, at 6 (“Another critical element in deciding how to strike the balance between encouraging 
innovation and dissemination is the extent to which creative activity responds to economic 
rewards.  The less that innovation depends on the resources invested and the potential economic 
rewards, the more limited is the case for granting substantial rights to creators.”).   
312  This may be because they may trigger rent dissipation.  For more on rent dissipation 
generally see supra Part II.A.2.  For more on rent dissipation within the context of IP see infra 
Part III.B.  This may also be because of the opportunity cost associated with the efforts made 
towards winning the reward.  See Lunney supra note 307 (discussing role of opportunity costs).   
313  See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-8 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 
6956, 1999); See, e.g., MICHAEL KREMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING 
INNOVATION 1-5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6304, 1997).  Social 
surplus is the amount of total social welfare generated by the invention minus the costs of making 
the invention, such as research by the inventor and the inventor’s competitors.  Social welfare is 
the aggregate value of all utility that individuals obtain from the invention.   
314  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 713-14, n. 77 (citing LEO KATZ, 
ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 (1996)).  As 
pointed out when discussing the problem of two or more authors or inventors:   
Concerning the distinction between acts and omissions, one might ask what 
level of contribution is required on the part of a supervising faculty member for 
co-authorship or co-inventorship.  What is sufficient: active advice, or passive 
permission and non-interference where others would have refused to allow a 
project, or its continuance?  Also consider how the rules of praise should 
evaluate the problems presented by cases of mere thought, transferred intent, or 
unreasonable hopes; any of which might nonetheless correlate with inventive 
success.  To what extent should originality, effort, genius, or utility drive our 
decisions to allocate rewards?     
Id. (citations omitted).   
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great, the marginal excess may generate too little marginal positive response or 
may generate too many negative side effects.315  While simple metrics such as too 
big or too small may turn out not to matter, at least some dimension of the reward 
will matter and yet the reward theories offer no guidance as to how to set the 
reward along that dimension, whatever it may be.316   
Some of the reward theorists do suggest techniques for solving some of 
the problems of determining the reward while at the same time mitigating the 
monopoly power and transaction costs problems associated with the IP property 
right by suggesting as alternatives to IP rights various forms of cash reward, prize, 
buyout, or subsidy.317  To be sure, these reward or prize proposals are each more 
ingenious than the other in developing methods for finding, at least on average 
and in theory, the “right” price for rewards.  And while Michael Abamowicz 
provides extensive and thoughtful analyses of many of their shortcomings, for 
several of these he also provides potential solutions.318  Nevertheless, in the final 
analysis the best case for these proposals leaves them as adjuncts to the IP system, 
not as complete replacements,319 and so their availability does not supplant the 
                                                 
315  For example, too little positive response might occur because those responding to the 
rewards might have decreasing marginal desire or ability to respond.  Similarly, for example, too 
many negative side effects might occur if the opportunity costs of the resources being spent 
responding are too high or if their rent seeking costs are too great. 
316  This problem is described as “screening” in earlier work by the present author and its 
resolution is one of the strengths of the commercialization theory, and its companion registration 
theory:  these theories turn out to have great explanatory power for the positive law rules 
governing when valid IP rights are available.  See, Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 
(elucidating the normative case for these positive law rules for patents).  For more on these 
positive law rules see infra Part IV.   
317  For an excellent review of these proposals including in-depth critiques see Michael 
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003).  For convenience, these 
proposals can be summarized in very brief form as follows:  (1) patents are bought out by the 
government with prices informed by test marketing (Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, 
Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q., June 1995, at 
213); (2) awards are given in the place of patents with the amount of reward set by later developed 
data from actual demand (SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, supra note 313); (3) patents are 
bought out with prices informed by probabilistic auctions (KREMER, supra note 313); (4) 
subsidizing purchases of subject matter covered by patents as a tool for improving effectiveness of 
price discrimination by patentees (Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government 
Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997)); 
and (5) the use of retrospective prizes in exchange for efforts to decrease monopoly effects of 
patents (Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes).   
318  See Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note 317.   
319  See, e.g., Id., at 115 (ultimately concluding that its proposal “would complement rather 
than replace the patent system”).   
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need for comparative analyses of the IP systems like the one offered in this 
paper.320   
Yet, to the extent these reward or prize proposals are taken to be 
replacements for the IP system there would be some objections to overcome that 
are worth considering here.  First, the benefits such proposals offer for 
determining the amount and type of reward may be illusory.  The systems are 
quite complex and so their transaction costs – both on the market side and the 
government side – should be carefully explored. On the market side these might 
influence the types of private ordering that would be able to occur around the 
rewards.321  On the government side, it would be important to elucidate the ways 
in which at bottom these approaches do not boil down to the very Pigouvian 
subsidies that were the target of criticism in the path-breaking treatment by Coase 
of the eternality problem.  That is, the rewards in these proposals are being 
offered to mitigate the problem raised by the positive externalities associated with 
the subject matter protected by IP (also seen as a public goods problem or Arrow 
Information Paradox problem).322 Yet, as Coase pointed out, property rights can 
compare favorably to Pigouvian taxes and subsidies as tools for mitigating the 
problem of externalities.323  As explored more fully below in the discussion of 
commercialization, the general nature of the reasons to suspect that prizes may 
not compare favorably to property rights includes concerns about both 
commercialization and screening.324  Unlike property rights, rewards implicate a 
number of problems for both commercialization and screening, as discussed 
immediately below.   
2. Ineffective Access 
The access side of the paradigm is similarly inapt because it is not clear 
that access is a problem under property rights or that access is improved in the 
long term without property rights.  The reward literature places great emphasis on 
the risk that the right to exclude associated with property rights in IP will lead to 
insufficient access to the subject matter protected by IP essentially because of the 
potential monopoly distortion and transaction costs associated with the IP right to 
                                                 
320  In addition, the best case for each of these proposals involves mechanisms of non-trivial 
complexity for which a careful evaluation of its implications for each of the various costs outlined 
supra in Part II would be an area of fruitful further study.   
321  For more on the particular role property rights can have for facilitating private ordering 
among diffuse individuals see supra Part II.B.4.  For an application to IP see infra Part III.C.   
322  For more on externalities generally see supra Part II.B.1.  For more on the public goods 
problem in particular see supra Part II.C.4(a).    
323  See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.   
324  For more on these issues see the discussion of the commercialization theory infra Part 
III.C.   
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exclude.  As explored below in the discussion of the commercialization theory 
and its implications for these and other social costs in the context of IP, the 
reward theory concerns about these costs are in a sense both overstated in that the 
costs are not as great a feared and understated in that property rights can be 
essential for mitigating them.325   
Nevertheless, in response to the risk of monopoly effect and transaction 
costs, reward theories advocate enforcing IP rights only as forms of liability rules, 
as distinct from property rules, by creating various forms of compulsory licenses, 
and exemptions from infringement (such as fair use or experimental use) to leave 
what some call an “open commons” or “public domain.”  Such liability rule 
treatment is advocated as a tool for providing adequate incentives to patentees 
while reducing the distortionary effects of an absolute right to exclude.   
Various forms of liability treatment have been offered.  For example, 
Ayres & Klemperer advocate a patent litigation system characterized by 
uncertainty and delay, which they show could serve as a form of compulsory 
license, or liability rule.326  Others simply advocate various exemptions to 
infringement, such as for what they call fair use.327  As explored further below, 
the approach offered in this paper, which builds on earlier work by the same 
author, elucidates why access may not be improved by these proposals for 
liability rule treatment and indeed may be made worse.   
The distinction between treatment of IP as a form of property rule or 
liability rule that is relevant here was elucidated in the seminal work by Guido 
Calabresi and Douglas Melamed.328  According to this view, an entitlement 
enjoys the protection of a property rule if the law condones its surrender only 
through voluntary exchange,329 so that holder of such an entitlement is allowed to 
enjoin infringement and in some cases to obtain enhanced damages as a deterrent 
to future infringements.330  An entitlement has the lesser protection of a liability 
rule if it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay some court-determined 
compensation.331  The holder of such an entitlement is only entitled to a court’s 
                                                 
325  See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing monopoly effects, transaction costs, and some 
additional particularly salient NIE lessons on social costs for IP).    
326  See, Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing 
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that sufficient incentive to invent can be provided without the 
monopoly power associated with a property right).   
327  See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward A Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (offering fair use exception because of excessive transaction costs 
causing too many market failures in the transactions over IP rights as property rights).    
328  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).   
329  See id. at 1105.   
330  See id.  
331  See id. at 1105-6.   
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assessment of actual damages caused by the specific act of infringement.332  Put 
differently, the bargaining over liability rules is done against the backdrop of a 
possible court ordered price while the bargaining over property rules is done 
against a backdrop of a possible court order to not infringe (or to pay some form 
of enhanced damages as a deterrent to future infringement).   
One lesson from the work by Calabresi and Melamed is that attention must 
be paid to which locus of decision-making about the true value of the underlying 
asset is the lowest cost provider of a correct decision.333  A liability rule can be 
more efficient if a collective, public, or governmental determination of the true 
value of the asset would be cheaper than a private evaluation reached by 
agreement of the parties; and conversely a property rule should be used if the 
private evaluation would be cheaper.334 Thus, soon after the Calabresi-Melamed 
framework was elucidated, Richard Posner pointed out that where private 
ordering implicates high transaction costs the case for liability rules is stronger.335  
Yet, as Mitchell Polinsky pointed out, where decisions by a court are more costly 
the case for property rules is stronger.336  Applying this framework to IP, Robert 
Merges has pointed out that use of a property rule rather than a liability rule may 
be best because private parties have a comparative advantage over courts in 
valuing IP.337   
But there are at least two additional problems relating to coordination that 
are raised by the distinction between property rules and liability rules.  The first 
relates to social costs directly caused by the failed coordination among potential 
infringers.  The second relates to the failed access indirectly caused by the 
decreased ability for the IP owner and those with whom it could otherwise 
transact to coordinate with each other to bring the invention to market.   
                                                 
332  See id.  
333  To be sure, important additional considerations not directly applicable here have also 
been offered.  See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden Of Determining Property 
Rules And Liability Rules: Broken Elevators In The Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267, 268, n. 8 
(2002) (elucidating analytical framework for assessing “the relative burden (or costs, or difficulty) 
faced by judges when attempting to determine property rules and liability rules”).   
334  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 328 at 1106.  See also James E. Krier & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
440, 447-49 (1995) (pointing out symmetries in the many problems elucidated in the literature). 
335  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29 (1st ed. 1972) (“where transaction 
costs are high, the allocation of resources to their highest valued uses is facilitated by denying 
property right holders an injunctive remedy against invasions of their rights and instead limiting 
them to a remedy in damages”). 
336  See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of 
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1111 (1980) (pointing out that “the 
argument could easily go either way”).   
337  See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 328).   
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Where there are large numbers of potential infringers (which is the case 
for IP) liability rules make bargaining between the entitlement owner and the 
infringers more difficult.  The use of a liability rule may create a prisoner’s 
dilemma or collective action problem among potential infringers in which each 
individual’s dominant strategy is to infringe in order to garner more of the 
potential gains from exchange for itself.338  And yet the property owner will not 
have adequate incentive to bargain with these infringers because such bargaining 
will not yield effective protection from others.  The point is elaborated further by 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell:   
 
Consider the situation of an owner and a particular potential taker who values 
the car less highly than does the owner (but above the level of damages).  The 
owner would like to bargain with the taker and pay him not to take the car.  
However, it would be irrational for the owner to pay this taker not to take the 
car, for he would subsequently have to pay another potential taker not to take the 
car, and then another and another. Therefore, the potential taker will tend to take 
the car even though the owner values it more highly.  The general point, in other 
words, is that when courts err and set damages too low, bargaining by owners 
will be effectively infeasible, and socially undesirable takings will occur.339 
 
Several negative impacts follow.  First, as elucidated in earlier work by the 
present author:  
 
Each infringer may calculate the impact of his marginal output on price without 
taking into account the output from other infringers. Such uncoordinated acts of 
infringement may cause collective profits—those reaped by the patentee directly 
and through damages awards from infringers—to fall below the total costs of 
                                                 
338  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 733 (citing David Haddock et al., An 
Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990)).   
339  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 765-66 (1996).  Kaplow and Shavell further point out:  
Our conclusion from the present argument is that a property rule enjoys a strong 
advantage over the liability rule, assuming, as is plausible, that the probability of 
underestimation of owners’ values would be substantial under a liability regime.  
We emphasize that this conclusion does not depend upon the assumption that 
there is systematic underestimation of owners’ values under a liability rule.  
Even when one assumes that courts’ estimates are on average correct, but are 
sometimes too high and sometimes too low, the liability rule will be inferior 
because the occasions in which damages are too low will involve the multiple-
taker problem we have identified.  (When damages are too high, there will be 
few takings, so the liability rule in such instances will be similar to a property 
rule.) 
Id. at 766.     
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creating and commercializing the invention, resulting in a destruction of 
wealth.340   
 
Thus, there is an increase in social costs directly caused by the failed coordination 
among potential infringers.   
Second, as recognized by Haddock, McChesney, and Speigel, the threat of 
this potential onslaught of infringements induced by a liability rule will 
discourage investments in the subject matter covered by the IP right ex ante.341  
As a result, the use of a property rule is particularly important for the impact it has 
on each potential infringer in ensuring there simply is no incentive to infringe ex 
ante, as compared with the type of benefit or compensation it might give the 
holder of the IP right ex post.342  That is, a fundamental distinction between 
property rules and liability rules is tied to the distinction explored earlier between 
static and dynamic efficiency.343  Property rules facilitate ex ante private ordering.  
This is the heart of the commercialization theory of IP, discussed below.344   
Finally, it is important to realize that perfectly strong property rule 
protection for IP is not possible in the context of the existing system of 
commercial law for several reasons.  First, as Ayres and Klemperer point out, 
uncertainty in how the rights will be enforced in court functions the same as 
enforcing those rights with liability rules,345 and largely because of the reward 
theories themselves there is substantial uncertainty in the rules governing the rules 
for obtaining IP rights,346 transacting over IP rights,347 and enforcing IP rights.348    
Second, “the ability for an infringer to be kept effectively judgment proof through 
corporate and bankruptcy laws may also operate as a form of liability rule gloss 
                                                 
340  Kieff supra note 7, at 733 (“As Ayres and Klemperer recognize, if there are fixed costs of 
entry or exit, or if infringers have higher marginal cost than the patentee, then market entry by 
infringers will generate extra costs for society.” (citing Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 326, at 
1015).   
341  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 733 (citing Haddock et al. supra note 
338, at 16-17).     
342  Id., at 734 (citing Haddock et al. supra note 338, at 13). 
343  See supra Part II.C.2(a).   
344  See infra Part III.C.   
345  See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 326.   
346  See, e.g., Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 7 (criticizing impact of reward theories 
on rules for obtaining patents).   
347  See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of 
Intellectual Property, Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 275, forthcoming __ G.W. LAW REV. __ (2004) (criticizing impact of reward 
theories on rules for transacting over IP and on antitrust enforcement of IP-based transactions).   
348  See, e.g., Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7 (criticizing impact of reward 
theories on rules for enforcing patents and elucidating the importance of property rights protected 
by property rules for enforcing patents).   
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on the present property rule regime.”349  Third, “[o]therwise infringing uses that 
are by or for the federal government enjoy sovereign immunity protection that 
effectively results in a compulsory licensing regime.”350  Put differently, at least 
some extent of liability rule treatment is always available for IP.   
At bottom, it is not clear that the access side of the incentive access 
paradigm is apt.  More specifically, it is not clear that access would be improved 
by the use of rewards or IP backed merely by liability rules instead of property 
rules.  In addition, as explored more fully below in the discussion of the 
commercialization theory of IP, property rights may indeed be important in 
ensuring that at least in the dynamic sense there is sufficient access in the first 
place.351   
3. Allocation and Screening 
A final limitation of reward theories is that they seem to view an IP right 
as somehow having a one-to-one correlation with a good or service that is sold in 
a market.352  As a result, while on the one hand seeing the transaction costs of 
property rights as an obstacle to the cumulative nature of intellectual endeavors, 
the reward theories overlook that this very cumulative nature makes it remarkably 
difficult to allocate merit among various contributors to an intellectual 
endeavor.353  Consider for example “that the typical car or computer sold in a 
                                                 
349  F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 307, 313 (2002) 
(Invited symposium piece for National Association of Environmental Law Societies annual 
meeting entitled “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future,” held March 15-17, 2002, at 
Washington University School of Law) (citing Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 
733-34, n.154).  For more on the interface between IP and bankruptcy see, F. Scott Kieff & Troy 
A. Paredes, Toward an Understanding of Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate 
Control, __ WASH U. LAW. Q. __ (forthcoming 2004).   
350  Id.  (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994), under which the government provides a limited 
waiver of its sovereign immunity for acts of infringement by or for the federal government and 
instead allows suits against the government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for a reasonable 
royalty).  State governments similarly enjoy immunity under the 11th Amendment.  See Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (state 
immunity from patent infringement suits); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (state immunity from Lanham Act trademark 
infringement and unfair competition suits); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 
2000) (state immunity from copyright infringement suits).  The point here is that anyone interested 
in achieving liability rule treatment for an IP right can achieve that result by prevailing on a 
government agency to arrange for the infringement.   
351  See infra Part III.C (discussing commercialization theory).   
352  See, Merges, supra note 2, at 1859-60 (criticizing common view in the literature as 
assuming a one-to-one correlation).   
353  The seemingly humble statement of the cumulative nature of intellectual works is often 
attributed to Sir Isaac Newton’s pronouncement after discovering calculus that “If I have seen 
further it is by standing upon the shoulders of Giants.”  Letter of Sir Isaac Newton to Robert 
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single market comprises a huge bundle of patent and other intellectual property 
rights.”354   
For example, in the model offered by Shavell and van Ypersele, the 
reward is determined by looking to market demand,355 yet they do not suggest 
how to disaggregate demand for licenses to intermittent windshield wiper 
technology used in cars, for example, from the demand for cars.  Put differently, 
“[e]very market having large demand would generate droves of reward claimants 
each asserting to have made some contribution.”356  What is more, “no market 
participant would have an adequate incentive to provide the government with 
information relating to [the validity of the reward].”357  Only in the rare cases of 
two individuals claiming to have invented the same exact thing does one 
individual have an incentive to challenge the claim of the other.358   
Put simply, when IP is the focus of a reward, the reward provider must 
determine how to allocate the reward, and it is likely there will be excessive 
claimants.  When IP rights instead are protected by property rules, the allocation 
is made among those holding the various IP rights through whatever contracts 
they entered into so as to obtain commercialization.  What is more, in contrast to 
the difficulties in setting appropriate reward discussed above,359 the positive law 
rules for obtaining the IP rights can serve as remarkably inexpensive screening 
tools for determining who will even get such a right.360 
                                                                                                                                     
Hooke, February 5, 1575/1576, as quoted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: 
A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 31 (1965) (unpacking the great deal of historical baggage associated 
with this famous phrase, which is often attributed to Newton, and demonstrating that Newton may 
actually have borrowed this phrase from Bernard of Chartres of the early Twelfth Century, who 
himself may have appropriated the phrase from Priscian, a Sixth Century grammarian, with many 
other intervening players at each stage).  For a colorful and wide-ranging list by Justice Story of 
examples of the cumulative nature of intellectual endeavors within the context of a copyright case, 
see, Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D.Mass.1845) (“In truth, in literature, in science 
and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new 
and original throughout….  What are all modern law books, but new combinations and 
arrangements of old materials, in which the skill and judgment of the author in the selection and 
exposition and accurate use of those materials constitute the basis of his reputation, as well as of 
his copyright?”).   
354  Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 7, at 62, n.29.   
355  SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, supra note 313.   
356  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 7, at 713.   
357  Id.   
358  Id., n. 75 (noting that so-called “interference” proceedings among two or more claimants 
to the same patent typically involve less than 0.25% of all patent applications that are filed with 
the Patent Office).   
359  See supra Part III.A.1. 
360  See infra Part III.C.   
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B. Problems of Prospect and Rent Dissipation Theories  
Recognizing that the lure of rewards may induce excessive rent seeking 
behavior leading to rent dissipation,361 in his 1977 piece on the so-called prospect 
theory of the patent system, which builds upon work by Yoram Barzel and others, 
Edmund Kitch argued that the use of property rights in the form of IP rights like 
patents could avoid or mitigate the rent dissipating effect otherwise associated 
with those rewards.362  A similar view of IP called the rent dissipation theory was 
offered by Mark Grady and Jay Alexander in 1992.363  The thrust of the prospect 
or rent dissipation approach is premised on the view that that property rights can 
facilitate coordination among competing users of a target asset so as to avoid 
overuse of other assets in the race to obtain the target.364 Kitch suggests that 
patents operate similarly as a tool to decrease both pre-patent and post-patent rent-
seeking.365  But reviewed in earlier work by the present author, there are a number 
of important limitations on the rent dissipating views of IP.366   
1. Extent of the Rent Dissipation  
Although rent dissipation can be a problem in theory, recent work by 
Michael Abramowicz adroitly points out a number of factors that may mitigate 
rent dissipation effects in practice.367 These factors include risk aversion; 
opportunity costs; diversity among those racing; the time it takes to get the 
reward; and externalized costs or benefits those racing impose on others, such as 
the income to those who sell goods and services needed by those racing or the 
costs to those who are bothered by the activities associated with racing.368 
                                                 
361  For more on rent seeking and rent dissipation see supra Part II.A.2.   
362  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
265–67 (1977) (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 
(1968)). 
363  Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 
305, 305-310, 316-322 (1992) (going further than the building upon the prospect theory by 
suggesting that the particular contours of the positive law rules for obtaining and enforcing patents 
are and should be adapted to minimize rent dissipation both pre patent and post patent).   
364  Kitch supra note at 256 (citing Barzel supra note 362).   
365  Id.  See also Grady & Alexander supra note 363.   
366  Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 63-66 (pointing out limitations in prospect 
and rent dissipation theories).  For clarity, this part of the argument is presented again in this paper 
in slightly expanded form, rather than more condensed form by way of citation.   
367  Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, supra note 303, at 10-18 (collecting 
sources and showing how each of these factors may operate to mitigate rent dissipation effects). 
368  Id. at 11-12. A more palpable, albeit mythological, example of these positive externalities 
of racing might include the joy children experience when they drink the Tang® and use the 
Velcro® that many think were brought to society through the NASA-sponsored space race; the 
corresponding negative externalities might include the cavities some children get from increased 
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In addition, rent dissipation presumes there is a single prize, or at least a 
discrete number of prizes.369 But those attempting to solve a problem may not 
arrive at the same solution; they may get to different solutions and there may be 
even more solutions available.370 Although multiple solutions to a given problem 
may be wasteful when the good is not really needed, which is an interesting 
possibility explored at some length by Abramowicz,371 when the utility of the 
good is substantial, the benefits of multiple solutions may dominate.372 That is, 
although more may not always be better, it also may not always be worse. 
Consider the multiple, independently patentable and non-infringing solutions to 
                                                                                                                                     
exposure to this sugared drink and their difficulty tying knots after growing up with shoes kept on 
by hook-and-loop fasteners instead of laces. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for 
Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 351, 378 n.95 
(1993): 
The creation of “spin off” inventions has often been urged as one of the benefits 
of government-funded research. See George J. Howick, The NASA Technology 
Utilization Program, in UTILIZING R & D BY-PRODUCTS 69, 78–82 (Jerome W. 
Blood ed., 1967) (describing NASA program and examples of spin-off 
inventions, including inorganic paint, walking wheel chair, maintenance-free 
lubricated bearings, and sight-controlled switches). Some other examples of 
commercial products arising out of the space program include, smoke detectors, 
graphite, an artificial pancreas, heated ski goggles and hang gliders, but not 
velcro, teflon or tang. 
369  Although it is often useful when modeling a problem to reduce it to a manageable form to 
construct the model, the single-solution element of the rent-seeking models cannot be extrapolated 
to provide meaningful guidance for policymakers without at least consideration of whether in the 
real world the set of possible solutions to a given problem (prizes) is limited, and whether we are 
nearing such a limit. 
370  See infra note 373 and accompanying text. 
371  Abramowicz, supra note 303, at 2-9. Interestingly, the fair use defense and the utility 
exception to copyrightable subject matter may combine to leave uses that are needed effectively 
beyond the enforceable reach of any valid copyright rights. 
372  An increase in the number of available solutions will increase the chance of each person 
gaining access to any one solution. This is one reason why the patent system does not require the 
claimed invention to be “better” than the prior art; it need only be new and nonobvious. As then-
judge Warren Burger wrote, quoting Judge Giles Rich: 
Progress is most effectively promoted by protecting those who enrich the art as 
well as those who improve it. Even though their inventions are not as good as 
what really exists, such inventors are not being rewarded for standing still or for 
retrogressing, but for having invented something. The system is not concerned 
with the individual inventor’s progress but only with what is happening to 
technology. 
Comm’r of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber-Scheideanstalt, 397 F.2d 656, 667 (D.C. Cir. 
1968) (Burger, J.) (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 
393, 402 (1960), reprinted in Nonobviousness – The Ultimate Condition of Patentability 2:1, 2:9 
(John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (admonishing that we must avoid “the unsound notion that to be 
patentable an invention must be better than the prior art.”).  
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the problem of pain and inflammation: aspirin, acetaminophen (Tylenol®), 
ibuprofen (Advil®, Motrin®), selective COX-2 inhibitors (Vioxx® and Celebrex®), 
and various steroids.373 Some patients can only take some of these drugs, and 
some patients can take all, but not at all times. In the real world we cannot know 
ex ante whether more solutions are going to be redundant, or whether they will 
both increase consumer choice and provide access to more consumers who could 
not consume the earlier solutions.374  Competition, after all, can be a good thing.   
In the least, such increased competition for research and development just 
might not be a bad thing.  The path breaking work by Robert Solow for which he 
was awarded the 1987 Nobel Prize in Economics,375 demonstrated that most of 
the economic growth in the United States in the first half of this century could be 
explained by investments in research and development and education rather than 
by increases in capital and labor.376  What is more, while the rent dissipating 
models themselves are premised upon decreasing returns to scale for research and 
development,377 the path breaking work by Paul Romer shows that such 
investment in research and development and education is unlike other forms of 
investment in that it does not experience decreasing returns to scale.378  To be 
sure, though, it still is the case that resources invested towards these activities 
would not be invested elsewhere, and this opportunity cost must also be 
considered.379   
                                                 
373  It is not always the case that an independently patentable invention will avoid 
infringement of earlier patents. Patentability of the second invention turns on a very different set 
of questions than its possible infringement of the first patent. The patentability analysis of the 
second invention will turn largely on the scope of information in the art at the time that invention 
is sought to be patented, which includes the disclosure in the first patent. For more on the rules of 
patentability over the prior art, see CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 323–706 (treatise and casebook 
teaching and collecting sources). The possible analysis of infringement of the first patent by the 
second invention will turn on the claims of the first patent. For more on the rules of patent 
infringement, see id. at 829–1041. 
374  In areas where we can make good judgments ex ante about which avenues of research are 
most likely to be productive, it may be possible to fund the work prospectively. The government 
grant-making processes such as those at NIH and NSF basically operate this way by empanelling 
experts in the field to review grant applications. 
375  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1987, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1987/index.html.   
376  See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957).   
377  See, e.g., Loury supra 49, at 408 (noting that an assumption of the model is diminishing 
returns to scale of research and development).   
378  See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Return and Long–Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002 
(1986).  Increasing returns to scale means that the more that is put in, the more that is gotten out – 
and the “bang-for-buck” does not decrease as more and more buck is added.  
379  In his seminal review of the patent system Fritz Machlup pointed out:  
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2. Effectiveness of the Tools for Mitigating Dissipation 
The prospect and rent dissipation theories present themselves with the 
very problem they attempt to solve. As Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith 
pointed out soon after Kitch, the more effective the patent is in coordinating 
activities of those in the industry after the patent has issued,380 the greater will be 
the problems of racing towards the patent application before filing.381  Kitch’s 
response was to argue that the coordination costs are likely to be low in such early 
stages because there are likely to be only a small number of players then.382 But 
this response does not fully answer the problem. As Abramowicz correctly points 
out, the behavioralism and transaction costs may be high in such a community 
because the members may have significant cognitive biases.383 The information 
and transaction costs to coordinating also may be high if the racers do not know 
about each other.384 
What is more, the central limitation of the rent dissipation and prospect 
theories is that they do not offer a way to use the social cost lessons of 
prospecting to design legal rules for obtaining patents that can operate ex ante to 
mitigate the social costs of prospecting. Instead, Kitch argues that the prospect 
theory explains why the commercial success associated with a patented invention 
                                                                                                                                     
It is easy to conceive of the possibility that such allocation [of productive 
resources to research and development] is too meager. But can there ever be too 
much?  Is not more research and development always better than less?  Is it 
possible that too much is devoted to the inventive effort of the Nation?  This 
depends on what it is that is curtailed when inventive activity is expanded. More 
of one thing must mean less of another, and the question is, what it is of which 
there will be less....  Whenever permanent economic policies – not just war or 
depression measures – are discussed, sound economists must start from the 
principle that no activity can be promoted without encroaching on some other 
activity.  More of one service or product must mean less of another.  
Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System: Study No. 15, prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1958).  See also, Lunney, supra note 307 (pointing out the importance 
of considering opportunity costs).   
380  Kitch, supra note 315, at 276. 
381  Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: 
A Comment, 23 J.L. & Econ. 197, 202-03 (1980). 
382  Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & Econ. 
205, 205-06 (1980). 
383  Abramowicz, supra note 303, at 184 n.251 (collecting sources on cognitive biases of 
overconfidence and overoptimism).  
384  They may not know each other because the field may be so new that the community of 
people working in it is not defined. Or, the potential members of the community may generally be 
known, but without the freedom to divulge their work to each other that is given by a patent, they 
may not know enough about each other to coordinate. This latter type of coordination problem is 
known generally as the Arrow Information Paradox. See supra note 60.  
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should be an important factor in determining whether it is patentable.385 Similarly, 
the rent dissipation theory urges a finely tuned patent system that will grant and 
enforce patents only when the balance of these pre-patent and post-patent racing 
costs tips just the right way.386 Yet, the rent dissipation theory does not provide a 
framework for making such determinations ex ante, at the time a private party 
would decide whether to file a patent application or at the time the Patent Office 
would examine it. Instead, it only identifies a select few reported judicial 
decisions that, according to the summary accounts of Grady and Alexander, turn 
out to be ex post examples of results that may have avoided rent dissipation.387 
The importance of being able to make determinations about patentability 
and patent scope around the time of the application has been emphasized recently 
in a number of areas of the literature. Polk Wagner, in his work on the patent 
infringement doctrine called the “doctrine of equivalents,” elucidates the 
importance of information-forcing penalty default rules as inducement to potential 
patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the 
patent.388 In addition, Clarissa Long, in her work on the often overlooked 
signaling function of patents, shows how in certain circumstances the 
information-signaling function of patents may be even more valuable to the rights 
                                                 
385  Kitch, supra note 315, at 282–83 (discussing commercial success). Later in the same 
work, Kitch may be advocating that the test for patentability over the prior art should merely be 
novelty, without nonobviousness. See id. at 284 (“Thus substantial novelty is an economically 
rational test of patentability.”). Such an argument would accord with the social cost saving 
benefits of the registration theory outlined in Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 76-81.   
386  See Grady & Alexander, supra note 363, at 322-47 (offering a complicated method for 
making patentability determinations using a host of factors, many of which are determined long 
after a patent application is filed, such as the importance of the patent in controlling downstream 
rent-dissipating effects). 
387  Id. at 343-47 (discussing only a few cases in summary). Furthermore, one of the few 
cases Grady and Alexander rely upon as illustrative of the rent dissipation theory, General Mills v. 
Pillsbury Co., 378 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1967), does not accord with any of the prevailing trends in 
the case law over time. An electronic search using the Westlaw® KeyCite® service did not reveal a 
single case after 1974 that cited Pillsbury on this issue and further revealed that, if anything, the 
case is miscited by a commentator as announcing a per se rule against patents in the field of 
culinary arts.  See Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or 
How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1477, 1482 n.30 (1991) 
(“Food items are patentable, but the culinary creativity of chefs is not the type of creativity which 
meets the standards for patentability.”). 
388  R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of 
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 161-67 (2002) (arguing for a shift in focus from the allocation of 
liability during infringement (ex post) towards rules that generate incentives both during and 
before inventors apply for patents (ex ante) so as to better understand information-forcing default 
penalty rules like the limitation on the doctrine of equivalents known as the “doctrine of 
prosecution history estoppel,” which holds out the possibility of lost patent scope as an 
inducement to potential patentees to produce socially valuable information early in the life of the 
patent.). 
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holder than the substantive rights conferred by patent law.389  Put simply, ex ante 
predictability is essential both for facilitating the private ordering of the property 
owner and those with whom it contracts, and for mitigating the information costs 
of third parties.390   
At bottom, the prospect and rent dissipation theories of IP make important 
contributions by elucidating the ways that property rights can facilitate 
coordination among competing users of an asset so as to avoid over use of other 
resources.  It seems from the literature that patents may indeed have this net 
beneficial impact in the real world.   
But several implications of these theories are less clear.  First, it is not 
clear whether other factors operate sufficiently to mitigate rent dissipation.391  
Second, it is not clear whether the racing effect really generates rather than 
dissipates rents in this setting because at least over the medium term we may be 
sufficiently far from the limit of knowable information that we can continue to 
enjoy the broader dynamic economic growth associated with new technologies as 
elucidated by Solow and Romer.392  Third, it is not clear whether the theoretical 
benefit of coordination among competing users actually is realized by the use of 
property rights here.393  Fourth, unlike the commercialization theory discussed 
below, the prospect and rent dissipation theories do not provide any concrete 
teaching about how best to shape the contours of an operating positive law 
institution associated with the IP rights it posits that would be predictable by both 
property owners and third parties ex ante.394   
C. Commercialization Theory, Coordination, and Social Costs 
The commercialization theory of IP views IP backed by property rights 
and property rules as just one more institutional option in the set of industrial 
organization tools for coordinating economic activity among individuals.  
Coordination can occur in many ways, each with its own costs and benefits:  
transactions among atomistic individuals in the open market without IP rights; 
transactions among those connected by personal or social bonds, such as family or 
religion; transactions among atomistic individuals in the open market with the 
                                                 
389  Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 625-28 (2002) (exploring the 
signaling function of patents generally, including the potential role of the patent document itself to 
convey information that would not be as credible when revealed in other contexts). 
390  See supra Part II.C.2(a) (highlighting importance of predictability to the property owner 
and those with whom it contracts); supra note 253, and accompanying text (work by Henry Smith 
highlighting importance of information costs to third parties).   
391  See supra notes 367-368, and accompanying text.   
392  See supra notes 369-378, and accompanying text.   
393  See supra notes 380-384, and accompanying text.   
394  See supra notes 286-387, and accompanying text. 
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benefit of IP rights; transactions within the hierarchy of a firm; transactions 
involving the direct aid of the government such as a Pigouvian subsidy, or 
transactions within the hierarchy of government such as at a government lab.   
The commercialization theory of IP views IP rights as filling an important 
niche left open by the other coordination options.  Property rights can fill this 
niche by offering a middle ground option.  That is, they offer the coordination 
benefits of hierarchy on the one hand and the strong incentives and information 
benefits of the market on the other hand.  They offer a tool for collective action 
that relies upon and indeed facilitates private ordering.  And to do so effectively 
and efficiently, of course, they require ex ante predictability on the one hand and 
they must, and indeed often do, mitigate a number of social costs on the other 
hand.  The discussion that follows elucidates the general outline of the 
commercialization theory with an emphasis on connecting it to the major themes 
in the IP literature.   
1. Overview of the Theory  
The commercialization theory and its component registration theory are 
explored at some length within the context of patents in two earlier works by the 
present author,395 and so only an overview is provided here.  The 
commercialization theory of IP views IP rights backed by property rules as 
important tools for facilitating the downstream commercialization of the subject 
matter that is protected by IP rights, after that subject matter has been made.396  
This downstream commercialization requires coordination among the many 
complementary users of the IP subject matter including developers, 
manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, advertisers, marketers, etc.397  
Providing a focal point, or beacon,398 the publicly recorded IP right helps each of 
these individuals to find each other,399 and then by cracking the Arrow 
                                                 
395  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, and Kieff, Registering Patents, supra 
note 8.   
396  See, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 707-712 (discussing 
commercialization role of patents).   
397  Id.  (discussing these many players and their incentives to interact).  See also supra Part 
II.B.4 (discussing coordination).   
398  For more on the role of focal points in coordination see supra notes 172-174, and 
accompany text.   
399  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 99-100 (pointing out that the publicly 
recorded patent documents help coordinate commercialization by giving notice of the property 
right over wish bargaining or avoidance can occur).  Compare, Richard A. Epstein, Notice and 
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) (proposing “that 
under a unified theory of servitudes, the only need for public regulation, either judicial or 
legislative, is to provide notice by recordation of the interests privately created”).  As discussed 
infra Part IV, patent and trademark function more efficiently along this dimension than copyright. 
KIEFF NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT  85 
 
Information Paradox otherwise facing them, helps them negotiate with each 
other.400  At the same time, therefore, IP rights facilitate the creation and 
maintenance of both diversity and socialization among individuals within the 
market by providing these diverse individuals with incentive and means for 
coordinating with each other.401  In addition, as elucidated by the registration 
component of the commercialization theory, the positive law rules for 
determining when a valid IP right may be obtained protect reasonable investment-
backed expectations (and thereby decrease the risk of asset specific investments 
and opportunism) by making sure that the right to exclude does not block 
activities individuals otherwise are doing, and they do so with relatively low 
administrative and public choice costs.402   
The commercialization theory explores the comparative role of property 
rights in IP as a tool for facilitating the commercialization of the subject matter it 
protects.  Under this view, IP can be seen as offering a type of middle ground 
among several alternative institutional alternatives: atomized individuals in the 
free market without IP rights, families or other close-knit groups, the firm, and the 
government.  As a middle ground between the open market and the firm, property 
rights for IP can offer the coordination benefits of the firm and the benefits of 
strong incentives of the market.403  At the same time, property rights for IP 
mitigate the risks of asset specificity and opportunism that are associated with full 
integration within a firm – for example, it can be easier for an inventor to walk 
away from a patent license with a firm than also to have to surrender a basic 
employment relationship with the firm.404  Property rights for IP also avoid the 
weakening of incentives that can be associated with integration within a firm and 
that can be especially pernicious where innovation is concerned.405  In addition, 
                                                 
400  See, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 710 (discussing importance of 
property right for encouraging “holder of the invention and the other players in this market to 
come together and incur all costs necessary to facilitate commercialization of the patented 
invention.”).  See also supra Part II.C.4(a) (discussing the role of property rights in cracking the 
Arrow Information Paradox).   
401  See supra notes127-130, 150-153, and 174-176, and accompany text (discussing the 
importance of coordination for facilitating both socialization and the specialization and division of 
labor, as well as diversity among market individuals in terms of both resources and preferences).   
402  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 76-98 (pointing out that the prior art rules 
for patents protect investments by third parties with low administrative and public choice costs).     
403  See generally, supra notes 144-146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text 
(exploring property rights in the context of the tradeoff between market and firm). 
404  See supra note 251, and accompany text (noting the importance of public enforcement of 
property rights and contracts as an option for avoiding the need for coordination within a firm, 
which would lead to increased asset specificity and opportunism).   
405 See supra note 149, and accompany text (discussing the problem of weakened incentives 
within a firm and the particular problem this poses for innovation).   
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property rights for IP can avoid the public choice costs of government.406  They 
also allow more open participation than families or other close-knit groups.407    
While achieving all of these benefits, property rights for IP also can protect third 
parties in two important ways:  low information costs,408 and protection of 
investment-backed expectations and the concomitant asset specificity and 
opportunism.409  At bottom, given the availability of certain enforcement through 
civil litigation backed up by government courts,410 IP rights can facilitate private 
ordering through coordination without the need for any additional formal 
hierarchy of a firm or government agency.  In the end, therefore, the 
commercialization theory as elucidated here connects the theory of IP rights to the 
set of problems explored through NIE.411   
What is perhaps most striking about the commercialization theory given 
the extent to which it is simply not discussed in most of the modern IP literature, 
is that as a matter of historical fact, it was the central motivation behind the 
framing of at least the present patent system, the 1952 Patent Act, if not also the 
present trademark system, the 1946 Lanham Act.412  While the commercialization 
theory is discussed to some extent in the contemporary IP literature, as elaborated 
below, a number of issues meriting response have been raised.  First, the theory is 
often misperceived on its own terms.  Second, the theory addresses many of the 
problems generally identified with IP rights.   
2. Common Misperceptions on the Theory 
The focus of the commercialization theory is on the incentives for diffuse 
individuals to decide individually to act in a way that ends up being 
                                                 
406  See supra note 267(exploring property rights in the context of the tradeoff between 
market and government).   
407  See supra notes 160-161, and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of “crony 
capitalism”).   
408  See supra note 253 (discussing work by Henry Smith on the importance for property 
rights regimes to consider third party information costs).   
409  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 (discussing the importance of the positive 
law rules for validity of the IP right (in that case patents) for protecting third-party investment-
backed expectations).   
410  The importance of certainty for facilitating private ordering is explored supra notes 198-
208, and accompanying text.   
411  For a review of this set of problems see supra Part II.   
412  Id., at 736-747 (reviewing the central role of the commercialization theory in the history 
of the framing of the 1952 Patent Act, which provided what essentially remains as our present 
patent system, by the same group that had only soon before framed the Lanham Act, which 
essentially remains as our present trademark system ).   
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coordinated.413  While rewards may provide an incentive to act to the individual 
reward recipient, rewards do little compared to property rights to bring that 
individual together with all other complementary users to successfully engage in 
the complex commercialization process.414  Regrettably, this simple mechanism 
of the commercialization theory’s coordination function is often misunderstood in 
the literature in several respects.   
First, the link between the commercialization theory and the prospect or 
rent dissipation theories is often overstated.415  Put simply, the commercialization 
theory focuses on the ability for IP to coordinate efforts among complementary 
users of the asset to increase (or avoid insufficient) use of resources, whereas 
prospect theory focuses on the ability for IP to coordinate efforts among 
competing users of an asset to decrease (or avoid excessive) use of resources.416   
Therefore, efforts to respond to the prospect and rent dissipation theories’ 
concerns about overuse (rent dissipation) are inapposite to commercialization 
theory.   
Second, the link between the commercialization theory for IP and the 
theory of property rights, generally, is often overlooked.  That is, much of the 
literature overlooks the coordination function in its entirety and simply lumps the 
property rights aspects of the prospect theory by Kitch with the property rights 
aspects of the work by Demsetz on internalizing externalities.417  As elucidated in 
                                                 
413  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 707-712 (discussing role of patents in 
coordinating complementary users of an invention so as to facilitate inventions 
commercialization).   
414  Id.  Compare the focus on providing direct incentives to the holder of the IP rights under 
the reward theories.  See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 2, at 130 (discussing role of IP as an “incentive 
the right gives the owner”).  For more on reward theories, which focus on such direct incentives, 
see supra Part III.A.   
415  See, e.g., Lemley supra note 2, at 141, n. 42 (referring to commercialization theory as 
“elaboration” of “prospect” theory).  In addition, unlike the prospect and reward theories, the 
commercialization theory, and its companion registration theory, has explanatory power for the 
positive law rules of the of the IP legal institutions.   
416  See supra note 397, and accompanying text (elucidating the basic coordination function 
of the commercialization theory).  See also Kieff, Registering Patents supra note 8, at 62-66 
(discussing prospect and rent dissipation theories in relation to commercialization theory).  For 
game theory examples of the formal link between the role property rights can have in these two 
different settings – described in that paper as racing games and mating games – see Dale T. 
Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games, 72 AM. ECON. 
REV. 968  (1982).   
417  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 
“Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 497 n.121 (1998) (citing work by Demsetz and 
noting: “Similar reasoning underlies Edmund Kitch’s proposed ‘prospect’ approach to patents.”); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1040 (1989) (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and noting: “The 
prospect theory offers a justification for patents that is in keeping with broader theories of property 
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earlier discussions, the prospect theory does focus on the role of property rights in 
mitigating rent dissipation.418  And Demsetz did also initially focus on property 
rights as a tool for internalizing externalities.419  But as Demsetz, himself, later 
realized:  
 
In retrospect, it now seems to me that the theory of property rights implicit in 
this explanation places too much weight on externalities (where, in the case 
discussed, the externality is the neglected impact of hunting today on the cost of 
hunting tomorrow). The “Toward” that begins the essay’s title, therefore, should 
be taken seriously. Externality here refers to an effect on the production 
transformation opportunities facing others, such effect being a result of actions 
taken by someone who does not bear the value consequences of this effect. 
Hunting today causes a change in the production opportunities facing hunters 
tomorrow. As circumstances make the externality more costly to bear, private 
rights adjust to reduce the seriousness of the externality. This is an important 
pattern of property right development. Nonetheless, private-ownership 
arrangements would exist even if there were no externality problems of the type 
being discussed.   
 
Simply put, and as discussed earlier in Part II.B.4, property rights can be seen not 
merely as tools for internalizing externalities (they may have this effect and it 
may be needed), but more importantly as tools for facilitating coordination among 
the complementary users of an asset that is protected by a property right.   
To be sure, property rights are not the only tool for facilitating 
coordination.  For example, coordination can take place with the help of more 
organic, previously existing institutional frameworks, such as family ties, or what 
Haber describes as “crony capitalism.”420  Coordination can take place with the 
help of more engineered institutional frameworks, such as the firm, as Coase and 
Williamson highlight in their important work on the theory of the firm.421  But the 
point about property is that it provides yet an alternative method for achieving 
coordination.422  Each method of course has costs and benefits, and the 
commercialization theory of IP is focused on offering property rights in IP as just 
one additional option to the facilitate private ordering associated with downstream 
                                                                                                                                     
rights elaborated by Harold Demsetz . . . .”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a 
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 309 n.108 (1996) (citing work by Kitch and 
Demsetz and noting: “For neoclassicists, therefore, intellectual property is less about creating an 
artificial scarcity in intellectual creations than about managing the real scarcity in the other 
resources that may be employed in using, developing, and marketing intellectual creations.”); Rai, 
supra note 186, at 121 n.236 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz). 
418  See supra Part III.B 
419  See supra Part II.B.1.   
420  See supra notes 160-162, and accompanying text.   
421  See supra notes 163-171, and accompanying text.   
422  See supra notes 173-178, and accompanying text.   
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commercialization of the subject matter that is protected by IP, after that subject 
matter has been made.423   
Third, the commercialization theory also has been confused erroneously 
with the work of Schumpeter in being focused on the IP holder’s assertion of 
control.424  While the commercialization theory is focused on who will have an 
incentive and ability to negotiate with whom, it is agnostic on the question of who 
will end up controlling those negotiations.  In fact, control will be a function of a 
great many factors other than who owns the IP.  For example, the parties’ relative 
wealth effects, bargaining positions, negotiating skills, other resources, holdout 
prices, alternative options, etc., will each impact the bottom line issue of control.  
In a world in which each market player may bring its own skill sets, IP sets, and 
other assets and opportunities to bear on development of a particular IP subject 
matter, the end result of who will control subsequent development and use of that 
subject matter is unclear, and indeed is left to the market and private bargains.  At 
bottom, the commercialization view of IP focuses on the importance of IP backed 
by a property right as a tool for facilitating such a division of labor and other 
forms of specialization.425 
Fourth, the importance the commercialization theory places on the 
distinction between ex ante and ex post may be confused by the different use of 
those terms recently by Mark Lemley.426  Under the commercialization theory, for 
IP to serve the commercialization function, the rules about how IP can be 
obtained and enforced must be knowable to all market actors ex ante, in advance 
of their decisions about whether to act.  This means that regulation and liability 
rule treatment may be suspect to the extent they have the effect of re-writing 
agreements or changing rules ex post.427  When used in this context, the terms “ex 
ante” and “ex post” are used in their general sense,428 which is different than how 
they are used in the recent work by Mark Lemley.429  Lemley uses the term “ex 
                                                 
423  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 707-710.   
424  See, e.g., Lemley supra note 2, at 139, n. 35 (discussing role of patentee as coordinator 
due to the control exerted through the patent and citing Kieff supra note 8 and JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, 100-02 (discussing coordination 
through the control of a monopolist)).  See also Lemley at 140 (suggesting that when the 
government assigns the IP right it is effectively selecting who will have “control over an area of 
research and development rather than trusting the market to pick the best researcher”).   
425  See supra notes127-130, 150-153, and 174-176, and accompany text (discussing role of 
property rights in facilitating specialization and division of labor).   
426  See Lemley, supra note 2.     
427  For a discussion of a number of such ex post changes and the problems they present see 
F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 
Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 275, 
forthcoming __ G.W. LAW REV. __ (2004).   
428  See supra Part II.C.2(a) (discussing differences between ex ante and ex post).   
429  See Lemley, supra note 2.   
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ante” in a special narrow sense to refer to the time period before any specific 
creative work is made.430  Similarly, he uses the term “ex post” in a special 
narrow sense to refer to a time period after any specific creative work is made.431  
The commercialization theory relies on the term “ex ante” in the more general 
sense to refer to a time period before any given act occurs, with a focus on the 
importance of predictability.  Similarly, it relies on the term “ex post” in the more 
general sense to refer to a time period after any given act occurs, again with a 
focus on predictability.  That is, as these terms are used for purposes of the 
commercialization theory, the focus is on the ability for private actors to predict a 
legal result before deciding whether, or how, to act on any specific issue. Under 
the commercialization view of IP, predictability ex ante is essential in facilitating 
private ordering.   
Fifth, some have suggested that “if patent law’s concern is to ensure 
commercialization of inventions, then it is both overinclusive and 
underinclusive.”432  The point is well taken, as far as it goes; but it may not 
account for the full reach of the commercialization theory.  On the question of 
overinclusiveness, Abramowicz points out that “sometimes first-mover 
advantages will outweigh second-mover advantages.”433  This is correct.  But only 
where a sufficient number of the complementary users of the asset believes ex 
ante that this is the case with sufficient conviction to take on the coordinating role 
will coordination so easily take place without the property right.  This can and 
likely does happen.  But the point of the commercialization theory is that IP rights 
can make it easier for this to happen in many more settings.  On the question of 
underinclusiveness, Abramowicz points out the need for commercialization of 
subject matter that does not meet the positive law rules for IP protection.434  But 
point of the registration component of the commercialization theory of IP is that 
the positive law rules for obtaining IP are normatively important for protecting the 
reasonable investment backed expectations of potential commercialization efforts 
by third parties.435  Put simply, these positive law rules about IP validity are 
                                                 
430  Id. at 130.   
431  Id.  
432  Abramowicz, supra note 317, at 174.  See also Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, 
at 68, n. 57 (noting that “participants in the Spring 2001Workshop Series of the John M. Olin 
Program in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law School [raised] a similar 
objection”).   
433  Id.   
434  Id. at 174-75 (“Patent law is underinclusive because commercializers of unpatentable 
inventions also face the prospect of copying”).    
435  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8, at 68-70, and 76-98 (responding to 
Abramowicz by noting that the registration theory component of the commercialization theory 
elucidates the importance of the positive law rules for obtaining IP rights for protecting third party 
investments in a way that mitigates administrative costs and public choice costs).   
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essential for making the IP system work well.  The extent to which they leave 
behind some subject matter is a reason to explore the use of other tools to help 
coordination in those areas, such as perhaps the firm, or the government.  IP does 
not solve all problems and it is only offered as an additional tool for helping to 
solve some.   
At bottom, the commercialization theory sees the IP right backed by the 
credible threat of an injunction as playing an essential coordinating role for all the 
players in the commercialization process.436  Those wishing to buy title to or 
permission under the IP right must negotiate with the IP holder.  As long as the 
existence of the IP right and the identity of the IP holder are readily discernible,437 
each of the putative participants in the commercialization process will have an 
individual incentive to seek out and negotiate with that person, and through that 
person with each other.438   
3. Some Particularly Salient NIE Lessons on Social Costs for IP  
While the above discussions of the major law and economic theories of IP 
– reward, prospect, and commercialization – have gone far in elucidating the 
implications of many of the NIE problems explored supra in Part II, a few themes 
that are particularly salient to the debates over property rights in IP have not yet 
been expressly addressed here.  These include the output restricting impacts of 
property rights due to problems of monopoly effects, transaction costs, 
behavioralism, anticommons, as well as the efficacy of government and problems 
of public choice.  While the reward literature in particular has emphasized the 
concerns about output restriction, the commercialization theory elucidates why 
they concerns may be significantly less severe than perceived and indeed why in 
some cases property rights may be essential for mitigating them.  The 
commercialization theory also elucidates why the concerns about government and 
public choice must not be overlooked.   
                                                 
436  By focusing on the right to exclude, the commercialization theory of IP differs in 
important ways from the general theory of property in land and goods, which typically consider 
more than the right to exclude.  Adam Mossoff provides an excellent historical account of property 
theories that emphasizes the failure of approaches that focus only on the right to exclude.  See 
Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 376 
(2003) (“The concept of property is explained best as an integrated unity of the exclusive rights to 
acquisition, use and disposal; in other words, property is explained best by the integrated theory of 
property.”).  But see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 
730, 747–48 (1998) (suggesting right to exclude is central feature of property). 
437  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 8 (discussing notice function of IP).   
438  See supra note 153, and accompanying text (discussing transitive nature of these 
interactions).  See also, supra notes  172-174, and accompany text (discussing the focal point role 
in coordination).     
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(a) Monopoly Effects 
As discussed above in the context of reward theories, much of the 
literature on IP rights is consumed with concerns about limiting the potential 
monopoly power associated with property rights in IP.439  But actual empirical 
data is inconclusive on whether, for example, patents have been used to facilitate 
cartel behavior.440  Although a dominant concern of the reward literature on IP is 
that IP rights can confer power over price of the type generally associated with 
monopolies, the connection this literature draws between IP and monopolies in 
essence may be backwards.  That is, as discussed below, IP rights often just do 
not confer monopoly power; and yet they can be essential anti-monopoly weapons 
– their availability can serve as an effective anti-monopoly vaccine for a market.   
IP rights often do not confer monopoly power in large part because there 
is rarely a one-to-one correlation between any particular IP asset and a market.441  
In addition, IP rights face competition from alternative technologies, extant and 
potential.442  At bottom, for example, even a patent on the better mousetrap faces 
competition from existing spring and glue traps, the threat of future traps, and, of 
course, cats.443   
What is more, IP rights can facilitate market entry, at least so long as they 
are backed by property rules.  As a result, they can be powerful anti-monopoly 
weapons.444  Indeed, the commercialization theory suggests that if meaningful IP 
                                                 
439  See supra Part III.A.   
440  See, C.D. Hall, Patents, Licensing, and Antitrust, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 59 (1986).   
441  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8 at 729-731 (reviewing reasons why 
IP rights confer insufficient market power to be monopolies and collecting sources).  See also 
supra note 212 (discussing relationship between IP assets and markets).     
442  Id.  
443  See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 61, providing the following overview:  
 Because the term monopoly is applied to an entire market, we begin our 
analysis of monopolies by looking at markets. Markets tend to order themselves 
around consumer demand—producers sell what consumers will buy. In general, 
consumers buy to satisfy their needs or desires. In the context of a particular 
consumer problem, like mouse infestation, for example, consumers need or want 
solutions; and producers sell these solutions, perhaps in the form of mouse traps 
or cats. We already know that a patent excludes others from making, using, 
selling, or offering for sale a particular invention. We now see that in the context 
of a market for solutions, a patentee can prevent others from selling a certain 
solution, though not all solutions to a given problem. Indeed, it is often said that 
necessity is the mother of invention, and the necessity caused by an inability to 
gain access to a particular patented solution—perhaps because the price is too 
high or perhaps because of an injunction—may very well give rise to the 
development of alternative non-infringing solutions. 
Id.  
444  Id. at 744 (discussing role of IP rights as anti-monopoly weapons).   
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rights had been available in the computer software industry in the 1970’s and 
80’s,445 by the time of the Microsoft antitrust suit the industry likely would have 
been characterized by a medium number of medium-sized players rather than a 
single large player.446  “According to Judge Frank, in this context the David Co. v. 
Goliath, Inc., competition is dependant upon investment in David Co., which will 
not occur unless it is armed with the patent slingshot.”447  At bottom, the gains IP 
rights may offer for competition and market entry across markets at any one time 
as well as across time may well offset the potential for individual dead weight loss 
in cases where an IP right truly conveys a monopoly in some point in time for 
some market.  In part, this point here is tied to the distinction between dynamic 
and static efficiency, which is to say that the static inefficiency associated with 
monopoly dead weight loss may be outweighed by the dynamic efficiency gains 
associated with innovation and entry.448   
In addition, IP rights can and often do operate to facilitate price 
discrimination, which can mitigate the dead weight loss efficiency considerations 
of monopolies.449  As explored in earlier work by the present author, the use of 
property rights in IP  
 
is also consistent with another basic work by Demsetz in which he demonstrated 
that (1) private producers can produce public goods efficiently given the ability 
to exclude nonpurchasers and (2) price discrimination is consistent with 
competitive equilibrium for such public goods.450 
 
Indeed, because of the doctrines of indirect infringement, IP rights facilitate price 
discrimination through tying in a great many more cases than otherwise, including 
for example where tying is not facilitated by technological constraints.451   
At bottom, while IP rights do give some power over price and therefore 
are associated with some dead-weight loss in theory, the actual monopoly effects 
                                                 
445  Patents were not available because of judge-made exceptions to patent law that had crept 
into the law in the late 1960’s.  The utilitarian nature of the industry made it an unlikely candidate 
for benefiting in the anti-monopoly sense from copyright and trademark protection.   
446  Id. (giving example of computer software industry as one in which the putative monopoly 
power of Microsoft was correlated with a time of no meaningful IP protection in that industry).   
447  Id. (citing Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir. 
1942) (Frank, J. concurring)).   
448  See supra note 209, and accompany text (pointing out the importance of exercising 
restraint for certain forms of antitrust enforcement designed to protect static efficiency so as to 
facilitate innovation and promote dynamic efficiency).   
449  See supra note 214, and accompanying text (discussing role of price discrimination in 
mitigating output-restricting effects of monopolies).   
450  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 727 (citing Harold Demsetz, The 
Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970)).  See also supra notes 213-214, 
and accompany text (discussing price discrimination as limit on monopoly power).   
451  Id., at 727-730 (exploring use of IP rights as tools for facilitating price discrimination).   
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of IP are overstated and the anti-monopoly benefits of IP are overlooked. Indeed, 
the lessons of the literature on “second-best” and the basic comparative 
institutional analysis of NIE452 are that there are many reasons why it may be 
prudent to avoid letting anti-monopoly concerns drive us to respond too 
aggressively to every occasion of power over price.  In this sense, for example, 
the reward literature’s concern over mitigating monopoly effect of IP can be seen 
as unduly exalting static efficiency over dynamic efficiency.453  Put simply, in the 
real world the benefits of this type of market power for capital formation and 
dynamic competition may outweigh its theoretical cost in the form of static dead-
weight loss.   
(b) Transaction Costs, Behavioralism, and Anticommons 
While the commercialization theory sees the nature of IP as a right backed 
by the credible threat of an injunction to be the core benefit of IP in providing 
coordination, it recognizes that this coordination requires transactions.  As 
explored in Part II.B.2, such transactions have both good and bad components to 
them.  They can be seen as costs.454  They also can be seen as benefits.455  But one 
lesson of NIE is to engage in comparative institutional analyses and so in the 
context of IP the comparison is between the various institutional options for 
achieving coordination that were surveyed earlier – e.g., open market without IP 
(commons), IP, family, firm, government.456  The focus of the commercialization 
theory highlights the coordination benefits of IP.   
Yet, one of the central focuses of the reward theories is on the transaction 
costs associated with IP compared to a commons.457  Thus, it is appropriate to 
compare the transaction costs of exchanges over property rights in IP against the 
transaction costs of exchanges over what would otherwise be the subject matter of 
IP but within a realistic commons, such as the putative commons of basic 
academic knowledge.458  Yet, as explored in other work by the present author, 
                                                 
452  See supra notes 20-28, and accompanying text (discussing comparative institutional 
analysis).   
453  See supra Part II.C.2(a) (highlighting difference between static and dynamic efficiency).     
454  See supra notes 120-126, and accompanying text (reviewing transaction costs).   
455  See supra notes 127-131, and accompanying text (reviewing transaction benefits). 
456  See supra notes 403-407, and accompanying text (positioning IP among various 
institutional choices for achieving coordination).   
457  See supra Part III.A (discussing reward theories and their incentive-access paradigm).   
458  See, e.g. Rai, supra note 186 (arguing that IP rights impose greater transaction costs than 
the basic scientific norms in the open “commons” of academics); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE. L.J. 177 
(1987) (exploring the potential negative impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of 
basic biological research); see also, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of 
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (exploring an 
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even this so-called “commons” is riddled with its own form of less commercial 
but nonetheless important property rights known informally as “kudos,” which 
include more personal and less fungible assets generally associated with academic 
and public sectors such as reputational benefits, fame, promotions, awards, titles, 
etc.459  Earlier work by the present author has elucidated through comparative 
institutional analysis why for exchanges in that setting of a putative commons 
compared with the same setting having added IP rights, the transaction costs of 
exchanges are likely to be worse without IP than with IP because IP brings 
increased wealth and diversity to that market.460  One of the lessons of NIE 
explored earlier is that transaction costs are likely to be more pernicious in thinner 
markets than in thicker markets,461  That is, transaction costs are likely to be 
worse in thinner markets than in thicker markets and the use of IP thickens the 
market.462  As also discussed earlier, recent work by Buchanan and Yoon adds to 
this analysis by pointing out that exchanges in such a commons also are more 
likely to fail because of what they call the “non-economic motivations” associated 
with such assets.463  Put simply, there are reasons to think that transaction costs 
are likely to be higher for a commons compared to for IP.   
Somewhat related to the concerns over transaction costs in the reward 
literature are similar concerns about behavioralism.  More specifically, in 
response to concerns about behavioralism leading to failures in transactions over 
IP rights, commentators have called for regulation for IP rights through the 
imposition of liability rule treatment and greater antitrust enforcement.464  To be 
sure, like all actors in the real world, IP owners are not perfectly rational.  That is, 
people are only boundedly rational in that they suffer cognitive biases, framing 
                                                                                                                                     
experimental use exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviating potential negative 
impact of patent rights on scientific norms in the field of basic biological research); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (offering preliminary observations 
about the empirical record of the use of patents in the field of basic biological research and 
recommending a retreat from present government policies of promoting patents in that field); 
Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 277 (arguing that patents can deter innovation in 
the field of basic biological research). 
459  Kieff, supra note 185.   
460  Id.   
461  See supra notes 133-134, and accompanying text.   
462  Kieff, supra note 185, at 703-4.   
463  See supra note 281, and accompanying text.   
464  See, e.g., Lemley supra note 2, at 133 (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048-72 (1997) (discussing 
implications of relaxing rationality assumption for IP); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market 
Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 857 (1992) 
(pointing out costs of rationality assumption).   
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effects, employ heuristics, etc.465  On the one hand, identification of 
behavioralism concerns does suggest reasons to be skeptical about the ability for 
individuals to actually achieve for themselves what is in their own best interest, 
and behavioralism has justified resort to liability rules, regulation, immutable 
contract terms, etc.  On the other hand, the individuals the government will use to 
affect these responses – legislators, regulators, and judges – are, of course, human 
beings, too, and so will also suffer the limits of behavioralism.466  What is more, 
these government decisions will be subject to public choice problems, discussed 
below.467   
At bottom for IP, the behavioralism limits of the market are important 
costs to consider about the market.  To the extent the alternative to IP is simply 
lack of IP, then the countervailing considerations are the coordination benefits the 
commercialization theory highlights.468  But to the extent regulation of the IP is 
the alternative, then behavioralism limits for the government actors associated 
with the regulation are also important countervailing considerations to consider.  
What is more, to the extent the regulation will occur ex post, then interference 
with ex ante incentives is an additional countervailing consideration to letting 
behavioralism concerns justify deviation from basic property treatment for IP.469  
Finally, regulation brings with it the inevitable costs of government, including the 
tollbooth and rent-dissipation problems of agency capture, as well as the real 
concomitant problems of permit thickets, License Raj, or anticommons.470 
Ironically, much of the recent literature advocating enhanced regulation of 
IP rights is tied to misplaced reliance on anticommons concerns.471  These 
concerns are misplaced for several reasons.   
In contrast to the real anticommons problem of the post socialist economy 
discussed earlier,472 the dominant private value that an IP owner obtains from the 
IP right to exclude use is by openly trading permission for use in exchange for 
                                                 
465  See supra Part II.A.4 (reviewing behavioralism problems as explored through NIE 
literature).   
466  See Paredes, supra note 70 (pointing out countervailing behavioralism problems for 
government actors, as well as public choice problems, and collecting sources).   
467  Id.  See also, infra Part III.C.3(c) (discussing public choice).   
468  See supra notes 396-412, and accompany text (overview of coordination benefits of 
commercialization theory).   
469  See supra Part II.C.2(a) (discussing importance of ex ante analysis).   
470  See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing public choice problems of rent dissipation and 
tollbooths).  See also supra Part II.C.4(b) (discussing the problems of permit thickets, License Raj, 
and anticommons).   
471  See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 458 (initiating literature on 
anticommons for IP); Kieff, supra note 14, at (reviewing Supreme Court cases expressing 
anticommons concerns about IP).   
472  See supra Part II.C.4(b) (discussing anticommons problem).   
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money or other consideration.473  As discussed earlier the economic motivations 
associated with such “residual claims” are precisely what mitigate anticommons 
concerns.474  Indeed, even the potential for a drive to suppress the subject matter 
protected by IP is mitigated by the uncertainty that higher untapped value may lie 
in wait.475  Put simply, the resulting social value of IP rights is that they 
encourage their owners to discover and market methods for pushing use towards 
the full competitive level so the IP rights will not create anticommons problems, 
in biotechnology, software technology, or even for more mundane technologies 
like nails and screws.476    
What is more, the reward literature on IP gets the concerns about 
anticommons backwards.  Not only are anticommons problems for IP overstated, 
the response generated by these concerns of liability rule treatment and regulation 
are likely to generate true anticommons problems.  There is a huge difference 
between the openly tradable nature of property on the one hand and the pernicious 
“permit thicket” or “License Raj” on the other hand.  At bottom, residual claim, 
tradability, enforceability, and private information are each reasons that IP rights 
are successful in avoiding anticommons effects.   
Interestingly, the realization that IP rights do not trigger anticommons 
concerns does suggest that it is worth pushing on the analogy to real and personal 
property rights and ask whether it makes sense for IP to be time-limited.477  
Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are each time-limited to some extent,478 but 
property rights in real and personal property do not simply expire.  Recent work 
by William Landes and Richard Posner has suggested a regime in which IP rights 
                                                 
473  That is, the IP owner may either actively license the IP to someone else who will in turn 
sell the subject matter protected by the IP, or the IP owner itself may sell the subject matter 
protected by the IP, which sale would include an implied license to the IP for its buyers.  See F. 
Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES 
OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125 (2003); Kieff, supra note 185.   
474  See supra notes 279-285, and accompanying text.   
475  See Kieff supra note 8 at 726 (commercialization risk and potential for future 
development provides incentives to license broadly).   
476  See Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, supra note 473.   
477  I thank Bruce Owen at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research for 
suggesting this exploration.  Conversation with Bruce Owen February 25, 2004.  Lemley seems to 
suggest this notion offhandedly but does not explore it, and indeed seems critical of it.  See 
Lemley supra note 2, at 131 (suggesting commercialization view may support “perhaps unlimited 
duration” for IP rights).   
478  By statute, patents expire after 17 years, on average (20 years from filing, and 
examination takes three years, on average).  For a brief discussion of the change from a 17 to 20 
year patent term, see CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 898-900.  Also by statute, copyrights expire 
after a time certain.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (life of the author plus 70 years for works by 
individual authors, or the shorter of 95 years after publication or 120 years after creation for works 
made for hire, anonymous works, and pseudonymous works).  Trademarks last only so long as the 
mark is used in commerce in a consistent fashion.   
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might be infinitely renewable; under their proposal the default for failure by the 
IP owner to act is that the IP passes into the commons.479  The commercialization 
benefits of IP suggest that it might be worth considering why the default position 
is commons, rather than continuing status as property.  When owners of personal 
and real property are negligent custodians of their assets, the default position is 
not that they fall into the public domain, but rather that they remain the subject of 
private ownership.  To be sure, the original owner typically loses title, but 
ownership itself is not destroyed and indeed is most often essentially put up for 
auction.480  Perhaps IP, too, should be left the subject of private ownership and 
merely put up for auction if left sufficiently fallow. 
Implementing perpetual IP would not be conceptually difficult.481  IP 
owners could be required to maintain updated records in a central filing office so 
anyone thinking they can put the IP to higher and better use will be able to initiate 
negotiations at low cost.  If the records are not kept (and perhaps a fee to cover 
their maintenance at a central office not paid), then the IP would be condemned 
and put up for auction.   
Some may suggest that surrender should also occur if the IP owner fails to 
either practice the subject matter covered by the IP or license the IP for someone 
else to practice.  But it is not clear that such an approach would be good.  The 
relative restrictive power of a property right in real or personal property is greater 
                                                 
479  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 471 (2003). 
480  Foreclosure sales, and tax sales are the most common type, but even adverse possession 
can be thought of as a type of auction open for bidding by the first to become adverse possessor.   
481  Indeed, trademark rights already are potentially unlimited in duration, so long as they 
remain in consistent use.  See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d, 1042, 1046–55 (CCPA 1982) 
(opinions by Judges Rich and Nies concurring in result and reviewing the life-cycle of a trademark 
– beginning with initial use and ending only with abandonment or genericness); see also Daphne 
Leeds, Trademarks – The Rationale of Registrability, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 666 (1958).  
For patents and copyrights, the term may be limited by the language of the constitutional grant of 
power under which these regimes are presently promulgated, wherein Congress is given the power 
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries. 
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.  In contrast the trademark laws are promulgated under the 
general Commerce Clause power of Article 1 that is now recognized to be quite expansive.  
Compare In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 (1879) (holding trademark laws to be improper 
exercise of Commerce Clause power because they regulate activity that is not sufficiently 
interstate) with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that even growing wheat for 
personal consumption in one’s own back yard has sufficient nexus to interstate commerce that it 
may be regulated by Congress using Commerce Clause power).  Thus, the patent and copyright 
could be similarly viewed as at least within Constitutional power if passed pursuant to the same 
commerce clause power.  For an interesting recent treatment of this option see Thomas B. 
Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004).   
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than that in IP because the total subject matter protectable by real and personal 
property is limited – there is only so much stuff and real estate available in the 
world – while the total subject matter protectable by IP rights has a limit that is 
not even known.  Only to the extent we think we are approaching the limit of 
knowable IP subject matter – inventions, creations, and symbols – is the 
restrictive power of IP potentially as great as that for real and personal property. 
Importantly, perpetual property rights in real and personal property is the norm 
precisely because we think that best allows for private actors to consistently 
evaluate and shift real and personal properties towards their highest and best use.  
Just as an empty plot of land is not automatically transferred into a commons for 
lack of use, perhaps neither should IP be left to the commons.  And just as 
concerns about transaction costs or anticommons do not allow the user of a plot of 
land to elect not to treat the claims of labor and suppliers as undue and thereby 
avoidable when building on that plot, such concerns perhaps should not worry 
those wishing to use subject matter covered by IP.   
Nevertheless, earlier work by the present author has identified at least one 
reason why extended term for IP may be problematic.482  But this has nothing to 
do with transaction costs and anticommons but rather with coordination and 
commons.483  The concern is that over time there may become fragmentation of 
ownership.  This is less of a problem for real and personal property than it is for 
IP.  Real and personal property may have private value to co-owners absent 
cooperation by other co-owners, as long as there is not too much interference by 
the co-owners.  For example, one owner may still play baseball on a co-owned 
empty lot without active cooperation from the other co-owners.  Because IP only 
includes the right to exclude, not the right to use, a co-owner may not sue to 
                                                 
 
482  I perhaps incorrectly agreed with concerns in the reward literature about transaction costs 
and anticommons concerns.  Kieff supra note 8, at 734-735 (expanded term may exacerbate 
anticommons problems).  But I also suggested that increasing term might trigger commons 
problems of the very type IP and commercialization are designed to avoid:  
Indeed, the possibility of fragmented ownership presents a particular problem 
for [IP]. The [IP] right is only a right to exclude, not a right to use. In addition, 
each co-owner of a patent can decide not to exclude third parties, by giving a 
partial assignment or license, without accounting to any other coowner.  As a 
result, an assignment by a co-owner will dissipate the entire value of the patent 
for all other owners.  For this reason, it is well recognized that co-ownership in 
patents can create a tragedy of the commons. 
 
Id. at 735 (citing ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1228-36 (2d ed. 1997). 
483  Id.   
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enforce that right without joining in the lawsuit all other co-owners.484  Put 
differently, inaction by a co-owner is tantamount to a free license to the world.   
In the end, the idea of perpetual ownership for IP certainly requires further 
consideration before adoption.  The point of raising it here is because it is helpful 
in elucidating the implications of the commercialization theory in operation.  The 
focus of commercialization is making sure that all of the different complementary 
users of the IP subject matter can coordinate with each other.  It sees the role of IP 
as the focal point, or beacon, that brings these diverse actors together.  At bottom, 
what provides them with incentives to indeed come together is the identification 
of this beacon combined with its exchange attributes:  residual claim, tradability, 
enforceability, and private information.   
(c) Public Choice 
Public choice problems have, at least until recently, almost entirely 
escaped attention in the IP literature.  Nevertheless, public choice problems do 
matter and should be considered because they are linked inextricably to 
government action, and so must be weighed as countervailing considerations to 
the extent regulation is offered as an alternative to IP.485  Indeed, the recent 
recognition of public choice problems in the body of IP literature that discusses 
copyright term extension only scratches the surface.486   
                                                 
484  See, Schering Corp. v. Roussel–UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed.Cir.1997) (‘‘one co-
owner has the right to impede the other co-owner’s ability to sue infringers by refusing to 
voluntarily join in such a suit.’’) 
485  For more on public choice generally see supra Part II.C.3.   
486  The recent IP literature often discusses the recent Copyright Term Extension Act 
(“CTEA”) as an example of public choice pressure from the entertainment industry.  While this 
may be so, it gravely underestimates the public choice problems in IP general, and in copyright in 
particular.  For more on the problems in copyright see the discussion infra Part IV.A.  For 
examples of the public choice view of the CTEA, see, e.g., Free Mickey Mouse: Lawrence Lessig 
Wants Less Copyright Protection, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2002; Michael H. Davis, Extending 
Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I Stayed Too Long?,” 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 1005 (2000) 
(arguing that the CTEA provided “not an incentive, but a gift or windfall”); William Patry, The 
Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
907, 932 (1997) (“[t]he real impetus for term extension” was to benefit “a very small group: 
children and grandchildren of famous composers whose works are beginning to fall into the public 
domain, thereby threatening trust funds”); Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of 
the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 128 (2002) (CTEA “pads the wealth 
of the widows and children of the original copyright holders” and is a “massive giveaway of 
public domain resources”); Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension 
Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 232-36 (2002) (setting forth basic public choice view of 
CTEA). Larry Lessig has gone so far as to refer to the statute itself as the “Mickey Mouse 
Protection Act” in reference to perceived public choice pressure brought by Disney.  Doug Bedell, 
Professor Says Disney, Other Firms Typify What’s Wrong with Copyrights, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, at 3D.   
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For IP, the problems of public choice are quite real.  For example, when 
decisional frameworks in IP have been left open to sui generis determination, as 
opposed to being guided by applicable statutory framework, courts and agencies 
have acted swiftly to eviscerate IP.487  Even if any of market power, transaction 
costs, anticommons, or behavioralism is a concern that ought to drive regulation 
of IP, the central problem that public choice adds to the mix, and one which is 
often overlooked by the literature, is that too often these concerns have been 
invoked in particular cases to restructure particular arrangements ex post for the 
benefit of one particular constituency or set of constituencies.488  Only if the 
government actions called for in the literature were to totally eliminate IP or to 
regulate it through revisions to statutory or regulatory decisional frameworks that 
were sufficiently predictable, would these types of public choice problems be 
potentially mitigated, including their negative impact on ex ante incentives and 
private ordering.   
                                                 
487  Examples in the patent context include the agency and court decisions to prohibit patents 
in software and modern biotechnology, which were finally reversed by later court decisions.  See, 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise 
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer 
program, or digital computer.”) and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–18 (1980) 
(holding living organisms not per se unpatentable).   
488  For at least the computer software example, the agency capture story is well known, 
beginning with the decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding software to be 
not eligible for patent protection).  As described by Judge Rich:   
I find it more significant to contemplate the identities of the troops lined up for 
battle in Benson and observe which side obtained the victory. On the one side 
was the Government, against patenting programs or software, supported by the 
collective forces of major hardware (i.e., computer) manufacturers and their 
representative associations who, for economic reasons, did not want patents 
granted on programs for their machines. On the other side was Benson et al. and 
their assignee and assorted lawyers and legal groups who were in favor of patent 
protection for programs or software. The anti-patenting forces won the victory…  
In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 774 (CCPA 1974), reversed by Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 
(reversing on other grounds than those discussed in the excerpt). The majority opinion in Benson 
relies heavily on the 1966 report by a Presidential Commission on the patent system, which also 
evidenced public choice issues.  As described by former Patent Office Commissioner Gerald 
Mossinghoff:   
The 1966 report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System was 
largely a battle between AT&T, which strongly supported the patenting of 
software, and IBM, which bitterly opposed it. IBM’s position as a mainframe 
manufacturer and seller was that software should be unpatentable and should be 
given away free of charge. AT&T, as primarily a software developer, felt 
precisely the opposite.  
Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of the Software Patent 
Saga, 8 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 307, 336 n.63 (1999) (citing interview with the Honorable Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, in Arlington, Va. (Sept. 13, 
1999)). 
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Put differently, if in any given case a party may invoke concerns about 
market power, transaction costs, anticommons, or behavioralism as a justification 
for avoiding IP, then we should not be surprised to see many cases in which 
parties make precisely such charges, successfully.489  What is most troubling 
about the concerns expressed in the literature about market power, transaction 
costs, anticommons, or behavioralism, is that no attempt is made to suggest a 
decisional framework for determining ex ante when these concerns will be 
enough to trigger government action.  This leaves open the possibility of a return 
to the time when the decisional framework by courts was so obtuse that either no 
IP right could satisfy them,490 or so unpredictably able to be satisfied that the 
effective value of all impacted IP rights simply collapsed towards zero.491   
                                                 
489  See Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem, Hoover Institution Essays on 
Public Policy (1993), 7-13:   
The general rule is that government undertakes an activity that seems desirable 
at the time.  Once the activity begins, whether it proves desirable or not, people 
in both the government and the private sector acquire a vested interest in it.  If 
the initial reason for undertaking the activity disappears, they have a strong 
incentive to find another justification for its continued existence. 
* * * 
Again, let me emphasize, the problem is not that bureaucrats are bad people.  
The problem, as Marxists would say, is with the system, not with the people. 
490  For example, the test for patentability has at different times become so rigid for some 
courts that no patents were held valid within their jurisdiction.  The standard had become so vague 
and yet so difficult to satisfy throughout the U.S. by the early 1940’s that Justice Jackson 
remarked “[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get its hands 
on.”  Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).    Even 
after the statute was amended in response to these cases, the problem persisted in the Second 
Circuit as late as the 1960’s.  See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The Creation of the Federal 
Circuit, in CHISUM ET AL. supra note 5, at 30, 30-31 (former Patent Office Commissioner 
Mossinghoff recounting that during the confirmation hearings for then-Second Circuit Judge 
Thurgood Marshall’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Judge Marshall responded to a question 
about patents by saying “I haven’t given patents much thought, Senator, because I’m from the 
Second Circuit and as you know we don’t uphold patents in the Second Circuit”).  
491  This is in effect the “permit thicket,” “License Raj,” or true anticommons problem 
discussed earlier.  See supra Part II.C.4(b).  The problem is more colorfully described by Dickens 
within the context of IP:   
At the Patent Office in Lincoln’s Inn, they made ‘a draft of the Queens bill’, of 
my invention, and a ‘docket of the bill’. I paid five pound, ten, and six, for this. 
They ‘engrossed two copies of the bill; one for the Signet Office, and one for the 
Privy-Seal Office’. I paid one pound, seven, and six, for this. Stamp duty over 
and above, three pound. The Engrossing Clerk of the same office engrossed the 
Queen’s bill for signature. I paid him one pound, one. Stamp-duty again, one 
pound, ten. I was next to take the Queen’s bill to the Attorney-General again, 
and get it signed again. I took it, and paid five pound more. I fetched it away, 
and took it to the Home Secretary again. He sent it to the Queen again. She 
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At bottom, public choice problems are an important countervailing 
consideration to the regulatory proposals suggested throughout the reward 
literature in response to concerns about IP, including concerns relating to power 
over price, transaction costs, anticommons, or behavioralism.  In the comparative 
institutional analysis, the question to always consider is not merely whether a 
particular problem can be fixed, but rather, all things considered, the state of 
affairs in general is improved by following the particular prescription to fixing 
that particular problem.    
IV. IMPLICATIONS FROM NIE FOR COMPARING IP REGIMES 
While the positive law IP regimes of patent, trademark, and copyright, 
each comprise substantial bodies of law, a thorough discussion of which is 
beyond the scope of this article, several core features of each essentially establish 
the overarching approach to their institutional framework.  The point of the 
discussion here is that these core features have particularly significant 
implications for a comparative institutional analysis across these different 
regimes.   
This comparative institutional analysis employs the central lessons from 
NIE that were explored earlier.492  In summary, these lessons include that property 
rights and IP can provide an important additional and middle-ground tool for 
optional use by individuals engaged in private ordering beyond those offered by 
the extreme poles of either the free, open market without them on the one hand, or 
the hierarchy of family, firm, or government on the other hand.493  To facilitate 
private ordering effectively, IP rights must operate as rights of exclusion around 
which coordination can take place.  To do so efficiently, they must be structured 
to mitigate the costs of rent dissipation, information, transactions, and public 
choice.   
The following comparative outline of the IP regimes suggests that the 
patent and trademark regimes generally function well along these metrics because 
they employ relatively crisp forms of property backed up by property rules, based 
                                                                                                                                     
signed it again. I paid seven pound thirteen, and six, more, for this. I had been 
over a month at Thomas Joy’s. I was quite wore out, patience and pocket. 
Charles Dickens, A Poor Man’s Tale of a Patent, in Charles Dickens and the ‘Poor Man’s Tale of 
a Patent’ 15, 18–19, 29 (Jeremy Phillips ed., 1984) (including appendices about the 
“circumlocution office” described to be “(as everybody knows without being told) the most 
important Department under Government”). 
492  See supra Part II.   
493  For elaboration on the role of property rights as a middle ground see supra notes 144-
146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context 
of the tradeoff between market and firm). See also supra note 267(exploring property rights in the 
context of the tradeoff between market and government).   
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on relatively easy to apply decisional frameworks in their organic statutes on both 
validity and enforceability.  At bottom, these systems facilitate private ordering 
while mitigating social costs by basically operating in accordance with the 
commercialization theory, as discussed above.494  In contrast, the copyright 
regime does not facilitate private ordering, and indeed seems to operate in 
accordance with the dysfunctional reward theories, as also discussed above.495 
Of some note in this comparative institutional analysis is that these 
different IP regimes evolved through remarkably different legislative histories.  
Through what may have been mere historical happenstance,496 the patent and 
trademark regimes both grew out of a concerted effort about the same time, the 
1940’s, by the same bar association, the New York Patent Law Association.497  
Focused not on any particular set of clients, owners or infringers, but rather on 
crafting a coherent system, these efforts produced institutional frameworks that 
generally cohere and as a result are effective and efficient at achieving their core 
goal, which is commercialization, as discussed below.498  In contradistinction, 
statutes shaped through interest group politics, including the copyright statute, are 
plagued by a host of public choice legislative compromises.  The copyright 
regime that resulted from this process turned out to be significantly less effective 
and less efficient in facilitating coordination.  Thus, an important area for further 
research would include a careful comparison of the operative legislative histories 
of these different regimes to determine the reasons why they seemed to have 
taken such different approaches and led to such different results.   
                                                 
494  See supra Part III.C (reviewing commercialization theory).   
495  See supra Part III.A (reviewing reward theories and their limitations).   
496  Id. at 740: 
Heady with success in implementing the Lanham Trademark Act [our present 
trademark system] a few years earlier, in 1948, the New York Patent Law 
Association had Giles Rich draft for introduction in Congress a bill [that 
eventually became the 1952 Patent Act, our present patent system].   
497  The organization is presently called the New York Intellectual Property Law Association.  
For a historical review of the organization see, Gregory J. Battersby, et al, A Seventy-Five Year 
History of NYIPLA, available on-line at http://www.nyipla.org/public/01_history.html.   
498  The point here is not that these statutes are perfect.  The drafters of these statutes, like all 
human beings, are characterized by human foibles including, for example, behavioralism.  Rather, 
the point is that because of the way they were organized during the drafting process, the individual 
incentives they each faced happened to be more consistent with their efforts being directed 
towards drafting a statute that coherently achieved the coordination function to which they had 
subscribed than with their efforts being directed towards helping any one class of client.  At a 
minimum, they were largely isolated from public choice pressures.   
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A. The Basics of Positive Law IP Regimes  
As explored in earlier work by the present author, the positive law rules 
for enforcing and obtaining patents are effective and efficient in achieving 
coordination benefits while minimizing social costs.499  Coordination is needed 
for inventions because their commercialization is a costly, risky, and complex 
process in which second-mover advantages can dominate, and which requires 
many diverse actors besides inventors, including, for example, capitalists, 
developers, laborers, managers, and advertisers.500   
The rules for enforcing patents facilitate coordination among all of these 
individuals by helping the patent itself serve as a coordinating focal point, or 
beacon around which to gather.501  This beacon effect is achieved by allowing 
patentees to elect to sue or license502 anyone who directly infringes,503 induces 
infringement,504 or contributes to infringement.505  Of course, money often can be 
made best by avoiding lawsuits, and instead negotiating against the backdrop of 
their threat.  And the diverse contracting that is facilitated by these positive law 
rules is important for pushing output of the patented invention towards the full 
competitive level.506   
The positive law rules for obtaining patents mitigate social costs in several 
respects.  The disclosure rules facilitate this private ordering by giving public 
                                                 
499  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8 (exploring law and economics of 
positive law rules for enforcing patents); Kieff Registering Patents supra note 8 (exploring law 
and economics of positive law rules for obtaining patents).   
500  Id. supra note 8 at 707-08 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
PUB. NO. OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 
3, 20-96 (1995) (collecting sources and setting forth as principle findings and describing in detail 
how successful commercialization is not simply a matter of developing technology first or getting 
to market first and instead requires intellectual property protection to create an environment 
conducive to securing complimentary assets, skills, capital, manufacturing, marketing, and 
support)).   
501  See supra note 398 (discussing focal point or beacon effect of patents).   
502  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 736-38.  Before the 1952 Act, 
courts had used the misuse doctrine to erode the ability for intellectual property owners to price 
discriminate or engage in restricting licensing.  Section 271(d) expressly states that such conduct 
shall not be misuse.  See also Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) 
(recognizing impact of Section 271(d) and its reason for inclusion in the 1952 Patent Act).  To be 
certain this was clear, Congress acted again in 1988 by adding subparts 4 and 5 to Section 271(d) 
of the Patent Act to expressly provide that neither a refusal to license nor a tying arrangement in 
the absence of market power is patent misuse.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5) (added by Pub. L. No. 
100-703, 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988)).   
503  Section 271(a) (direct infringement).   
504  Section 271(b) (inducement of infringement).   
505  Section 271(c) (contributory infringement).   
506  The diverse contracting that is allowed facilitates both price discrimination and 
coordination among complementary users.  See, Kieff & Paredes, supra note 427 at 9-11.   
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notice of the property right.507  They also help protect third parties’ reasonable 
investment backed expectations by helping these third parties to avoid inadvertent 
trespass.508  Third parties’ reasonable investment backed expectations also are 
protected by the rules about patentability over the prior art, which protect any 
verifiably prior investments.509  Importantly, these patentability rules are all 
enforced with rules biased in such a way that they involve remarkably low 
administrative, public choice, and both Type I and Type II error costs.510   Indeed, 
because patentees are the ones who are lowest cost processors of the information 
needed to assess validity information costs are mitigated when property the 
owners themselves are given such strong incentives to make these determinations, 
and recent empirical models suggest these incentives do work.511  As elucidated 
by Anderson & Hill, this type of owner-driven system for establishing property 
rights tailor-made to the needs of the owners is the best candidate for mitigating 
the rent-dissipation that otherwise can accompany the establishment of property 
rights.512   
When put to the test in practice, patent law seems to work.  For example, 
the 1980 shift in positive patent law that opened patents to the field of modern 
biotechnology is at least consistent with the conclusion that patents do indeed 
work to facilitate coordination.  Only in the U.S. and only since 1980 have patents 
been available in modern biotechnology.513  And only in the U.S. and only since 
1980 has the biotechnology industry been characterized by not only the large 
companies often collectively called “Big Pharma,” but also by a steady pool of 
roughly 1,400 small and medium-sized companies that is also consistently turning 
over.514   
                                                 
507  See Kieff Registering Patents supra note 8, at 99-105.   
508  See Id.  
509  See Id. at 76-99.   
510  See, F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex 
Technological Questions of Patentability over the Prior Art, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON 
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125 (2003).   
511  See AMALIA YIANNAKA & MURRAY FULTON, PRIVATELY OPTIMAL PATENT BREADTH 
UNDER THE THREAT OF PATENT VALIDITY CHALLENGES, presented to the 8th International 
Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology Research (ICABR): International Trade and Domestic 
Production, held in Ravello (Italy), July 8-11, 2004 (available on-line at 
http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/conferenze/icabr2004/papers/Yiannaka.A.pdf) (showing how 
patentees integrate concerns about validity challenges into their own decision-making ex ante).   
512  See Anderson & Hill, supra note 271, at 443 (showing how less centralization in the 
definition and enforcement property rights helps to improve efficiency by avoiding rent 
dissipation).   
513  See Kieff supra note 473 (discussing shifts in positive law).   
514  The increase in small and medium sized firms, which is unique to the U.S., after the 
addition of patents in the U.S., is consistent with the antimonopoly power of patents explored 
earlier.  See supra Part III.C.3(a).   
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To be sure, the patent regime is not without problems.  Indeed, several 
recent areas of patent law provide comparatively poorer mixes of cost and benefit.  
For example, overhaul to the statutory regime governing the interaction between 
patent law and Food and Drug law called the Hatch-Waxman Act515 raises a host 
of public choice, administrative, and market power problems.516  Also, the 
uncertainty governing the process of patent claim construction may be frustrating 
the patent system’s important ex ante incentives for private ordering by both 
patentees and infringers.517  In addition, the increasing reliance in infringement 
matters on the doctrine of equivalents is similarly frustrating the patent system’s 
important ex ante incentives for private ordering by both patentees and 
infringers.518  Lastly, the recent trend by the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division to pursue actions against patentees on 
so-called “upstream” technologies in the name of mitigating problems of market 
power, transaction costs, and anticommons problems, are actually evidence of 
agency capture that can not only frustrate market entry but also upsets private 
ordering overall, as all players in the market realize over time that terms like 
“upstream” and “downstream” are so relative that they simply may be synonyms 
for “things to be bought” and “things to be sold” by any private party able to gain 
the agency’s attention.519  But each of these bodies of contemporary patent law 
                                                 
515  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (1984), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. 156 & 271.   
516  See, e.g., FTC report entitled “Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration” (July 2002) 
(describing problems with Hatch-Waxman Act and collecting sources).   
517  For an excellent collection of recent empirical work on claim construction by R. Polk 
Wagner, see www.claimconstruction.com.   Importantly, the uncertainty here is not the 
individualized uncertainty associated with what some see as high reversal rates on appeal but 
rather the lack of coherence, or predictability, that the entire body of claim construction law seems 
to be generating.  Ironically, the empirical work by Wagner suggests that although the body of 
legal rubrics that are available for claim construction may not yield predictability, simply knowing 
the identities of the members of the appellate panel at the Federal Circuit may yield at least case 
specific predictability at the time of oral argument.   
518  The point here is that patentees may be able to gain more flexibility in claim scope while 
at the same time providing more certainty to infringers by relying on the established disclosure 
rules of Section 112 than on the doctrine of equivalents.  See Kieff supra note 14, at 8-9 
(discussing Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 1153, 117 S.Ct. 
1352 (1997) (holding that patent claims that are not infringed literally may still be infringed under 
the judge-made rule called the “doctrine of equivalents” to allow patentees flexibility) and Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002) 
(holding that the doctrine of equivalents is cabined by the judge-made rule called “prosecution 
history estoppel” to allow third parties more certainty in knowing what will infringe a patent)).     
519  For an excellent and easily accessible review of such recent FTC activities see Stanley M. 
Gorinson, James L. Ewing, IV, and Peter M. Boyle, Federal Antitrust Enforcers Focus on 
Intellectual Property Abuses, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW TODAY 38 (Aug. 2003) (discussing 
Rambus and Unocal cases).  For more detailed discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the 
problem with these actions see Kieff & Paredes supra note 427.   
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could, and should, be reversed, through case or statute, as appropriate; and indeed 
none was provided for in the institutional framework of the 1952 Patent Act, 
itself.  Put differently, the patent system of yesterday may be better in several 
respects than the patent system of today.   
As also explored in earlier work by the present author, the positive law 
rules for enforcing and obtaining trademarks are also effective and efficient in 
achieving coordination benefits while minimizing social costs.520  Coordination is 
needed for the symbols protected by trademarks because the commercialization of 
these symbols is also a costly, risky, and complex process in which second-mover 
advantages can dominate and which requires many diverse actors besides the one 
first making appropriate use of the symbol in commerce, including for example, 
capitalists, business partners, and advertisers.521   
The rules for enforcing and determining validity of trademarks facilitate ex 
ante private ordering because, as with patents, they turn on facts equally 
knowable to all market actors in advance.522  Also as with patents, the rules 
allowing the trademark holder to elect to sue or license anyone who would be 
guilty of direct, contributory, or induced infringement are important in ensuring 
that use of the protected subject matter is pushed towards fully competitive 
levels.523  In addition, as with patents, the validity and disclosure rules of 
trademark help protect third party investments, both ex ante, and ex post.  For 
example, ex ante investments are protected through rule giving a cause of action 
to a prior user of a mark that is made famous by a subsequent user.524  Similarly, 
ex post investments are protected by the limited scope of trademark rights in the 
first instance by, for example, the doctrine that prevents trademark rights from 
                                                 
520  Kieff supra note 8 at 751-754 (exploring law and economics of positive law rules for 
obtaining and enforcing trademarks and their role in commercialization).   
521  Id.   
522  Key evidence typically takes the form of survey data from ordinary customers.   
523  Because the need to make commercial use of the subject matter protected by trademarks 
is less compelling than for patents – because functionality is a bar to trademark protection – the 
impact of any remaining distortion caused by market power is less severe.  That is, there is still the 
potential for static economic dead weight loss, but the alternative moral claims about output 
effects are mitigated.   
524  See, e.g., Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th 
Cir. 1977) (protecting small prior user’s mark using theory sometimes called “reverse confusion” 
because the public is lead to confuse the first-user’s mark with the more famous second-user’s 
mark and think that the first is the second rather than the more typical confusion case in which a 
second user’s mark is confused with that of a first user).  In some cases, both users may be 
allowed to operate in different markets.  See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 
904 (7th Cir.1968) (holding that the national chain Burger King is allowed exclusive use the mark 
throughout the nation except in the town of Matoon, IL, where a prior user in that particular 
location is allowed to continue exclusive use).   
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covering functional elements.525  And as with patents, the contours of the rights 
staked out by trademarks are largely set by the rights-holders themselves, which 
mitigates the rent dissipation that otherwise can accompany the establishment of 
property rights.526   
While the trademark system generally works well in facilitating 
coordination over non-functional aspects of products and services, several recent 
changes in trademark law have eroded this function in important ways.  Consider 
for example, the recent Dastar decision to substantially limit false advertising 
claims as a matter of law when they touch on subject matter that relates to other 
IP regimes,527 as well as the recent Moseley decision to limit dilution causes of 
action to cases of actual dilution rather than also including likelihood of 
dilution.528   
The approach the Court took in Dastar runs the risk of eviscerating as a 
matter of judge-made law the carefully crafted balance struck by the legal 
institutional framework set forth in the Lanham Act.529  The Court’s approach 
interferes with private ordering by both producers (who can no longer bring 
causes of action that are important for coordination) and by consumers (who lose 
the benefit of truthful advertising for planning and making purchase decisions).530   
The approach the Court took in Moseley also runs the risk of eviscerating 
as a matter of judge-made law the carefully crafted balance struck by the legal 
institutional framework associated with the Lanham Act.531  Limiting causes of 
action for dilution to cases in which actual dilution has occurred may eliminate 
                                                 
525  See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) 
(Rich, J.) (reviewing functionality doctrine and collecting sources). 
526  See Anderson & Hill, supra note 271, at 443 (showing how less centralization in the 
definition and enforcement property rights helps to improve efficiency by avoiding rent 
dissipation).   
527  See Kieff supra note 14, at 1722-26 (discussing Dastar decision).   
528  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 115 (2003) (interpreting statute to be 
limited to causes of action for only actual dilution, not likelihood of dilution, which is in contrast 
to the causes of action available for confusion that include both those for likelihood of confusion 
and actual confusion).   
529  See Kieff supra note 14, at 1722-26.  More recently, Laura Heymann has provided an 
excellent and detailed treatment of the importance of allowing trademark-type false advertising 
causes of action relating to potentially copyrighted works.  See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of 
the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, The George Washington 
University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 101, forthcoming at 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (2005).   
530  Id.   
531  Although not expressly set forth in the statute itself, dilution was very much part of the 
institution of trademark law associated with the Lanham Act. Compare Sara Stadler Nelson, The 
Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003) (criticizing the long 
persistence of dilution in the institution of trademark law since just before the framing of the 
Lanham Act).   
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the effectiveness of the cause of action for dilution.  Eliminating dilution would 
frustrate the coordination benefits of trademarks by providing marginally 
decreased protection for exactly those marks around which coordination and 
commercialization were marginally most successful.532   Protecting these marks in 
this way recognizes that individuals sometimes are motivated to buy simply by 
fashion concerns – such as to appear a certain way, to appear to be motivated in a 
certain way – rather than by concerns about source of a particular good or 
service.533  That is, availability of a dilution cause of action makes it profitable for 
firms to invest in making marks fashion statements in their own right.534  In turn, 
these marks offer consumers the opportunity to make the ultimate consumption 
choice – to buy with frivolity what simply is desired but not needed.535   
As there is no suggestion in the Court’s opinions or elsewhere that 
Congress lacks sufficient power to promulgate a statute that could be worded 
slightly differently so as effectively to overrule both Dastar and Moseley, 
coordination concerns suggest such an effort may be well worth perusing.  Indeed, 
it would bring these two areas of trademark law back into conformity with the 
                                                 
532  See Kieff supra note 8, at 752-53.  As pointed out by Judges Rich and Nies, two leading 
scholars of both the history and theory of trademark law, there is not and should not be any 
principle of trademark law that requires imposition of a penalty for the originality, creativeness, 
attractiveness, uniqueness, or even fame of one’s product.  In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 
1046-55 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (opinions of Judge Rich and Judge Nies concurring separately in result).  
They note that the opposite rule  
has led courts to an esoteric and extraneous inquiry focusing on what motivates 
the purchasing public to buy particular goods, the product itself or the source. . . 
. The reason the public is motivated to buy the product . . . is of concern to 
market researchers but is legally immaterial to the issue of whether a particular 
designation is generic…. It would be unfortunate were we to discourage use of a 
spark of originality which would transform an ordinary product into one of 
grace. 
 Id.   
533  See supra note 91 (discussing fashion).   
534  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 8, at 752-53 (noting that “the amount 
of investing in potentially famous marks will rise” and citing William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 304 (1988)).   
535  Id., at 753.   To be sure, it is recognized that the consumers might argue that because their 
collective attention in the mark is at least as responsible for the mark’s fashion status, the mark 
should be owned by them, not the one commercializing the mark.  Id., (citing Jessica Litman, 
Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1730).  
The commercialization theory, however, explains that it makes sense to treat the mark as private 
property owned by the one who engaged in commercialization because such treatment facilitates 
the coordination necessary to promote the mark to this level of recognition.  Nevertheless, it also 
is recognized that investments of this type – by both producers and consumers – have their own 
opportunity costs.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, supra note 303 
(pointing out in the context of copyrights that there may be too much investment of this type).   
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institutional framework associated with the Lanham Act as framed.536  Such 
changes would also further the coordination goals of the system.  Put differently, 
as with the patent system, the trademark system of yesterday may be better in 
several respects than the trademark system of today.   
In contrast to patents and trademarks, the basic statutory scheme for 
copyrights grew out of a classic public choice bargain among large interest 
groups.  These groups have regularly returned to the legislative process to re-
shape the framework and reach new compromises each time technology or other 
factors sufficiently have changed the interests of those groups.537  While such an 
approach does do a reasonable job integrating into the statute many of the 
collective preferences of those present in the negotiations at that time, it does less 
well integrating concerns of others, or even of the same parties at later times.538  
More specifically, as the basic economics of the drafting constituencies’ 
businesses change over time due to changing technologies, norms, etc., it should 
not be surprising that each iteration of the legislative bargain often will be too 
intensely focused on responding to prior allocations.  That is, there is a lag 
between the change in technology and the change in economics and a subsequent 
                                                 
536  For a review of the history of the institution of trademark law associated with the Lanham 
Act, see, e.g., Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks--From 
Signals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks 
and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1979); 
and Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks--Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551 (1969).   
537  See generally, Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, 23, 135-63 (2001) (reviewing “unique” 
public choice history of copyright and explaining how since 1909 all but two of the frequent 
revisions to copyright law were essentially written by collective bargaining among some of the 
impacted industries and citing the following as the only two exceptions: (1) The Computer 
Software Copyright Act of 1980, Sec. 10, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, which revised 
Section 117 to expressly extend copyright protection to computer programs on the 
recommendation of the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU), a committee of experts focused on copyrights in computer software; and (2) The 
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, which amended Section 110(5) to limit the number of institutions 
required to pay performance royalties for nondramatic musical works)).  See also, Niels 
Schaumann, Intellectual Property Symposium: The Impact of the United States Supreme Court on 
Intellectual Property This Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1617,  1619, n.8 (citing same 
two exceptions).  Even these two revisions that putatively did not emerge directly from interest 
group pressures may themselves have been driven by concerns for interest groups.  For example, I 
thank Mike Meurer for pointing out the interest Congress may have had in appearing to be 
sensitive to the needs of small restaurants and coffee shops when passing The Fairness in Music 
Licensing Act of 1998.  See also, David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA 
L. REV. 1233, 1281 (arguing that the statute “smacks of special interest legislation for the benefit 
of a defined class”).   
538  In part this is a race to the bottom story and so does not argue that such a process will 
always yield this bad result but rather it explains how one contributing factor may have played a 
role in this case.   
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lag between the change in economics and efforts to renegotiate the legislative 
bargain.  This is an important difference between the drafting approach used for 
the patent and trademark regimes on the one hand and the copyright regime on the 
other and this difference leads to comparatively greater public choice costs for the 
copyright regime as well as comparatively less ex ante coordination benefit.   
But more important than this historical explanation for how the copyright 
regime came to fare comparatively less well than the patent and trademark 
regimes, a comparative institutional economic analysis of the regimes themselves 
shows why the copyright regime does fare less well.  On this measure, as 
described more fully below, copyright is less successful in achieving coordination 
benefit because it is too clumsy in operation.  What is more, the copyright regime 
may not be needed to achieve coordination benefits in the first place, at least for 
the entertainment industry.  Put differently, the copyright regime may seen as 
resembling a bridge over a river that is not only redundant of other crossings, but 
that also has essentially collapsed under its own weight.   
Copyright is famously difficult to understand, even for business actors 
within the system.539  Even though copyright involves assets over which private 
parties are more informed than government actors (and so property rules dominate 
liability rules)540 the system employs a host of liability rules, as well as exceptions 
to infringement (such as fair use and home recording for self use and for 
distribution to friends and family) and exceptions to those exceptions (such as the 
Napster case holding liability for sharing with peers where done over the 
internet).541   
In addition, evolved rules on preemption and misuse leave property 
owners unclear as to what coordinating deals can be struck.542  That is, taking the 
strong form of the preemption arguments at face value would suggest that efforts 
to sell songs through services like i-Tunes under contracts limiting subsequent 
distribution may be trying to impose acceptance of restrictive contract terms that 
are as a matter of law preempted and therefore void as against public policy.543  
Then, taking the strong form of the misuse arguments at face value such an effort 
                                                 
539  According to Rob Glaser, Chairman of the company MusicNet, “It’s as if Franz Kafka 
designed this system and employed Rube Goldberg as is architect.”  Amy Harmon, Copyright 
Hurdles Confront Selling of Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at C1.   
540  See supra notes 328-344, and accompanying text (discussing relative roles of property 
rules and liability rules).   
541  Consider compulsory licensing at positive rates in many areas like re-transmissions 
(Sections 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122) and jukeboxes (Section 116).  Also consider compulsory 
licensing for free for those uses determined to be fair (Section 107 on Fair Use and Section 122 on 
copies for the blind).   
542  See Kieff supra note 14, at 5-7 (discussing preemption); Kieff & Paredes supra note 427 
(discussing misuse).  
543  See Kieff supra note 14, at 5-7 (discussing preemption).   
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to impose illegal terms in a contract over material that relates to copyright would 
constitute misuse of a type that would at a minimum make any otherwise valid IP 
rights involved in the transaction unenforceable and at a maximum subject the one 
imposing the contract terms to antitrust liability including, potentially, treble 
damages and attorney fees.544   
Even the rules on validity and scope of copyright itself are comparatively 
murky.545  What is more, unlike for patents and trademarks, they essentially are 
set as immutable rules (not even default rules) through the central regime rather 
than by the individual claimants, and therefore are most likely to be associated 
with rent-dissipation.546   
The mere fact that cases like Napster and Aimster were brought is 
evidence that the regime simply is failing to allow sufficient private ordering to 
occur to meet new customer needs.547  Cases like this can be seen as evidence of 
large numbers of consumers manifesting some willingness to pay some positive 
price by going through the hassle costs of participating in the services but electing 
instead to pay no monetary price because no effective sales venue was provided.  
Put differently, these cases can be seen as evidence of producers being motivated 
not to sell in these markets at least in part by the fear that such business models 
would not be afforded legal protection, and instead might generate legal liability 
under doctrines of misuse or antitrust.548  Indeed, for some time the fear of 
rampant copying by consumers has driven producers to seek and obtain statutory 
changes providing criminal liability for copyright infringement in certain 
circumstances.  The fear of this criminal liability imposes an added cost on 
consumers.   
                                                 
544  See Kieff & Paredes supra note 427 (discussing misuse).  
545  Consider, for example, the murky rules about what constitutes a derivative work or an 
adaptation.  Also consider the basic question of whether putative copyright subject matter is 
protectable expression or unprotectable idea.  On the difficulty with the so-called idea/expression 
dichotomy, see Gregory Aharonian, Problems with Copyright and Trade Dress, available on-line 
at http://www.patenting-art.com/copyprob/cpyqst-e.htm (quoting F. Scott Kieff at the conferences 
“Promoting Markets in Creativity: Copyright in the Internet Age” held June 10, 2003 in 
Washington, D.C. (“The ‘idea/expression’ dichotomy is so ill-defined that lawyers have no idea 
how to express it”)).   
546  See supra notes 512 & 526, and accompanying text (similarities in approaches for patents 
and trademarks).   
547  See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (suit 
against service that facilitated peer to peer sharing of copyrighted music); In re: Aimster Copyright 
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (same). 
548  To be sure, other motivations such as fear of copying also operate here.  Therefore, an 
important area of further research would include a determination of which motivations are 
operating and to what extent, such as through the gathering of empirical evidence of legal 
positions explored by players in this industry.  Gathering such data is likely to face several 
obstacles, however, because it seeks to elucidate information that would be both protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and potentially very damaging.   
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At bottom, the uncertainty, coordination, administrative, and public choice 
costs associated with the copyright system may be operating to frustrate its ability 
to facilitating coordination through private ordering.  At the same time, these 
same features of the regime impose remarkably high costs on both consumers and 
producers.   For producers, costs include the risk of antitrust liability.  For 
consumers, costs include the inability to gain access to copyrighted works as well 
as the threat of criminal sanction.   
B. Beginning the Case against Copyright  
There are several important differences between the institutional 
economics of the patent and trademark regimes on the one hand and the copyright 
regime on the other.  While the patent and trademark regimes achieve 
coordination benefit with low social cost, as designed, the copyright system has 
grown largely out of collective bargaining as a descriptive matter while being 
motivated by reward theories as a normative matter.  The present copyright 
regime does reward many of the constituencies present in the legislative 
bargaining, but it fails to achieve effective coordination because of excessive 
uncertainty and regulation.  The basic differences between the approach of patents 
and trademarks on the one hand and copyrights on the other hand, suggest the 
possibility that the types of coordination needed for at least the entertainment 
industry may be facilitated sufficiently without a copyright regime at all, as long 
as well functioning trademark and patent regimes are present.   
Key to the proposed model industrial organization system for the 
entertainment industry, such as publishing, film, and television, is the realization 
that commercialization costs today in the entertainment industry are largely those 
associated with advertising, reputation, and business networks.  Due to 
technological changes, physical plant costs of distributing in this industry need 
not be as large as before.549  Yet, as discussed earlier, trademark law works well 
to allow some coordination and some pricing above marginal cost of the type 
necessary to facilitate commercialization of goods and services facing such 
reputation and network costs.  Thus, as discussed below, a model approach might 
be suggested under which the industry would rely essentially on trademarks (and 
to some extant patents) rather than copyrights.  Put differently, the model begins 
the conversation of a modest proposal: 550 for the entertainment industry to reply 
trademarks and patents instead of copyrights.   
                                                 
549  An internet server of sufficient bandwidth will be sufficient if advertising and other 
network costs have been effectively deployed.   
550  It is recognized that the proposal is more extreme than modest, just as was Jonathan 
Swift’s “modest proposal” that the problems of Irish poverty be solved through the sale of Irish 
babies as food for the wealthy English, JONATHAN SWIFT, A Modest Proposal, in GULLIVER’S 
TRAVELS AND OTHER WRITINGS 439, 441 (L. Landa ed. 1960).  A less extreme proposal is Marie 
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Implementing effective coordination in the entertainment industry absent 
copyright may be conceivable.  First, major advances in these industries, although 
likely rare, would be eligible for patent protection (a new projector, a new chord, 
etc).551   Second, while non-commercial infringements may not be actionable 
under trademark law,552 content providers can adapt to nevertheless make 
coordination and commercialization profitable against the backdrop of effective 
trademark protections.  For example, trademark suits would be viable against 
commercial infringers.  To the extent needed, these rights can be strengthened by 
re-instating dilution law, or by reversing Moseley.553   
Content providers may be able to take several different steps that in 
concert with consumer prescriptive norms and preferences may yield a landscape 
of descriptive norms in which coordination and commercialization are profitable.  
First, as Demsetz pointed out, private producers can produce public goods 
efficiently given the ability to exclude non-purchasers, and price discrimination is 
consistent with competitive equilibrium for such public goods.554  That is, content 
providers can establish networks that sell, or even give away, content along with 
other bundled goods and services, such as updates,555 replacements, library 
management tools and services, etc.556  By effectively educating consumers on 
such practical, commercial, benefits of purchasing through licensed sources, 
content providers may be able to maintain profitable networks.  Indeed, further 
strengthening of the content provider’s position – and further protection of 
consumers – may be obtained by reversing Dastar’s elimination of certain false 
advertising suits.557  
                                                                                                                                     
Antoinette’s “let them eat cake” remark offered in response to inability for the impoverished 
population in France to afford even bread.   
Legend has it that as the people were rioting in the streets in Paris just before the 
French Revolution, Marie Antoinette turned to her assistant and asked, “What is 
wrong? Why are the people fighting in the streets?” “They have no bread to eat, 
your majesty” came the response. “No bread?” gasped Marie. “Let them eat 
cake.” 
Molly Townes O’Brien, Questioning the Power of Consumerism to Reform Public Education, 75 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 233, n.1 (2001) (“The story is said to have originated with Jean Jacques 
Rousseau in his Confessions, Book 6 (1782) and is generally understood to be fictional.”).   
551  See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 5, at 728-828 (discussing statutory subject matter).   
552  That is, file sharing will still likely occur.   
553  See supra note 528.   
554  See Kieff supra note 8, at 727 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public 
Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970)). 
555  This method is used frequently for software.   
556  Apple I-tunes is one approach to selling.  The Wallmart approach is more like bundling 
since they are (supposedly) selling below cost and so are essentially bundling with advertising in 
much the same way that Demsetz suggested that television signals could be bundled with 
advertising.   
557  See supra note 527.   
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Second, the role of consumer norms must not be overlooked.558  If artists 
and publishers make clear which works are “authorized” and therefore associated 
with some pay-back to the originators of the work, then the customers may be 
willing to pay more for those works.  Again, at the very least, suits under 43(a) 
will be available against commercial competitors, even when there is only falsity, 
as opposed to confusion as to source.  In much the same way that cult followings 
like to support their object of allegiance, general consumer norms may – at least 
at the right prices – be willing to pay simply to support their preferred performers 
and distributors.559 Indeed, much of the direct income generation that already 
occurs in the entertainment industry is based on marketing of products and 
services that are only linked to core content, a strategy known as 
“merchandizing.”  The ability to capture revenues though such tying, however, 
requires the availability of suits for false advertising and dilution, as well complex 
contractual arrangements.  Importantly, transaction costs are lower when tying is 
done through merchandizing or through advertising (as is done with broadcast 
television content that is itself provided for “free” when tied to the sale of 
advertising time).  Instead of the content provider having to transact directly with 
each user, the transaction can be with the tied merchandisers or advertisers.   
At bottom, the analysis offered here is designed to explore a hypothetical 
industrial organization model under which coordination may be achieved for 
entertainment industry by using the regimes of trademark and perhaps patent; but 
not copyright.  Such a model may be associated with lower social costs than the 
present copyright system.  If so, then the participants in this industry can get 
more, at lower cost, by eschewing, or perhaps even jettisoning, copyright. 
To be sure, the model offered here is only a model, and only of most 
relevance for an industry where the commercialization costs are largely those 
associated with advertising, reputation, and networks, such as the entertainment 
industry.  As a result, a number of areas of further study must be considered 
before the model could even be tested seriously.  For example, a comparative 
study of the relative importance of trademark and false advertising rights as 
compared with copyright rights to established networks in the real world would 
provide some insight as to the model’s practical appeal.   
In addition, objections to the model may include pointing out that even on 
its own terms it does little to address the copyright needs of low volume 
industries, such as sculptors and painters.   While reputational effects help in 
those sectors, absent copyright, they may not be sufficient to drive trademark and 
false advertising issues, particularly with regard to the type of factual data about 
                                                 
558  For more on norms see supra Part II.C.1.   
559  Compare, Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives 
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004) (suggesting that authors may respond particularly well to 
reputation incentives).   
KIEFF NIE & THE CASE AGAINST COPYRIGHT  117 
 
overall consumer behavior that are needed to mount a successful case using those 
causes of action.  Nevertheless, reputational effects may be sufficient to drive 
other methods through which income can be extracted such as the selling of 
authentic signatures on mementos or authentic artifacts associated with the works 
of art.  For example, both of these techniques have been employed by the artists 
Christo and Jeanne-Claude, whose works themselves – such as the wrapping of 
the Reichstag, which culminated in a pubic display in 1995 – are simply not able 
to be sold.560   
Before the model could be implemented in a working legal system a 
number of additional obstacles would also need to be overcome.  For example, as 
indicated in the model itself, the trademark system would need to be rolled back 
to the way it was before Dastar and Mosley – both false advertising and dilution 
would be needed.  In addition, a number of administrative and public choice costs 
are raised by the need to determine the carve-out from copyright that the model 
proposes for certain industries.   
Importantly, the model is not so much offered as the beginning of the end 
of copyright; but rather as a tool for elucidating some highlights of the differences 
in institutional frameworks between the major positive law IP regimes.  If nothing 
else, it is hoped that the present study elucidates the tie between social costs and 
reward theories that is emblematical of the copyright system.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The complexity of modern copyright may frustrate the ability of the 
system to achieve the coordination benefits IP rights can deliver, and that patents 
and trademarks generally do deliver.  This same complexity of modern copyright 
causes the costs of the copyright system to be remarkably high.  A radical 
conclusion would be that the case today for copyright simply fails.  A more 
modest conclusion would be that the comparative institutional analysis explored 
in this paper shows how copyright may be become more obsolete in view of 
patent and trademark if copyright were to become even more complex than it 
already is.  Although it seems radical, the elimination of copyright may not be bad 
for the central constituents involved with modern copyright – producers and 
consumers.  Indeed, these same market actors may find their own norms – extant 
or potential – may be combined with the institutions of trademark and patent, at 
least as they recently existed, to become both more effective and less expensive in 
facilitating the private ordering that is necessary for the commercialization of 
creative works.   
                                                 
560  See The Art of Christo and Jeanne-Claude, available on-line at 
http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/ (web site authorized by the artists).   
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Several core lessons can be drawn from the analysis offered here.  NIE 
teaches that the details of different institutional choices matter in that they have 
different implications for a large number of costs and problems.  Using the 
lessons from NIE this paper elucidates how many of the problems that have 
attracted attention in the IP literature turn out to be properly viewed as inapposite, 
overstated, or even having implications opposite of those offered by the literature.  
The paper elucidates how property rights in IP can provide an important 
additional and middle-ground tool for optional use by individuals engaged in 
private ordering beyond those offered by the extreme poles of either the free, open 
market without them on the one hand or the hierarchy of family, firm, or 
government on the other hand.561  The paper also shows how IP rights must be 
designed to facilitate private ordering if they are to play this role effectively.  That 
is, IP rights must operate as rights of exclusion around which coordination can 
take place.  To do so efficiently, they must be structured to mitigate the costs of 
rent dissipation, information, transactions, and public choice.  By elucidating how 
at least the patent and trademark systems of yesterday operated to achieve 
commercialization effectively and efficiently, the paper thereby offers an 
overarching normative case for IP.  The paper also elucidates why institutional 
choices for IP regimes that have been motivated by other theories of IP have been 
both less effective and less efficient.   
At bottom, the paper shows how the set of tools from NIE can be used to 
conduct comparative analyses of institutional options for IP.  It is hoped the 
approaches offered here help frame debates over future choices for these regimes.   
 
* * * * * 
 
                                                 
561  For elaboration on the role of property rights as a middle ground see supra notes 144-
146, 163-171, 173-178, and 250, and accompanying text (exploring property rights in the context 
of the tradeoff between market and firm). See also supra note 267(exploring property rights in the 
context of the tradeoff between market and government).   
